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Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2024 10:14:04 -0700 (PDT)
From: Eric Voskuil <eric@voskuil.org>
To: Bitcoin Development Mailing List <bitcoindev@googlegroups.com>
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Subject: Re: [bitcoindev] Re: Great Consensus Cleanup Revival
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>> It is not clear to me how determining the coinbase size can be done at
an earlier stage of validation than detection of the non-null coinbase.
> My point wasn't about checking the coinbase size, it was about being able
to cache the hash of a (non-malleated) invalid block as permanently invalid
to avoid re-downloading and re-validating it.
This I understood, but I think you misunderstood me. Your point was
specifically that, "it would let node implementations cache block failures
at an earlier stage of validation." Since you have not addressed that
aspect I assume you agree with my assertion above that the proposed rule
does not actually achieve this.
Regarding the question of checking coinbase size, the issue is of detecting
(or preventing) hashes mallied via the 64 byte tx technique. A rule against
64 byte txs would allow this determination by checking the coinbase alone.
If the coinbase is 64 bytes the block is invalid, if it is not the block
hash cannot have been mallied (all txs must have been 64 bytes, see
previous reference).
In that case if the block is invalid the invalidity can be cached. But
block invalidity cannot actually be cached until the block is fully
validated. A rule to prohibit *all* 64 byte txs is counterproductive as it
only adds additional checks on typically thousands of txs per block,
serving no purpose.
>> It seems to me that introducing an arbitrary tx size validity may create
more potential implementation bugs than it resolves.
> The potential for implementation bugs is a fair point to raise, but in
this case i don't think it's a big concern. Verifying no transaction in a
block is 64 bytes is as simple a check as you can get.
You appear to be making the assumption that the check is performed after
the block is fully parsed (contrary to your "earlier" criterion above). The
only way to determine the tx sizes is to parse each tx for witness marker,
input count, output count, input script sizes, output script sizes, witness
sizes, and skipping over the header, several constants, and associated
buffers. Doing this "early" to detect malleation is an extraordinarily
complex and costly process. On the other hand, as I pointed out, a rational
implementation would only do this early check for the coinbase.
Yet even determining the size of the coinbase is significantly more complex
and costly than checking its first input point against null. That check
(which is already necessary for validation) resolves the malleation
question, can be performed on the raw unparsed block buffer by simply
skipping header, version, reading input count and witness marker as
necessary, offsetting to the 36 byte point buffer, and performing a byte
comparison against
[0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000ffffffff].
This is:
(1) earlier
(2) faster
(3) simpler
(4) already consensus
>> And certainly anyone implementing such a verifier must know many
intricacies of the protocol.
> They need to know some, but i don't think it's reasonable to expect them
to realize the merkle tree construction is such that an inner node may be
confused with a 64 bytes transaction.
A protocol developer needs to understand that the hash of an invalid block
cannot be cached unless at least the coinbase has been restricted in size
(under the proposal) -or- that the coinbase is a null point (presently or
under the proposal). In the latter case the check is already performed in
validation, so there is no way a block would presently be cached as invalid
without checking it. The proposal adds a redundant check, even if limited
to just the coinbase. [He must also understand the second type of
malleability, discussed below.]
If this proposed rule was to activate we would implement it in a late stage
tx.check, after txs/blocks had been fully deserialized. We would not check
it an all in the case where the block is under checkpoint or milestone
("assume valid"). In this case we would retain the early null point
malleation check (along with the hash duplication malleation check) that we
presently have, would validate tx commitments, and commit the block. In
other words, the proposal adds unnecessary late stage checks only.
Implementing it otherwise would just add complexity and hurt performance.
>> I do not see this. I see a very ugly perpetual seam which will likely
result in unexpected complexities over time.
> What makes you think making 64 bytes transactions invalid could result in
unexpected complexities? And why do you think it's likely?
As described above, it's later, slower, more complex, unnecessarily broad,
and a consensus change. Beyond that it creates an arbitrary size limit -
not a lower or upper bound, but a slice out of the domain. Discontinuities
are inherent complexities in computing. The "unexpected" part speaks for
itself.
>> This does not produce unmalleable block hashes. Duplicate tx hash
malleation remains in either case, to the same effect. Without a resolution
to both issues this is an empty promise.
> Duplicate txids have been invalid since 2012 (CVE-2012-2459).
