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From: Chris Riley <criley@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Apr 2022 10:01:57 -0400
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To: Billy Tetrud <billy.tetrud@gmail.com>, 
 Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
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>> we should not let the wealthy make consensus decisions.

>We shouldn't let the wealthy continue to control our governments. However,
bitcoin is not a government. Its a financial network.
>The fact of the matter is that fundamentally, the economic majority
controls where the chain goes. Its very likely that the wealthy
>are disproportionately represented in the economic majority. Attempting to
subvert the economic majority seems like a bad idea.
>The reality of control there will come out one way or another, and being
honest about it is probably the best way to avoid major schisms in the
future.

Yes, the economic majority is important:  Who else has more incentive to
protect the security and thus the value embodied in the network than people
who have invested money and time in the network?  A group of people with
1/10/100/1000 bitcoins each has more economic incentive to do so than a
similar sized group with 1/10/100/1000 satoshis each.  Likewise, it is
significantly easier to mobilize 1 million people "voting" with 100
satoshis each - a total of 1 BTC -  vs 10000 people each voting with 100
bitcoins each - a total of 1 million BTC.  I don't think anyone would say
that even if those 1 million people, for example, thought that we should
increase the number of bitcoins via perpetual inflation it would be a good
idea to listen to it however the vote was done whether via transaction
flags or something else.  Of course they could fork off.

Cheers,    :-)
Chris





On Wed, Apr 27, 2022 at 4:11 AM Billy Tetrud via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> >   A transaction signaling in the affirmative MUST NOT be included in a
> block that does not signal in the affirmative
>
> I feel like I've heard this idea somewhere before. Its an interesting
> idea.
>
> It should be noted that there is a consequence of this: holders wouldn't
> have much say. People that transact a lot (or happen to be transacting a
> lot during the signaling time period) would have a very disproportionate
> ability to pressure miners than people who aren't transacting much. This
> would probably be a pretty good proxy for future mining revenue that
> supports (or is against) a particular thing. However, the network does do
> more than just transact, so I would be a bit worried that such a mechanism
> would bias the system towards things that are good for transactors and bad
> for holders. Things like more coin inflation, larger blocks, etc.
>
> Another consideration is that miners are already incentivized to follow
> the money here. Adding an *additional* incentive might be distorting the
> market, so to speak.
>
> An alternative I proposed was a way to do weighted polling of holders:
>
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-March/020146.html
>
> The polling wouldn't be directly connected to the activation mechanism in
> any way, but would just be a mechanism to gauge some portion of consensus.
> If enough people were involved, theoretically it could be hooked up to
> activation, but I would be pretty wary of doing that directly as well.
>
> > we should not let the wealthy make consensus decisions.
>
> We shouldn't let the wealthy continue to control our governments. However,
> bitcoin is not a government. Its a financial network. The fact of the
> matter is that fundamentally, the economic majority controls where the
> chain goes. Its very likely that the wealthy are disproportionately
> represented in the economic majority. Attempting to subvert the economic
> majority seems like a bad idea. The reality of control there will come out
> one way or another, and being honest about it is probably the best way to
> avoid major schisms in the future.
>
> > Does a scheme like this afford us a better view into consensus than we
> have today?
>
> It does more than provide a view. It directly changes the game theory
> around how activation works. If we wanted to simply get a better view into
> consensus, we could allow the same thing, but allow any block to mine any
> transaction regardless of transaction signaling. Then it would be more
> purely informational.
>
> > Can it be gamed to give us a *worse* view into consensus? How?
> > Does it measure the right thing? If not, what do you think is the right
> thing to measure?
>
> Doesn't seem like it could be gamed, but as I mentioned above, the honest
> mechanics of it might be themselves undesirably distorting.
>
>
>
> On Tue, Apr 26, 2022 at 3:49 PM Bryan Bishop via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>> You may be interested in these posts on transaction signalling:
>>
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-April/014193.html
>>
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-April/014202.html
>>
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-May/014251.html
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Apr 26, 2022 at 3:12 PM Keagan McClelland via bitcoin-dev <
>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>
>>> Hi all,
>>>
>>> Alongside the debate with CTV right now there's a second debate that was
>>> not fully hashed out in the activation of Taproot. There is a lot of
>>> argument around what Speedy Trial is or isn't, what BIP8 T/F is or isn't
>>> etc. A significant reason for the breakdown in civility around this debate
>>> is that because we don't have a means of measuring user support for
>>> proposed sof-fork changes, it invariably devolves into people claiming that
>>> their circles support/reject a proposal, AND that their circles are more
>>> broadly representative of the set of Bitcoin users as a whole.
