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From: <eric@voskuil.org>
To: "'Prayank'" <prayank@tutanota.de>
References: <MdCL7jI--3-2@tutanota.de>
In-Reply-To: <MdCL7jI--3-2@tutanota.de>
Date: Wed, 30 Jun 2021 02:17:08 -0700
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Cc: 'Bitcoin Dev' <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Trinary Version Signaling for softfork
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Hi Prayank,

=20

> So majority hash power not following the consensus rules can result in =
chain split?

=20

Any two people on different rules implies a chain split. That=E2=80=99s =
presumably why rule changes are called forks. There is no actual concept =
of =E2=80=9Cthe rules=E2=80=9D just one set of rules or another.

=20

> Why would majority of miners decide to mine a chain that nobody wants =
to use?

=20

I don=E2=80=99t presume to know why people prefer one thing over =
another, or what people want to use, nor does economics.

=20

> What are different things possible in this case based on game theory?

=20

I=E2=80=99ve seen no actual demonstration of the relevance of game =
theory to Bitcoin. People throw the words around quite a bit, but I =
can=E2=80=99t give you an answer because I have found no evidence of a =
valid game theoretic model applicable to Bitcoin. It=E2=80=99s not a =
game, it=E2=80=99s a market.

=20

> Do miners and mining pools participate in discussions before signaling =
for a soft fork begins?

=20

Who knows, I don=E2=80=99t get invited to round table meetings.

=20

> Can they still mine something else post activation even if signaling =
readiness for soft fork?=20

=20

A person can mine whatever they want. Signaling does not compel a miner =
to enforce. Each block mined is anonymous. But each miner seeing the =
signals of others, unless they are coordinating, would presumably assume =
that others will enforce.

=20

> Who enforces consensus rules technically in Bitcoin? Full nodes or =
Miners?

=20

A node (software) doesn=E2=80=99t enforce anything. Merchants enforce =
consensus rules when they reject trading for something that they =
don=E2=80=99t consider money. Every time two people trade both party =
validates what they receive (not what they trade away). Those receiving =
Bitcoin are economically relevant and their power is a function of how =
much they are doing so.

=20

Miners censor, which is inconsequential unless enforced. Majority miners =
can enforce censorship by simply not building on any non-censoring =
blocks. This is what soft fork enforcement is.

=20

> Is soft fork signaling same as voting?

=20

I don=E2=80=99t see that it needs a label apart from signaling. There =
are many kinds of voting. It would be hard to equate signaling with any =
of them. It=E2=80=99s a public signal that the miner who mined a given =
block miner intends to censor, that=E2=80=99s all.

=20

> According to my understanding, miners follow the consensus rules =
enforced by full nodes and get (subsidy + fees) for their work.

=20

Miners mine a chain, which ever one they want. There are many. They earn =
the block reward.

=20

> Signaling is not voting although lot of people consider it voting =
including some mining pools and exchanges.

=20

What people consider it is inconsequential. It has clearly defined =
behavior.

=20

e

=20

From: Prayank <prayank@tutanota.de>=20
Sent: Sunday, June 27, 2021 5:01 AM
To: eric@voskuil.org
Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Trinary Version Signaling for softfork

=20

Hello Eric,

=20

I have few questions:

=20

> Without majority hash power support, activation simply means you are =
off on a chain split.=20

=20

So majority hash power not following the consensus rules can result in =
chain split? Why would majority of miners decide to mine a chain that =
nobody wants to use? What are different things possible in this case =
based on game theory?=20

=20

> And activation without majority hash power certainly does not =
=E2=80=9Censure=E2=80=9D this.

=20

Do miners and mining pools participate in discussions before signaling =
for a soft fork begins? Can they still mine something else post =
activation even if signaling readiness for soft fork?=20

=20

> If one wants to enforce a soft fork (or otherwise censor) this is =
accomplished by mining (or paying others to do so). Anyone can mine, so =
everyone gets a say. Mining is trading capital now for more later. If =
enough people want to do that, they can enforce a soft fork. =
It=E2=80=99s time Bitcoiners stop thinking of miners as other people. =
Anyone can mine, and that=E2=80=99s your vote.

=20

Who enforces consensus rules technically in Bitcoin? Full nodes or =
Miners?

=20

Is soft fork signaling same as voting?

=20

According to my understanding, miners follow the consensus rules =
enforced by full nodes and get (subsidy + fees) for their work. =
Signaling is not voting although lot of people consider it voting =
including some mining pools and exchanges.

