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Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] 75%/95% threshold for transaction versions
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> On 27 Apr 2015, at 21:21, Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org> wrote:
>=20
> Even right now there are edge cases without
> good solutions, like how in a multisig environment any of the key
> holders can mutate transactions.
Can't we add requirement for RFC6979 signatures to mitigate this? Of =
course, multiple signers can still mutate transaction by choosing a =
different set (but not the order, thankfully) of signatures. Or when a =
single signer has multiple participating keys.
In some interesting to me scenarios mutation by signer is not critical: =
it is mutation by non-signers that creates a problem. Do you know of any =
edge cases when non-signers can mutate transactions which are not =
covered by BIP62? What would be a more robust approach than =
"whack-a-mole" to work around mutability? (Normalized tx ids?)=
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