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Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2014 20:19:43 -0500
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From: William Yager <will.yager@gmail.com>
To: Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org>,
Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
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Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Proposal: Encrypt bitcoin messages
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--001a1139807629818505010566fd
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On Tue, Aug 19, 2014 at 8:14 PM, Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org> wrote:
>
> Don't let perfect be the enemy of good.
>
I'm not. I don't think this proposal is even good.
> You realize that by your own definition even the NSA is mostly a "weak
> passive attacker" They do *not* have the ability to attack more than a
> small, targeted, subset of connection for both technical and political
> reasons. For starters, MITM attacks are easily detected - "Bitcoin network
> attacked by unknown agents! Has your ISP been compromised?" would make for
> great headlines and would soon see the problem fixed both technically and
> politically.
>
>
Again, the NSA might get an absolutely trivial amount of data from
monitoring connections on the Bitcoin network. A bit of publicity is *not*
worth drastically increasing the software complexity of the client.
> In any case, my suggestion of enabling hidden service support by default
> adds both encryption and reasonably good authentication.
Enabling hidden service support by default would introduce an insanely huge
attack surface.
And you're conflating two different things; using Tor is valuable to
Bitcoin because it would provide some anonymity. The encryption aspect is
pretty much useless for us.
--001a1139807629818505010566fd
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
<div dir=3D"ltr">On Tue, Aug 19, 2014 at 8:14 PM, Peter Todd <span dir=3D"l=
tr"><<a href=3D"mailto:pete@petertodd.org" target=3D"_blank">pete@petert=
odd.org</a>></span> wrote:<br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"g=
mail_quote">
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class=3D"">
<br>
</div><div class=3D"">Don't let perfect be the enemy of good.<br></div>=
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>I'm not. I don't think this propos=
al is even good.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" st=
yle=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
You realize that by your own definition even the NSA is mostly a "weak=
passive attacker" They do *not* have the ability to attack more than =
a small, targeted, subset of connection for both technical and political re=
asons. For starters, MITM attacks are easily detected - "Bitcoin netwo=
rk attacked by unknown agents! Has your ISP been compromised?" would m=
ake for great headlines and would soon see the problem fixed both technical=
ly and politically.<br>
<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Again, the NSA might get an absolutely=
trivial amount of data from monitoring connections on the Bitcoin network.=
A bit of publicity is *not* worth drastically increasing the software comp=
lexity of the client.</div>
<div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8=
ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
In any case, my suggestion of enabling hidden service support by default ad=
ds both encryption and reasonably good authentication.</blockquote><div><br=
></div><div>Enabling hidden service support by default would introduce an i=
nsanely huge attack surface.=C2=A0</div>
<div><br></div><div>And you're conflating two different things; using T=
or is valuable to Bitcoin because it would provide some anonymity. The encr=
yption aspect is pretty much useless for us.</div></div></div></div>
--001a1139807629818505010566fd--
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