>>>
>>> It seems everyone in this forum has at one point or another said "I
>>> would support activation of ____ if there was consensus on it, but there
>>> isn't". This statement, in order to be true, requires that there exist a
>>> set of conditions that would convince you that there is consensus. People
>>> have tried to dodge this question by saying "it's obvious", but the reality
>>> is that it fundamentally isn't. My bubble has a different "obvious" answer
>>> than any of yours.
>>>
>>> Secondly, due to the trauma of the block size wars, no one wants to
>>> utter a statement that could imply that miners have any influence over what
>>> rulesets get activated or don't. As such "miner signaling" is consistently
>>> devalued as a signal for market demand. I don't think this is reasonable
>>> since following the events of '17  miners are aware that they have the
>>> strong incentive that they understand market demand. Nevertheless, as it
>>> stands right now the only signal we have to work with is miner signaling,
>>> which I think is rightly frustrating to a lot of people.
>>>
>>> So how can we measure User Support for a proposed rule change?
>>>
>>> I've had this idea floating around in the back of my head for a while,
>>> and I'd like to solicit some feedback here. Currently, all forms of
>>> activation that are under consideration involve miner signaling in one form
>>> or another. What if we could make it such that users could more directly
>>> pressure miners to act on their behalf? After all, if miners are but the
>>> humble servants of user demands, this should be in alignment with how
>>> people want Bitcoin to behave.
>>>
>>> Currently, the only means users have of influencing miner decisions are
>>> A. rejection of blocks that don't follow rules and B. paying fees for
>>> transaction inclusion. I suggest we combine these in such a way that
>>> transactions themselves can signal for upgrade. I believe (though am not
>>> certain) that there are "free" bits in the version field of a transaction
>>> that are presently ignored. If we could devise a mapping between some of
>>> those free bits, and the signaling bits in the block header, it would be
>>> possible to have rules as follows:
>>>
>>> - A transaction signaling in the affirmative MUST NOT be included in a
>>> block that does not signal in the affirmative
>>> - A transaction that is NOT signaling MAY be included in a block
>>> regardless of that block's signaling vector
>>> - (Optional) A transaction signaling in the negative MUST NOT be
>>> included in a block that signals in the affirmative
>>>
>>> Under this set of conditions, a user has the means of sybil-resistant
>>> influence over miner decisions. If a miner cannot collect the fees for a
>>> transaction without signaling, the user's fee becomes active economic
>>> pressure for the miner to signal (or not, if we include some variant of the
>>> negative clause). In this environment, miners could have a better view into
>>> what users do want, as would the Bitcoin network at large.
>>>
>>> Some may take issue with the idea that people can pay for the outcome
>>> they want and may try to compare a method like this to Proof of Stake, but
>>> there are only 3 sybil resistant mechanisms I am aware of, and any "real"
>>> view into what social consensus looks like MUST be sybil resistant:
>>>
>>> - Hashpower
>>> - Proof of personhood (KYC)
>>> - Capital burn/risk
>>>
>>> Letting hashpower decide this is the thing that is currently
>>> contentious, KYC is dead on arrival both on technical and social grounds,
>>> which really just leaves some means of getting capital into the process of
>>> consensus measurement. This mechanism I'm proposing is measurable
>>> completely en-protocol and doesn't require trust in institutions that fork
>>> futures would. Additionally it could be an auxiliary feature of the soft
>>> fork deployment scheme chosen making it something you could neatly package
>>> all together with the deployment itself.
>>>
>>> There are many potential tweaks to the design I propose above:
>>> 1. Do we include a notion of negative signaling (allowing for the
>>> possibility of rejection)
>>> 2. Do we make it such that miner signaling must be congruent with >X% of
>>> transactions, where congruence is that the signal must match any
>>> non-neutral signal of transaction.
>>>
>>> Some anticipated objections:
>>>
>>> 1. signaling isn't voting, no deployment should be made without
>>> consensus first.
>>> - yeah well we can't currently measure consensus right now, so that's
>>> not a super helpful thing to say and is breeding ground for abuse in the
>>> form of certain people making the unsubstantiated claim that consensus does
>>> or does not exist for a particular initiative
>>>
>>> 2. This is just a proposal for "pay to play", we should not let the
>>> wealthy make consensus decisions.
>>> - I agree that wealth should not be able to strong-arm decision making.
>>> But the status quo seems even worse where we let publicly influential
>>> people decide consensus in such a way where not only do they not "lose
>>> ammunition" in the process of campaigning, but actually accrue it, creating
>>> really bad long-term balances of power.