=20

=20

--=20

Prayank


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link=3D"#0563C1" vlink=3D"#954F72" style=3D'word-wrap:break-word'><div =
class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal>Hi Prayank,<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&gt; So =
majority hash power not following the consensus rules can result in =
chain split?<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Any two people on different rules implies a chain =
split. That=E2=80=99s presumably why rule changes are called forks. =
There is no actual concept of =E2=80=9Cthe rules=E2=80=9D just one set =
of rules or another.<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&gt; Why =
would majority of miners decide to mine a chain that nobody wants to =
use?<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>I don=E2=80=99t presume to know why people prefer one =
thing over another, or what people want to use, nor does =
economics.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&gt; What are different things possible in this case =
based on game theory?<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>I=E2=80=99ve =
seen no actual demonstration of the relevance of game theory to Bitcoin. =
People throw the words around quite a bit, but I can=E2=80=99t give you =
an answer because I have found no evidence of a valid game theoretic =
model applicable to Bitcoin. It=E2=80=99s not a game, it=E2=80=99s a =
market.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&gt; Do miners and mining pools participate in =
discussions before signaling for a soft fork begins?<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Who knows, I =
don=E2=80=99t get invited to round table meetings.<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&gt; Can =
they still mine something else post activation even if signaling =
readiness for soft fork?&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>A person can =
mine whatever they want. Signaling does not compel a miner to enforce. =
Each block mined is anonymous. But each miner seeing the signals of =
others, unless they are coordinating, would presumably assume that =
others will enforce.<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&gt; Who =
enforces consensus rules technically in Bitcoin? Full nodes or =
Miners?<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>A node (software) doesn=E2=80=99t enforce anything. =
Merchants enforce consensus rules when they reject trading for something =
that they don=E2=80=99t consider money. Every time two people trade both =
party validates what they receive (not what they trade away). Those =
receiving Bitcoin are economically relevant and their power is a =
function of how much they are doing so.<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Miners =
censor, which is inconsequential unless enforced. Majority miners can =
enforce censorship by simply not building on any non-censoring blocks. =
This is what soft fork enforcement is.<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&gt; Is soft =
fork signaling same as voting?<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>I =
don=E2=80=99t see that it needs a label apart from signaling. There are =
many kinds of voting. It would be hard to equate signaling with any of =
them. It=E2=80=99s a public signal that the miner who mined a given =
block miner intends to censor, that=E2=80=99s all.<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&gt; =
According to my understanding, miners follow the consensus rules =
enforced by full nodes and get (subsidy + fees) for their =
work.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Miners mine a chain, which ever one they want. There =
are many. They earn the block reward.<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&gt; =
Signaling is not voting although lot of people consider it voting =
including some mining pools and exchanges.<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>What people =
consider it is inconsequential. It has clearly defined =
behavior.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>e<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><div =
style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b>From:</b> Prayank =
&lt;prayank@tutanota.de&gt; <br><b>Sent:</b> Sunday, June 27, 2021 5:01 =
AM<br><b>To:</b> eric@voskuil.org<br><b>Cc:</b> Bitcoin Dev =
&lt;bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org&gt;<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: =
[bitcoin-dev] Trinary Version Signaling for =
softfork<o:p></o:p></p></div></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>Hello =
Eric,<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>I =
have few questions:<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&gt;&nbsp;Without majority hash power support, =
activation simply means you are off on a chain split. =
<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>So majority hash power not following the consensus =
rules can result in chain split? Why would majority of miners decide to =
mine a chain that nobody wants to use? What are different things =
possible in this case based on game =
theory?&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&gt;&nbsp;And activation without majority hash power =
certainly does not =E2=80=9Censure=E2=80=9D =
this.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Do miners and mining pools participate in discussions =
before signaling for a soft fork begins? Can they still mine something =
else post activation even if signaling readiness for soft =
fork?&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&gt;&nbsp;If one wants to enforce a soft fork (or =
otherwise censor) this is accomplished by mining (or paying others to do =
so). Anyone can mine, so everyone gets a say. Mining is trading capital =
now for more later. If enough people want to do that, they can enforce a =
soft fork. It=E2=80=99s time Bitcoiners stop thinking of miners as other =
people. Anyone can mine, and that=E2=80=99s your =
vote.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Who enforces consensus rules technically in Bitcoin? =
Full nodes or Miners?<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Is soft fork signaling same as =
voting?<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>According to my understanding, miners follow the =
consensus rules enforced by full nodes and get (subsidy + fees) for =
their work. Signaling is not voting although lot of people consider it =
voting including some mining pools and =
exchanges.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>-- <o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Prayank<o:p></o:p></p></div></div></body></html>
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