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From: Mark Friedenbach <mark@friedenbach.org>
Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2015 11:20:21 -0700
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Cc: Bitcoin Development <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] User vote in blocksize through fees
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Peter it's not clear to me that your described protocol is free of miner
influence over the vote, by artificially generating transactions which they
claim in their own blocks, or conforming incentives among voters by opting
to be with the (slight) majority in order to minimize fees.
Wouldn't it in fact be simpler to use the dynamic block size adjustment
algorithm presented to the list a few weeks back, where the miner opts for
a larger block by sacrificing fees? In that way the users "vote" for larger
blocks by including sufficient fees to offset subsidy, but as it is an
economic incentives miners gain nothing by inflating the fees in their own
blocks.
On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 11:11 AM, Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org> wrote:
> Jeff Garzik recently proposed that the upper blocksize limit be removed
> entirely, with a "soft" limit being enforced via miner vote, recorded by
> hashing power.
>
> This mechanism within the protocol for users to have any influence over
> the miner vote. We can add that back by providing a way for transactions
> themselves to set a flag determining whether or not they can be included
> in a block casting a specific vote.
>
> We can simplify Garzik's vote to say that one of the nVersion bits
> either votes for the blocksize to be increased, or decreased, by some
> fixed ratio (e.g 2x or 1/2x) the next interval. Then we can use a
> nVersion bit in transactions themselves, also voting for an increase or
> decrease. Transactions may only be included in blocks with an
> indentical vote, thus providing miners with a monetary incentive via
> fees to vote according to user wishes.
>
> Of course, to cast a "don't care" vote we can either define an
> additional bit, or sign the transaction with both versions. Equally we
> can even have different versions with different fees, broadcast via a
> mechanism such as replace-by-fee.
>
>
> See also John Dillon's proposal for proof-of-stake blocksize voting:
>
>
> https://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg02323.html
>
> --
> 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
> 0000000000000000127ab1d576dc851f374424f1269c4700ccaba2c42d97e778
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>
>
--001a11c2ff1c6c02990518562a6a
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Peter it's not clear to me that your described pr=
otocol is free of miner influence over the vote, by artificially generating=
transactions which they claim in their own blocks, or conforming incentive=
s among voters by opting to be with the (slight) majority in order to minim=
ize fees.<br><br></div>Wouldn't it in fact be simpler to use the dynami=
c block size adjustment algorithm presented to the list a few weeks back, w=
here the miner opts for a larger block by sacrificing fees? In that way the=
users "vote" for larger blocks by including sufficient fees to o=
ffset subsidy, but as it is an economic incentives miners gain nothing by i=
nflating the fees in their own blocks.<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=
<br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 11:11 AM, Peter Todd=
<span dir=3D"ltr"><<a href=3D"mailto:pete@petertodd.org" target=3D"_bla=
nk">pete@petertodd.org</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_=
quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1=
ex">Jeff Garzik recently proposed that the upper blocksize limit be removed=
<br>
entirely, with a "soft" limit being enforced via miner vote, reco=
rded by<br>
hashing power.<br>
<br>
This mechanism within the protocol for users to have any influence over<br>
the miner vote. We can add that back by providing a way for transactions<br=
>
themselves to set a flag determining whether or not they can be included<br=
>
in a block casting a specific vote.<br>
<br>
We can simplify Garzik's vote to say that one of the nVersion bits<br>
either votes for the blocksize to be increased, or decreased, by some<br>
fixed ratio (e.g 2x or 1/2x) the next interval. Then we can use a<br>
nVersion bit in transactions themselves, also voting for an increase or<br>
decrease. Transactions may only be included in blocks with an<br>
indentical vote, thus providing miners with a monetary incentive via<br>
fees to vote according to user wishes.<br>
<br>
Of course, to cast a "don't care" vote we can either define a=
n<br>
additional bit, or sign the transaction with both versions. Equally we<br>
can even have different versions with different fees, broadcast via a<br>
mechanism such as replace-by-fee.<br>
<br>
<br>
See also John Dillon's proposal for proof-of-stake blocksize voting:<br=
>
<br>
<a href=3D"https://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourcefor=
ge.net/msg02323.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.mail=
-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg02323.html</a><br=
>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
--<br>
'peter'[:-1]@<a href=3D"http://petertodd.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">petertodd.org</a><br>
0000000000000000127ab1d576dc851f374424f1269c4700ccaba2c42d97e778<br>
</font></span><br>---------------------------------------------------------=
---------------------<br>
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Bitcoin-development mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net">Bitcoin-develo=
pment@lists.sourceforge.net</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development=
" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/=
listinfo/bitcoin-development</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>
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