>>>
>>> 3. Enforcing this proposal requires its own soft fork.
>>> - Yes. It does...and there's a certain cosmic irony to that, but before
>>> we consider how to make this happen, I'd like to even discuss whether or
>>> not it's a good idea.
>>>
>>> 4. This gives CoinJoin pool operators and L2 protocol implementations
>>> power over deciding consensus.
>>> - I see this as an improvement over the status quo
>>>
>>> 5. This encourages "spam"
>>> - If you pay the fees, it's not spam.
>>>
>>> The biggest question I'd like to pose to the forum is:
>>> - Does a scheme like this afford us a better view into consensus than we
>>> have today?
>>> - Can it be gamed to give us a *worse* view into consensus? How?
>>> - Does it measure the right thing? If not, what do you think is the
>>> right thing to measure? (assuming we could)
>>> - Should I write a BIP spec'ing this out in detail?
>>>
>>> Cheers,
>>> Keagan
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
>>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> - Bryan
>> https://twitter.com/kanzure
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>

--0000000000004f01d805dda341b2
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>&gt;&gt; we should not let the wealthy make consensus=
 decisions.</div><div><br></div><div>&gt;We shouldn&#39;t let the wealthy c=
ontinue to control our governments. However, bitcoin is not a government. I=
ts a financial network.=C2=A0<br></div><div>&gt;The fact of the matter is t=
hat fundamentally, the economic majority controls where the chain goes. Its=
 very likely that the wealthy=C2=A0</div><div>&gt;are disproportionately re=
presented in the economic majority. Attempting to subvert the economic majo=
rity seems like a bad idea.=C2=A0</div><div>&gt;The reality of control ther=
e will come out one way or another, and being honest about it is probably t=
he best way to avoid major schisms in the future.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div=
><div>Yes, the economic majority=C2=A0is important: =C2=A0Who else has more=
 incentive to protect the security and thus the value embodied in the netwo=
rk than people who have invested money and time in the network?=C2=A0 A gro=
up of people with 1/10/100/1000 bitcoins each has more economic incentive t=
o do so than a similar sized group with=C2=A01/10/100/1000=C2=A0satoshis ea=
ch.=C2=A0 Likewise, it is significantly=C2=A0easier to mobilize 1 million p=
eople &quot;voting&quot; with 100 satoshis each - a total of 1 BTC - =C2=A0=
vs 10000 people each voting with 100 bitcoins each - a total of 1 million B=
TC.=C2=A0 I don&#39;t think anyone would say that even if those 1 million p=
eople, for example, thought that we should increase the number of bitcoins =
via perpetual inflation it would be a good idea to listen to it however the=
 vote was done whether via transaction flags or something else.=C2=A0 Of co=
urse they could fork off.</div><div><br></div><div>Cheers, =C2=A0 =C2=A0:-)=
</div><div>Chris</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br=
></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail=
_attr">On Wed, Apr 27, 2022 at 4:11 AM Billy Tetrud via bitcoin-dev &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org">bitcoin-dev@lists.lin=
uxfoundation.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" =
style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:s=
olid;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">=
&gt;=C2=A0

=C2=A0A transaction signaling in the affirmative MUST NOT be included in a =
block that does not signal in the affirmative=C2=A0<div><br></div><div>I fe=
el like I&#39;ve heard this idea somewhere before. Its an interesting idea.=
=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>It should be noted that there is a conseque=
nce of this: holders wouldn&#39;t have much say. People=C2=A0that transact =
a lot (or happen to be transacting a lot during the signaling time period) =
would have a very disproportionate ability to pressure miners than people w=
ho aren&#39;t transacting much. This would probably be a pretty good proxy =
for future mining revenue that supports (or is against) a particular=C2=A0t=
hing. However, the network does do more than just transact, so I would be a=
 bit worried that such a mechanism would bias the system towards=C2=A0thing=
s that are good for transactors and bad for holders. Things like more coin =
inflation, larger blocks, etc.</div><div><br></div><div>Another considerati=
on is that miners are already incentivized to follow the money here. Adding=
 an *additional* incentive might be distorting the market, so to speak.</di=
v><div><br></div><div>An alternative I proposed was a way to do weighted po=
lling of holders:=C2=A0</div><div><a href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.=
org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-March/020146.html" target=3D"_blank">https:/=
/lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-March/020146.html</a>=
</div><div><br></div><div>The polling wouldn&#39;t be directly connected to=
 the activation mechanism in any way, but would just be a mechanism to gaug=
e some portion of consensus. If enough people were involved, theoretically =
it could be hooked up to activation, but I would be pretty wary of doing th=
at directly as well.</div><div><br></div><div>&gt; we should not let the we=
althy make consensus decisions.</div><div><br></div><div>We shouldn&#39;t l=