I think again here you may have misunderstood me. I was not making a point
pertaining to BIP30. I was referring to the other form of block hash
malleability, which results from duplicating sets of trailing txs in a
single block (see previous reference). This malleation vector remains, even
with invalid 64 byte txs. As I pointed out, this has the "same effect" as
the 64 byte tx issue. Merkle hashing the set of txs is insufficient to
determine identity. In one case the coinbase must be checked (null point or
size) and in the other case the set of tx hashes must be checked for
trailing duplicated sets. [Core performs this second check within the
Merkle hashing algorithm (with far more comparisons than necessary), though
this can be performed earlier and independently to avoid any hashing in the
malleation case.]
I would also point out in the interest of correctness that Core reverted
its BIP30 soft fork implementation as a consequence of the BIP90 hard fork,
following and requiring the BIP34 soft fork that presumably precluded it
but didn't, so it is no longer the case that duplicate tx hashes are
invalid in implementation. As you have proposed in this rollup, this
requires fixing again.
> If 64 bytes transactions are also made invalid, this would make it
impossible for two valid blocks to have the same hash.
Aside from the BIP30/34/90 issue addressed above, it is already
"impossible" (cannot be stronger than computationally infeasible) for two
*valid* blocks to have the same hash. The proposal does not enable that
objective, it is already the case. No malleated block is a valid block.
The proposal aims only to make it earlier or easier or faster to check for
block hash malleation. And as I've pointed out above, it doesn't achieve
those objectives. Possibly the perception that this would be the case is a
consequence of implementation details, but as I have shown above, it is not
in fact the case.
Given either type of malleation, the malleated block can be determined to
be invalid by a context free check. But this knowledge cannot ever be
cached against the block hash, since the same hash may be valid. Invalidity
can only be cached once a non-mallied block is validated and determined to
be invalid. Block hash malleations are and will remain invalid blocks with
or without the proposal, and it will continue to be necessary to avoid
caching invalid against the malleation. As you said:
> it was about being able to cache the hash of a (non-malleated) invalid
block as permanently invalid to avoid re-downloading and re-validating it.
This is already the case, and requires validating the full non-malleated
block. Adding a redundant invalidity check doesn't improve this in any way.
Best,
Eric
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>> It is not clear to me how determining the coinbase size can be don=
e at an earlier stage of validation than detection of the non-null coinbase=
.<br />> My point wasn't about checking the coinbase size, it was about =
being able to cache the hash of a (non-malleated) invalid block as permanen=
tly invalid to avoid re-downloading and re-validating it.<br /><br />This I=
understood, but I think you misunderstood me. Your point was specifically =
that, "it would let node implementations cache block failures at an earlier=
stage of validation." Since you have not addressed that aspect I assume yo=
u agree with my assertion above that the proposed rule does not actually ac=
hieve this.<br /><br />Regarding the question of checking coinbase size, th=
e issue is of detecting (or preventing) hashes mallied via the 64 byte tx t=
echnique. A rule against 64 byte txs would allow this determination by chec=
king the coinbase alone. If the coinbase is 64 bytes the block is invalid, =
if it is not the block hash cannot have been mallied (all txs must have bee=
n 64 bytes, see previous reference).<br /><br />In that case if the block i=
s invalid the invalidity can be cached. But block invalidity cannot actuall=
y be cached until the block is fully validated. A rule to prohibit *all* 64=
byte txs is counterproductive as it only adds additional checks on typical=
ly thousands of txs per block, serving no purpose.<br /><br />>> It s=
eems to me that introducing an arbitrary tx size validity may create more p=
otential implementation bugs than it resolves.<br />> The potential for =
implementation bugs is a fair point to raise, but in this case i don't thin=
k it's a big concern. Verifying no transaction in a block is 64 bytes is as=
simple a check as you can get.<br /><br />You appear to be making the assu=
mption that the check is performed after the block is fully parsed (contrar=
y to your "earlier" criterion above). The only way to determine the tx size=
s is to parse each tx for witness marker, input count, output count, input =
script sizes, output script sizes, witness sizes, and skipping over the hea=
der, several constants, and associated buffers. Doing this "early" to detec=
t malleation is an extraordinarily complex and costly process. On the other=
hand, as I pointed out, a rational implementation would only do this early=
check for the coinbase.<br /><br />Yet even determining the size of the co=
inbase is significantly more complex and costly than checking its first inp=
ut point against null. That check (which is already necessary for validatio=
n) resolves the malleation question, can be performed on the raw unparsed b=
lock buffer by simply skipping header, version, reading input count and wit=
ness marker as necessary, offsetting to the 36 byte point buffer, and perfo=
