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Date: Sat, 29 Mar 2014 14:41:17 -0400
From: Alan Reiner <etotheipi@gmail.com>
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Cc: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Presenting a BIP for Shamir's Secret
Sharing of Bitcoin private keys
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Armory does exactly this: it defines the "Fragment ID" as the first few
bytes of the hash of the root pubKey + M-parameter, converted to
base58. Then it explains to the user "All fragments with the same
fragment ID are compatible" (which only works if you use deterministic
coefficients). Each fragment is then labeled with "[FragID]-#1",
"[FragID]-#2", etc. It became quite useful for organizing the fragments
and documenting how I was distributing them, especially if I had printed
or saved the same fragment twice by accident.
On 03/29/2014 02:16 PM, Tamas Blummer wrote:
> I also think that we can add usability features if the underlying
> secret remains well protected.
> I do not think there is any reason to assume that the knowledge of the
> degree of the polynomial, would aid an attacker.
>
> Similarly a fingerprint of the secret if it is unrelated to the hash
> used in the polinomyal should leak no useful information,
>
> The length of such fingerpring (say 4 bytes) and the degree (1 byte)
> does not seem a big overhead for me.
>
> Remember that the biggest obstacle of Bitcoin is usability not security.
>
> Regards,
>
> Tamas Blummer
> http://bitsofproof.com
>
> On 29.03.2014, at 18:52, Alan Reiner <etotheipi@gmail.com
> <mailto:etotheipi@gmail.com>> wrote:
>
>> On 03/29/2014 01:19 PM, Matt Whitlock wrote:
>>> I intentionally omitted the parameter M (minimum subset size) from
>>> the shares because including it would give an adversary a vital
>>> piece of information. Likewise, including any kind of information
>>> that would allow a determination of whether the secret has been
>>> correctly reconstituted would give an adversary too much
>>> information. Failing silently when given incorrect shares or an
>>> insufficient number of shares is intentional.
>>
>> I do not believe this is a good tradeoff. It's basically obfuscation of
>> something that is already considered secure at the expense of
>> usability. It's much more important to me that the user understands
>> what is in their hands (or their family members after they get hit by a
>> bus), than to obfuscate the parameters of the secret sharing to provide
>> a tiny disadvantage to an adversary who gets ahold of one.
>>
>> The fact that it fails silently is really all downside, not a benefit.
>> If I have enough fragments, I can reconstruct the seed and see that it
>> produces addresses with money. If not, I know I need more fragments.
>> I'm much more concerned about my family having all the info they need to
>> recover the money, than an attacker knowing that he needs two more
>> fragments instead of which are well-secured anyway.
>>
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> _______________________________________________
>> Bitcoin-development mailing list
>> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
>> <mailto:Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>>
>
--------------020904030404000102000300
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<head>
<meta content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1"
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</head>
<body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
Armory does exactly this: it defines the "Fragment ID" as the first
few bytes of the hash of the root pubKey + M-parameter, converted to
base58. Then it explains to the user "All fragments with the same
fragment ID are compatible" (which only works if you use
deterministic coefficients). Each fragment is then labeled with
"[FragID]-#1", "[FragID]-#2", etc. It became quite useful for
organizing the fragments and documenting how I was distributing
them, especially if I had printed or saved the same fragment twice
by accident.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 03/29/2014 02:16 PM, Tamas Blummer
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote
cite="mid:19FE9882-7FC2-4518-BD50-8818B059271B@bitsofproof.com"
type="cite">
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;
charset=ISO-8859-1">
I also think that we can add usability features if the underlying
secret remains well protected.
<div>I do not think there is any reason to assume that the
knowledge of the degree of the polynomial, would aid an
attacker.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Similarly a fingerprint of the secret if it is unrelated to
the hash used in the polinomyal should leak no useful
information,</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>The length of such fingerpring (say 4 bytes) and the degree
(1 byte) does not seem a big overhead for me.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Remember that the biggest obstacle of Bitcoin is usability
not security.</div>
<div>
<div apple-content-edited="true"><br style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
font-family: Helvetica; font-size: medium; font-style:
normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal;
letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: 2;
text-align: -webkit-auto; text-indent: 0px; text-transform:
none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px;
-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width:
0px; ">
<span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica;
font-size: medium; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal;
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height:
normal; orphans: 2; text-align: -webkit-auto; text-indent:
0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2;
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto;
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important;
float: none; ">Regards,</span><br style="color: rgb(0, 0,
0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: medium; font-style:
normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal;
letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: 2;
text-align: -webkit-auto; text-indent: 0px; text-transform:
none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px;
-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width:
0px; ">
<br style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica;
font-size: medium; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal;
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height:
normal; orphans: 2; text-align: -webkit-auto; text-indent:
0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2;
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto;
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; ">
<span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica;
font-size: medium; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal;
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height:
normal; orphans: 2; text-align: -webkit-auto; text-indent:
0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2;
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto;
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important;
float: none; ">Tamas Blummer</span><br style="color: rgb(0,
0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: medium;
font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight:
normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal;
orphans: 2; text-align: -webkit-auto; text-indent: 0px;
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2;
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto;
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; ">
<span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica;
font-size: medium; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal;
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height:
normal; orphans: 2; text-align: -webkit-auto; text-indent:
0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2;
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto;
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important;
float: none; "><a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://bitsofproof.com">http://bitsofproof.com</a></span>
</div>
<br>
<div>
<div>On 29.03.2014, at 18:52, Alan Reiner <<a
moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:etotheipi@gmail.com">etotheipi@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:</div>
<br class="Apple-interchange-newline">
<blockquote type="cite">On 03/29/2014 01:19 PM, Matt Whitlock
wrote:<br>
<blockquote type="cite">I intentionally omitted the
parameter M (minimum subset size) from the shares because
including it would give an adversary a vital piece of
information. Likewise, including any kind of information
that would allow a determination of whether the secret has
been correctly reconstituted would give an adversary too
much information. Failing silently when given incorrect
shares or an insufficient number of shares is intentional.<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
I do not believe this is a good tradeoff. It's basically
obfuscation of<br>
something that is already considered secure at the expense
of<br>
usability. It's much more important to me that the user
understands<br>
what is in their hands (or their family members after they
get hit by a<br>
bus), than to obfuscate the parameters of the secret sharing
to provide<br>
a tiny disadvantage to an adversary who gets ahold of one. <br>
<br>
The fact that it fails silently is really all downside, not
a benefit. <br>
If I have enough fragments, I can reconstruct the seed and
see that it<br>
produces addresses with money. If not, I know I need more
fragments. <br>
I'm much more concerned about my family having all the info
they need to<br>
recover the money, than an attacker knowing that he needs
two more<br>
fragments instead of which are well-secured anyway.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
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<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development">https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development</a><br>
<br>
</blockquote>
</div>
<br>
</div>
</blockquote>
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