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Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2015 12:24:21 -0500
Message-ID: <CAJfRnm7gWmXUj=9Dh2o5sEXOMe6Y_4P=naY3cVt1gfLRKOpmnw@mail.gmail.com>
From: Allen Piscitello <allen.piscitello@gmail.com>
To: Gavin Andresen <gavinandresen@gmail.com>
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Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Is it possible for there to be two chains after a
hard fork?
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--089e013a1a38a884320520e61503
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You're entire argument seems to be based on this assumption.
>I support the 95% chain (because I'm not insane)
I fail to see how always following a majority of miners no matter what
their actions somehow equates to insanity.
On Tue, Sep 29, 2015 at 9:04 AM, Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> I keep seeing statements like this:
>
> On Tue, Sep 29, 2015 at 9:30 AM, Jonathan Toomim (Toomim Bros) via
> bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>> As a further benefit to hard forks, anybody who is ideologically opposed
>> to the change can continue to use the old version successfully, as long as
>> there are enough miners to keep the fork alive.
>
>
> ... but I can't see how that would work.
>
> Lets say there is a hard fork, and 5% of miners stubbornly refuse to go
> along with the 95% majority (for this thought experiment, it doesn't matter
> if the old rules or new rules 'win').
>
> Lets further imagine that some exchange decides to support that 5% and
> lets people trade coins from that fork (one of the small altcoin exchanges
> would definitely do this if they think they can make a profit).
>
> Now, lets say I've got a lot of pre-fork bitcoin; they're valid on both
> sides of the fork. I support the 95% chain (because I'm not insane), but
> I'm happy to take people's money if they're stupid enough to give it to me.
>
> So, I do the following:
>
> 1) Create a send-to-self transaction on the 95% fork that is ONLY valid on
> the 95% fork (maybe I CoinJoin with a post-fork coinbase transaction, or
> just move my coins into then out of an exchange's very active hot wallet so
> I get coins with a long transaction history on the 95% side of the fork).
>
> 2) Transfer those same coins to the 5% exchange and sell them for
> whatever price I can get (I don't care how low, it is free money to me-- I
> will still own the coins on the 95% fork).
>
> I have to do step (1) to prevent the exchange from taking the
> transfer-to-exchange transaction and replaying it on the 95% chain.
>
> I don't see any way of preventing EVERYBODY who has coins on the 95% side
> of the fork from doing that. The result would be a huge free-fall in price
> as I, and everybody else, rushes to get some free money from anybody
> willing to pay us to remain idealogically pure.
>
> Does anybody think something else would happen, and do you think that
> ANYBODY would stick to the 5% fork in the face of enormously long
> transaction confirmation times (~3 hours), a huge transaction backlog as
> lots of the 95%'ers try to sell their coins before the price drops, and a
> massive price drop for coins on the 5% fork.
>
> --
> --
> Gavin Andresen
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
>
--089e013a1a38a884320520e61503
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>You're entire argument seems to be based on this =
assumption.<br></div><div><br></div>><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px">I =
support the 95% chain (because I'm not insane)</span><div class=3D"gmai=
l_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">I fail to see how always foll=
owing a majority of miners no matter what their actions somehow equates to =
insanity.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_ext=
ra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue,=
Sep 29, 2015 at 9:04 AM, Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev <span dir=3D"ltr">=
<<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target=3D"_bla=
nk">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockqu=
ote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-wid=
th:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-l=
eft:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_qu=
ote">I keep seeing statements like this:</div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><b=
r></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Sep 29, 2015 at 9:30 AM, Jonatha=
n Toomim (Toomim Bros) via bitcoin-dev <span dir=3D"ltr"><<a href=3D"mai=
lto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target=3D"_blank">bitcoin-dev@li=
sts.linuxfoundation.org</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail=
_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left=
-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">As a furt=
her benefit to hard forks, anybody who is ideologically opposed to the chan=
ge can continue to use the old version successfully, as long as there are e=
nough miners to keep the fork alive.</blockquote></div><br>... but I can=
9;t see how that would work.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div=
class=3D"gmail_extra">Lets say there is a hard fork, and 5% of miners stub=
bornly refuse to go along with the 95% majority (for this thought experimen=
t, it doesn't matter if the old rules or new rules 'win').</div=
><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Lets furth=
er imagine that some exchange decides to support that 5% and lets people tr=
ade coins from that fork (one of the small altcoin exchanges would definite=
ly do this if they think they can make a profit).</div><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Now, lets say I've got a lo=
t of pre-fork bitcoin; they're valid on both sides of the fork. I suppo=
rt the 95% chain (because I'm not insane), but I'm happy to take pe=
ople's money if they're stupid enough to give it to me.</div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">So, I do the foll=
owing:</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"=
>1) Create a send-to-self transaction on the 95% fork that is ONLY valid on=
the 95% fork (maybe I CoinJoin with a post-fork coinbase transaction, or j=
ust move my coins into then out of an exchange's very active hot wallet=
so I get coins with a long transaction history on the 95% side of the fork=
).</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">2) =
Transfer =C2=A0those same coins to the 5% exchange and sell them for whatev=
er price I can get (I don't care how low, it is free money to me-- I wi=
ll still own the coins on the 95% fork).</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><b=
r></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">I have to do step (1) to prevent the exc=
hange from taking the transfer-to-exchange transaction and replaying it on =
the 95% chain.<br><br>I don't see any way of preventing EVERYBODY who h=
as coins on the 95% side of the fork from doing that. The result would be a=
huge free-fall in price as I, and everybody else, rushes to get some free =
money from anybody willing to pay us to remain idealogically pure.</div><di=
v class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Does anybody t=
hink something else would happen, and do you think that ANYBODY would stick=
to the 5% fork in the face of enormously long transaction confirmation tim=
es (~3 hours), a huge transaction backlog as lots of the 95%'ers try to=
sell their coins before the price drops, and a massive price drop for coin=
s on the 5% fork.<span class=3D""><font color=3D"#888888"><br clear=3D"all"=
><div><br></div>-- <br><div>--<br>Gavin Andresen<br></div><div><br></div>
</font></span></div></div>
<br>_______________________________________________<br>
bitcoin-dev mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org">bitcoin-dev@lists.=
linuxfoundation.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev" =
rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail=
man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div></div>
--089e013a1a38a884320520e61503--
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