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To: Andrew <onelineproof@gmail.com>
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Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Selfish Mining Prevention
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> Also with merge mining and proof of space we can be quite efficient in the=
future.
Proof of memory (space) is just proof of work with extra steps. It does not r=
educe energy consumption.
https://github.com/libbitcoin/libbitcoin/wiki/Proof-of-Memory-Facade
Merge mining is non-dedicated cost, so also does not improve energy efficien=
cy. The irreducible *cost* is what matters.
https://github.com/libbitcoin/libbitcoin/wiki/Dedicated-Cost-Principle
e
On Sep 17, 2018, at 06:18, Andrew <onelineproof@gmail.com> wrote:
>> I see what you say, however, since the proposal as I have read it says "A=
nd this will keep happening as long as hashrate keeps rising," - what actual=
ly happens in the case hashrate stagnates or falls?
>=20
> In general, a target hashrate can be set by users (can be less or more
> than the peak hashrate). As long as hashrate is rising and still
> didn't reach the target, miners will incrementally get the reserve
> fees. Once the "contract" times out, the remaining part can be used as
> fees by the users who created the reserve fee "contract". So if
> hashrate remains the same or falls, then users get the reserve fees
> back.
>=20
> I agree that we can't stop people from being greedy. If they are not
> Bitcoin mining, they will try to put their energy to earn in some
> other way...The hashrate is related the demand for Bitcoin (price) and
> the amount of fees/subsidies the miners will get paid. For every level
> of mining rewards (based on demand) there exists a limit on the
> hashrate. Once hashrate gets large enough, no new miners (additional
> hashrate) will want to join since their share of the hashrate is too
> small to make a profit.
>=20
> Also with merge mining and proof of space we can be quite efficient in
> the future. But of course I sympathize with the "don't be greedy"
> philosophy, and it can be good to educate people to use less resources
> than they need, just I think it's a bit outside of the scope of what
> the Bitcoin software protocol does.
--Apple-Mail-91325BF3-CD92-46DC-87B1-1970AE8AA93C
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3D=
utf-8"></head><body dir=3D"auto"><div></div><div><span style=3D"background-c=
olor: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">> Also with merge mining and proof of spac=
e we can be quite efficient in the future.</span></div><div><span style=
=3D"background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);"><br></span></div><div><span s=
tyle=3D"background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">Proof of memory (space) i=
s just proof of work with extra steps. It does not reduce energy consumption=
.</span></div><div><span style=3D"background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);"=
><br></span></div><div><a href=3D"https://github.com/libbitcoin/libbitcoin/w=
iki/Proof-of-Memory-Facade">https://github.com/libbitcoin/libbitcoin/wiki/Pr=
oof-of-Memory-Facade</a></div><div><span style=3D"background-color: rgba(255=
, 255, 255, 0);"><br></span></div><div>Merge mining is non-dedicated cost, s=
o also does not improve energy efficiency. The irreducible *cost* is what ma=
tters.</div><div><br></div><div><a href=3D"https://github.com/libbitcoin/lib=
bitcoin/wiki/Dedicated-Cost-Principle">https://github.com/libbitcoin/libbitc=
oin/wiki/Dedicated-Cost-Principle</a></div><div><br></div><div>e</div><div><=
br>On Sep 17, 2018, at 06:18, Andrew <<a href=3D"mailto:onelineproof@gmai=
l.com">onelineproof@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br><br></div><blockquote type=3D=
"cite"><div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span>I see what you say, however, sin=
ce the proposal as I have read it says "And this will keep happening as long=
as hashrate keeps rising," - what actually happens in the case hashrate sta=
gnates or falls?</span><br></blockquote><span></span><br><span>In general, a=
target hashrate can be set by users (can be less or more</span><br><span>th=
an the peak hashrate). As long as hashrate is rising and still</span><br><sp=
an>didn't reach the target, miners will incrementally get the reserve</span>=
<br><span>fees. Once the "contract" times out, the remaining part can be use=
d as</span><br><span>fees by the users who created the reserve fee "contract=
". So if</span><br><span>hashrate remains the same or falls, then users get t=
he reserve fees</span><br><span>back.</span><br><span></span><br><span>I agr=
ee that we can't stop people from being greedy. If they are not</span><br><s=
pan>Bitcoin mining, they will try to put their energy to earn in some</span>=
<br><span>other way...The hashrate is related the demand for Bitcoin (price)=
and</span><br><span>the amount of fees/subsidies the miners will get paid. =
For every level</span><br><span>of mining rewards (based on demand) there ex=
ists a limit on the</span><br><span>hashrate. Once hashrate gets large enoug=
h, no new miners (additional</span><br><span>hashrate) will want to join sin=
ce their share of the hashrate is too</span><br><span>small to make a profit=
.</span><br><span></span><br><span>Also with merge mining and proof of space=
we can be quite efficient in</span><br><span>the future. But of course I sy=
mpathize with the "don't be greedy"</span><br><span>philosophy, and it can b=
e good to educate people to use less resources</span><br><span>than they nee=
d, just I think it's a bit outside of the scope of what</span><br><span>the B=
itcoin software protocol does.</span><br></div></blockquote></body></html>=
--Apple-Mail-91325BF3-CD92-46DC-87B1-1970AE8AA93C--
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