et the wealthy continue to control our governments. However, bitcoin is not=
 a government. Its a financial network. The fact of the matter is that fund=
amentally, the economic majority controls where the chain goes. Its very li=
kely that the wealthy are disproportionately represented in the economic ma=
jority. Attempting to subvert the economic majority seems like a bad idea. =
The reality of control there will come out one way or another, and being ho=
nest about it is probably the best way to avoid major schisms in the future=
.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>&gt; Does a scheme like this afford=C2=A0u=
s a better view into consensus than we have today?</div><div><br></div><div=
>It does more than provide a view. It directly changes the game theory arou=
nd how activation works. If we wanted to simply get a better view into cons=
ensus, we could allow the same thing, but allow any block to mine any trans=
action regardless of transaction signaling. Then it would be more purely in=
formational.</div><div><br></div><div>&gt;=C2=A0Can it be gamed to give us =
a *worse* view into consensus? How?</div><div>&gt; Does it measure the righ=
t thing? If not, what do you think is the right thing to measure?<br></div>=
<div><br></div><div>Doesn&#39;t seem like it could be gamed, but as I menti=
oned above, the honest mechanics of it might be themselves undesirably dist=
orting.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_qu=
ote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Apr 26, 2022 at 3:49 PM =
Bryan Bishop via bitcoin-dev &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxf=
oundation.org" target=3D"_blank">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a>&=
gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0=
px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-colo=
r:rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">You may be interested=
 in these posts on transaction signalling:<br><a href=3D"https://lists.linu=
xfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-April/014193.html" target=3D"_bl=
ank">https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-April/014=
193.html</a><br><a href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitc=
oin-dev/2017-April/014202.html" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.linuxfounda=
tion.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-April/014202.html</a><br><a href=3D"htt=
ps://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-May/014251.html" =
target=3D"_blank">https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2=
017-May/014251.html</a><br><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div di=
r=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Apr 26, 2022 at 3:12 PM Keagan McCle=
lland via bitcoin-dev &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundati=
on.org" target=3D"_blank">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a>&gt; wro=
te:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px =
0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(2=
04,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">Hi all,<div><br></div><div>A=
longside the debate with CTV right now there&#39;s a second debate that was=
 not fully hashed out in the activation of Taproot. There is a lot of argum=
ent around what Speedy Trial is or isn&#39;t, what BIP8 T/F is or isn&#39;t=
 etc. A significant reason for the breakdown in civility around this debate=
 is that because we don&#39;t have a means of measuring user support for pr=
oposed sof-fork changes, it invariably devolves into people claiming that t=
heir circles support/reject a proposal, AND that their circles are more bro=
adly representative of the set of Bitcoin users as a whole.</div><div><br><=
/div><div>It seems everyone in this forum has at one point or another said =
&quot;I would support activation of ____ if there was consensus on it, but =
there isn&#39;t&quot;. This statement, in order to be true, requires that t=
here exist a set of conditions that would convince you that there is consen=
sus. People have tried to dodge this question by saying &quot;it&#39;s obvi=
ous&quot;, but the reality is that it fundamentally isn&#39;t. My bubble ha=
s a different &quot;obvious&quot; answer than any of yours.</div><div><br><=
/div><div>Secondly, due to the trauma of the block size wars, no one wants =
to utter a statement that could imply that miners have any influence over w=
hat rulesets get activated or don&#39;t. As such &quot;miner signaling&quot=
; is consistently devalued as a signal for market demand. I don&#39;t think=
 this is reasonable since following the events of &#39;17=C2=A0=C2=A0miners=
 are aware that they have the strong incentive that they understand market =
demand. Nevertheless, as it stands right now the only signal we have to wor=
k with is miner signaling, which I think is rightly frustrating to a lot of=
 people.</div><div><br></div><div>So how can we measure User Support for a =
proposed rule change?</div><div><br></div><div>I&#39;ve had this idea float=
ing around in the back of my head for a while, and I&#39;d like to solicit =
some feedback here. Currently, all forms of activation that are under consi=
deration involve miner signaling in one form or another. What if we could m=
ake it such that users could more directly pressure miners to act on their =
behalf? After all, if miners are but the humble servants of user demands, t=
