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From: =?UTF-8?B?Sm9yZ2UgVGltw7Nu?= <jtimon@jtimon.cc>
To: Gregory Maxwell <gmaxwell@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] block size - pay with difficulty
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Greg, I believe Jeff is focusing on BtcDrak's proposal (
https://gist.github.com/btcdrak/1c3a323100a912b605b5 ) where the
increased nBits are used to vote for the block size to raise
permanently ( or until it gets voted down).
His arguments don't seem to apply to your original proposal (where the
size is only increased for that block).
On Thu, Sep 3, 2015 at 7:57 PM, Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
<bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 3, 2015 at 2:40 PM, Jeff Garzik <jgarzik@gmail.com> wrote:
>> Expanding on pay-with-diff and volatility (closing comment),
>>
>> Users and miners will have significant difficulty creating and/or predic=
ting
>> a stable block size (and fee environment) with pay-with-diff across the
>> months. The ability of businesses to plan is low. Chaos and
>> unpredictability are bad in general for markets and systems. Thus the
>> binary conclusion of "not get used" or "volatility"
>
> Sorry, I'm still not following. I agree that predictability is important=
.
>
> I don't follow where unpredictability is coming from here. Most (all?)
> of the difficulty based adjustments had small limits on the difficulty
> change that wouldn't have substantially changed the interblock times
> relative to orphaning.
>
>> It's written as 'a' and/or 'b'. If you don't have idle hashpower, then =
paying with difficulty requires some amount of collusion ('a')
>> Any miner paying with a higher difficulty either needs idle hashpower, o=
r self-increase their own difficulty at the possible opportunity cost of lo=
sing an entire block's income to another miner who doesn't care about chang=
ing the block size. The potential loss does not economically compensate fo=
r size increase gains in most cases, when you consider the variability of b=
locks (they come in bursts and pauses) and the fee income that would be ass=
ociated
>
> What the schemes propose is blocksize that increases fast with
> difficulty over a narrow window. The result is that your odds of
> producing a block are slightly reduced but the block you produce if
> you do is more profitable: but only if there is a good supply of
> transactions which pay real fees compariable to the ones you're
> already taking. The same trade-off exists at the moment with respect
> to orphaning risk and miners still produce large blocks, producing a
> larger block means a greater chance you're not successful (due to
> orphaning) but you have a greater utility. The orphing mediated risk
> is fragile and can be traded off for centeralization advantage or by
> miners bypassing validation, issues which at least so far we have no
> reason to believe exist for size mediated schemes.
>
> As you know, mining is not a race (ignoring edge effects with
> orphaning/propagation time). Increasing difficulty does not put you at
> an expected return disavantage compared to other miners so long as the
> income increases at least proportionally (otherwise pooling with low
> diff shares would be an astronomically losing proposition :)!).
>
> Pay-for-size schemes have been successfully used in some altcoins
> without the effects you're suggesting.
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