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Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP - Block size doubles at each reward halving
 with max block size of 32M
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Well I'd like to think that with an economy all parts of it interact with =
each other in ways more complex than simplistic imperative logic.=C2=A0




I agree that the economic majority is essentially what matters in a hard =
fork but everyone (miners,devs,public thought leaders,businesses) is part =
of that economy. Additionally what miners signal as their intention affects=
 the decision of that economic majority (and vice versa). =C2=A0You can see=
 the effects of this in traditional political processes in how preliminary =
vote polling results affect (reinforce) the final vote.=C2=A0

We also can see the results of this in (dare I mention) the whole XT affair=
 which had the signed intent of many of the economy (payment processors and=
 wallets and one miner pool) and the rest of the miners did not go along =
with it. This experiment either means that the rest of the miners couldn't =
be bothered to signal at all (because they didn't know how) or they were =
affected by the influence of core devs or the opinions of others on the =
matter and rejected the economic majority. =C2=A0(Which would imply core =
devs have some power by way of indirect influence) I would be inclined to =
believe the latter was more likely.=C2=A0




The conclusion which this would seem to imply is that at the very least, =
miners matter (to what exact extent is debatable). =C2=A0And although there=
 is no direct control of any party over the other in the strict sense, the =
public vocal opinions of any part of the Bitcoin economy does have an =
effect in its ability to sway the opinions of the other parts.=C2=A0




Digitsu



=E2=80=94
Regards,

On Sat, Nov 14, 2015 at 7:29 AM, Luke Dashjr <luke@dashjr.org> wrote:

> On Friday, November 13, 2015 4:01:09 PM digitsu@gmail.com wrote:
>> Forgive the frankness but I don't see why signaling your intent to =
support
>> an upgrade to one side of a hard fork can be seen as a bad thing.  If =
for
>> nothing else doesn't this make for a smoother flag day=3F (Because once =
you
>> signal your intention, it makes it hard to back out on the commitment.)
> It isn't a commitment in any sense, nor does it make it smoother, because=
 for=20
> a hardfork to be successful, it is the *economy* that must switch =
entirely.=20
> The miners are unimportant.
>> If miners don't have any choice in hard forks, who does=3F Just the =
core
>> devs=3F=20
> Devs have even less of a choice in the matter. What is relevant is =
the=20
> economy: who do people want to spend their bitcoins with=3F There is =
no=20
> programmatic way to determine this, especially not in advance, so the =
best we=20
> can do is a flag day that gets called off if there isn't clear consensus.=

> Luke
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<div>Well I'd like to think that with an economy all parts of it interact =
with each other in ways more complex than simplistic imperative logic.=
=C2=A0</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>I agree that the economic majority is essentially what matters in a =
hard fork but everyone (miners,devs,public thought leaders,businesses) is =
part of that economy. Additionally what miners signal as their intention =
affects the decision of that economic majority (and vice versa). =C2=A0You =
can see the effects of this in traditional political processes in how =
preliminary vote polling results affect (reinforce) the final vote.=
=C2=A0</div>
<div>We also can see the results of this in (dare I mention) the whole XT =
affair which had the signed intent of many of the economy (payment =
processors and wallets and one miner pool) and the rest of the miners did =
not go along with it. This experiment either means that the rest of the =
miners couldn't be bothered to signal at all (because they didn't know how)=
 or they were affected by the influence of core devs or the opinions of =
others on the matter and rejected the economic majority. =C2=A0(Which would=
 imply core devs have some power by way of indirect influence) I would be =
inclined to believe the latter was more likely.=C2=A0</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>The conclusion which this would seem to imply is that at the very =
least, miners matter (to what exact extent is debatable). =C2=A0And =
although there is no direct control of any party over the other in the =
strict sense, the public vocal opinions of any part of the Bitcoin economy =
does have an effect in its ability to sway the opinions of the other parts.=
=C2=A0</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>Digitsu</div>
<div class=3D=22mailbox=5Fsignature=22>
<br>=E2=80=94
Regards, </div>
<br><br><div class=3D=22gmail=5Fquote=22><p>On Sat, Nov 14, 2015 at 7:29 AM=
, Luke Dashjr <span dir=3D=22ltr=22>&lt;<a href=3D=22mailto:luke@dashjr.=
org=22 target=3D=22=5Fblank=22>luke@dashjr.org</a>&gt;</span> =
wrote:<br></p><blockquote class=3D=22gmail=5Fquote=22 style=3D=22margin:0 0=
 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;=22><p>On Friday, =
November 13, 2015 4:01:09 PM digitsu@gmail.com wrote:
<br>&gt; Forgive the frankness but I don't see why signaling your intent to=
 support
<br>&gt; an upgrade to one side of a hard fork can be seen as a bad thing. =
 If for
<br>&gt; nothing else doesn't this make for a smoother flag day=3F (Because=
 once you
<br>&gt; signal your intention, it makes it hard to back out on the =
commitment.)
<br><br>It isn't a commitment in any sense, nor does it make it smoother, =
because for=20
<br>a hardfork to be successful, it is the *economy* that must switch =
entirely.=20
<br>The miners are unimportant.
<br><br>&gt; If miners don't have any choice in hard forks, who does=3F =
Just the core
<br>&gt; devs=3F=20
<br><br>Devs have even less of a choice in the matter. What is relevant is =
the=20
<br>economy: who do people want to spend their bitcoins with=3F There is =
no=20
<br>programmatic way to determine this, especially not in advance, so the =
best we=20
<br>can do is a flag day that gets called off if there isn't clear =
consensus.
<br><br>Luke
<br></p></blockquote></div><br>
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