his should be in alignment with how people want Bitcoin to behave.</div><di=
v><br></div><div>Currently, the only means users have of influencing miner =
decisions are A. rejection of blocks that don&#39;t follow rules and B. pay=
ing fees for transaction inclusion. I suggest we combine these in such a wa=
y that transactions themselves can signal for upgrade. I believe (though am=
 not certain) that there are &quot;free&quot; bits in the version field of =
a transaction that are presently ignored. If we could devise a mapping betw=
een some of those free bits, and the signaling bits in the block header, it=
 would be possible to have rules as follows:<br><br>- A transaction signali=
ng in the affirmative MUST NOT be included in a block that does not signal =
in the affirmative<br>- A transaction that is NOT signaling MAY be included=
 in a block regardless of that block&#39;s signaling vector</div><div>- (Op=
tional) A transaction signaling in the negative MUST NOT be included in a b=
lock that signals in the affirmative</div><div><br></div><div>Under this se=
t of conditions, a user has the means of sybil-resistant influence over min=
er decisions. If a miner cannot collect the fees for a transaction without =
signaling, the user&#39;s fee becomes active=C2=A0economic pressure for the=
 miner to signal (or not, if we include some variant of the negative clause=
). In this environment, miners could have a better view into what users do =
want, as would the Bitcoin network at large.</div><div><br></div><div>Some =
may take issue with the idea that people can pay for the outcome they want =
and may try to compare a method like this to Proof of Stake, but there are =
only 3 sybil resistant mechanisms I am aware of, and any &quot;real&quot; v=
iew into what social consensus looks like MUST be sybil resistant:</div><di=
v><br></div><div>- Hashpower</div><div>- Proof of personhood (KYC)<br>- Cap=
ital burn/risk</div><div><br></div><div>Letting hashpower decide this is th=
e thing that is currently contentious, KYC is dead on arrival both on techn=
ical and social grounds, which really just leaves some means of getting cap=
ital into the process of consensus measurement. This mechanism I&#39;m prop=
osing is measurable completely en-protocol and doesn&#39;t require trust in=
 institutions that fork futures would. Additionally it could be an auxiliar=
y=C2=A0feature of the soft fork deployment scheme chosen making it somethin=
g you could neatly package all together with the deployment itself.</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>There are many potential tweaks to the design I propose a=
bove:</div><div>1. Do we include a notion of negative signaling (allowing f=
or the possibility of rejection)</div><div>2. Do we make it such that miner=
 signaling must be congruent with &gt;X% of transactions, where congruence =
is that the signal must match any non-neutral signal of transaction.</div><=
div><br></div><div>Some anticipated objections:</div><div><br></div><div>1.=
 signaling isn&#39;t voting, no deployment should be made without consensus=
 first.</div><div>- yeah well we can&#39;t currently measure consensus righ=
t now, so that&#39;s not a super helpful thing to say and is breeding groun=
d for abuse in the form of certain people making the unsubstantiated claim =
that consensus does or does not exist for a particular initiative</div><div=
><br></div><div>2. This is just a proposal for &quot;pay to play&quot;, we =
should not let the wealthy make consensus decisions.</div><div>- I agree th=
at wealth should not be able to strong-arm decision making. But the status =
quo seems even worse where we let publicly influential people decide consen=
sus in such a way where not only do they not &quot;lose ammunition&quot; in=
 the process of campaigning, but actually accrue it, creating really bad lo=
ng-term balances of power.</div><div><br></div><div>3. Enforcing this propo=
sal requires its own soft fork.</div><div>- Yes. It does...and there&#39;s =
a certain cosmic irony to that, but before we consider how to make this hap=
pen, I&#39;d like to even discuss whether or not it&#39;s a good idea.</div=
><div><br></div><div>4. This gives CoinJoin pool operators and L2 protocol =
implementations power over deciding consensus.</div><div>- I see this as an=
 improvement over the status quo</div><div><br></div><div>5. This encourage=
s &quot;spam&quot;</div><div>- If you pay the fees, it&#39;s not spam.</div=
><div><br></div><div>The biggest question I&#39;d like to pose to the=C2=A0=
forum is:</div><div>- Does a scheme like this afford=C2=A0us a better view =
into consensus than we have today?</div><div>- Can it be gamed to give us a=
 *worse* view into consensus? How?</div><div>- Does it measure the right th=
ing? If not, what do you think is the right thing to measure? (assuming we =
could)</div><div>- Should I write a BIP spec&#39;ing this out in detail?</d=
iv><div><br></div><div>Cheers,</div><div>Keagan</div></div>
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</blockquote></div><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr"=
><div dir=3D"ltr">- Bryan<br><a href=3D"https://twitter.com/kanzure" target=
=3D"_blank">https://twitter.com/kanzure</a></div></div>
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</blockquote></div>
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</blockquote></div>

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