rming a byte comparison against [000000000000000000000000000000000000000000=
0000000000000000000000ffffffff].<br /><br />This is:<br /><br />(1) earlier=
<br />(2) faster<br />(3) simpler<br />(4) already consensus<br /><br />>=
;> And certainly anyone implementing such a verifier must know many intr=
icacies of the protocol.<br />> They need to know some, but i don't thin=
k it's reasonable to expect them to realize the merkle tree construction is=
such that an inner node may be confused with a 64 bytes transaction.<br />=
<br />A protocol developer needs to understand that the hash of an invalid =
block cannot be cached unless at least the coinbase has been restricted in =
size (under the proposal) -or- that the coinbase is a null point (presently=
or under the proposal). In the latter case the check is already performed =
in validation, so there is no way a block would presently be cached as inva=
lid without checking it. The proposal adds a redundant check, even if limit=
ed to just the coinbase. [He must also understand the second type of mallea=
bility, discussed below.]<br /><br />If this proposed rule was to activate =
we would implement it in a late stage tx.check, after txs/blocks had been f=
ully deserialized. We would not check it an all in the case where the block=
is under checkpoint or milestone ("assume valid"). In this case we would r=
etain the early null point malleation check (along with the hash duplicatio=
n malleation check) that we presently have, would validate tx commitments, =
and commit the block. In other words, the proposal adds unnecessary late st=
age checks only. Implementing it otherwise would just add complexity and hu=
rt performance.<br /><br />>> I do not see this. I see a very ugly pe=
rpetual seam which will likely result in unexpected complexities over time.=
<br />> What makes you think making 64 bytes transactions invalid could =
result in unexpected complexities? And why do you think it's likely?<br /><=
br />As described above, it's later, slower, more complex, unnecessarily br=
oad, and a consensus change. Beyond that it creates an arbitrary size limit=
- not a lower or upper bound, but a slice out of the domain. Discontinuiti=
es are inherent complexities in computing. The "unexpected" part speaks for=
itself.<br /><br />>> This does not produce unmalleable block hashes=
. Duplicate tx hash malleation remains in either case, to the same effect. =
Without a resolution to both issues this is an empty promise.<br />> Dup=
licate txids have been invalid since 2012 (CVE-2012-2459).<br /><br />I thi=
nk again here you may have misunderstood me. I was not making a point perta=
ining to BIP30. I was referring to the other form of block hash malleabilit=
y, which results from duplicating sets of trailing txs in a single block (s=
ee previous reference). This malleation vector remains, even with invalid 6=
4 byte txs. As I pointed out, this has the "same effect" as the 64 byte tx =
issue. Merkle hashing the set of txs is insufficient to determine identity.=
In one case the coinbase must be checked (null point or size) and in the o=
ther case the set of tx hashes must be checked for trailing duplicated sets=
. [Core performs this second check within the Merkle hashing algorithm (wit=
h far more comparisons than necessary), though this can be performed earlie=
r and independently to avoid any hashing in the malleation case.]<br /><br =
/>I would also point out in the interest of correctness that Core reverted =
its BIP30 soft fork implementation as a consequence of the BIP90 hard fork,=
following and requiring the BIP34 soft fork that presumably precluded it b=
ut didn't, so it is no longer the case that duplicate tx hashes are invalid=
in implementation. As you have proposed in this rollup, this requires fixi=
ng again.<br /><br />> If 64 bytes transactions are also made invalid, t=
his would make it impossible for two valid blocks to have the same hash.<br=
/><br />Aside from the BIP30/34/90 issue addressed above, it is already "i=
mpossible" (cannot be stronger than computationally infeasible) for two *va=
lid* blocks to have the same hash. The proposal does not enable that object=
ive, it is already the case. No malleated block is a valid block.<br /><br =
/>The proposal aims only to make it earlier or easier or faster to check fo=
r block hash malleation. And as I've pointed out above, it doesn't achieve =
those objectives. Possibly the perception that this would be the case is a =
consequence of implementation details, but as I have shown above, it is not=
in fact the case.<br /><br />Given either type of malleation, the malleate=
d block can be determined to be invalid by a context free check. But this k=
nowledge cannot ever be cached against the block hash, since the same hash =
may be valid. Invalidity can only be cached once a non-mallied block is val=
idated and determined to be invalid. Block hash malleations are and will re=
main invalid blocks with or without the proposal, and it will continue to b=
e necessary to avoid caching invalid against the malleation. As you said:<b=
r /><br />> it was about being able to cache the hash of a (non-malleate=
d) invalid block as permanently invalid to avoid re-downloading and re-vali=
dating it.<br /><br />This is already the case, and requires validating the=
full non-malleated block. Adding a redundant invalidity check doesn't impr=
ove this in any way.<br /><br />Best,<br />Eric
<p></p>
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