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From: Gavin Andresen <gavinandresen@gmail.com>
To: Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net>
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Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Payment Protocol: BIP 70, 71, 72
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--f46d044517f7bdfe7a04e2cce4b1
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Thanks, Mike!
"PaymentRequest messages larger than 50,000 bytes should be rejected by
> the merchant's server, to mitigate denial-of-service attacks."
>
> Do you mean "users wallet" here?
>
Yes, fixed.
> You could note in the motivation section two more motivations:
> 1) That the protocol can be a foundation on which other features are built
>
I don't like putting "this is what we think will happen in the future"
types of statements in specifications, so I'm inclined to leave that out.
> 2) That it is required to assist hardware wallets when there is a virus on
> the system
>
Added:
"Resistance from man-in-the-middle attacks that replace a merchant's
bitcoin address with an attacker's address before a transaction is
authorized with a hardware wallet."
Perhaps note in the BIP that the merchant should not assume the
> merchant_data field is trustworthy - malicious buyers could rewrite it as
> they see fit. Point out that a good way to use this is to serialize server
> state, signed by a merchant-only key, in the same way one might use an HTTP
> cookie.
>
Added:
"Note that malicious clients may modify the merchant_data, so should be
authenticated in some way (for example, signed with a merchant-only key)."
> "PaymentDetails.payment_url must be secure against man-in-the-middle
> attacks that might alter Payment.refund_to (if using HTTP, it must be
> TLS-protected).
>
> This says "must", but what should a client do here if the payment URL is
> not HTTPS? I suggest weakening this to "should", as sometimes TLS is
> redundant (e.g. if you're sending to a Tor hidden service).
>
done.
> The PaymentACK message contains a copy of Payment, but the BIP doesn't say
> what to do with it. I assume this means a client is free to ignore it and
> rely on TCP state to figure out the payment/ack connection instead? It may
> be worth noting that explicitly.
>
Added:
"payment | Copy of the Payment message that triggered this PaymentACK.
Clients may ignore this if they implement another way of associating
Payments with PaymentACKs."
>
> In the certificates section, you could observe that "validation" means
> "verification that it correctly chains to a trusted root authority, where
> trusted roots may be obtained from the operating system. If there is no
> operating system, the Mozilla root store is recommended".
>
Modified that section to say:
"...followed by additional certificates, with each subsequent certificate
being the one used to certify the previous one, up to a trusted root
authority. The recipient must verify the certificate chain according to
[RFC5280] and reject the PaymentRequest if any validation failure occurs.
Trusted root certificates may be obtained from the operating system; if
validation is done on a device without an operating system, the Mozilla
root store<http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/included/index.html>
is
recommended."
--
--
Gavin Andresen
--f46d044517f7bdfe7a04e2cce4b1
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Thanks, Mike!<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_=
quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1=
ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>=A0 =A0"<span style=3D"line-height:1.5em">Pa=
ymentRequest messages larger than 50,000 bytes should be rejected by the me=
rchant's server, to mitigate denial-of-service attacks."</span></d=
iv>
<div><span style=3D"line-height:1.5em"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D=
"line-height:1.5em">Do you mean "users wallet" here?</span></div>=
</div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Yes, fixed.</div><div><br></div><div=
>
=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;borde=
r-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><span style=
=3D"line-height:1.5em"></span></div><div><span style=3D"line-height:1.5em">=
You could note in the motivation section two more motivations:</span></div>
<div><span style=3D"line-height:1.5em">1) That the protocol can be a founda=
tion on which other features are built</span></div></div></blockquote><div>=
<br></div><div>I don't like putting "this is what we think will ha=
ppen in the future" types of statements in specifications, so I'm =
inclined to leave that out.</div>
<div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;=
border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><span st=
yle=3D"line-height:1.5em">2) That it is required to assist hardware wallets=
when there is a virus on the system</span></div>
</div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Added:</div><div><br></div><div>&quo=
t;<span style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,255);font-family:sans-serif;f=
ont-size:13px;line-height:19.1875px">Resistance from man-in-the-middle atta=
cks that replace a merchant's bitcoin address with an attacker's ad=
dress before a transaction is authorized with a hardware wallet."</spa=
n></div>
<div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex=
;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">
<div><span style=3D"line-height:1.5em">Perhaps note in the BIP that the mer=
chant should not assume the merchant_data field is trustworthy - malicious =
buyers could rewrite it as they see fit. Point out that a good way to use t=
his is to serialize server state, signed by a merchant-only key, in the sam=
e way one might use an HTTP cookie.</span></div>
</div></blockquote><div>=A0</div><div>Added:</div><div><br></div><div>"=
;<span style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,255);font-family:sans-serif;fo=
nt-size:13px;line-height:19.1875px">Note that malicious clients may modify =
the merchant_data, so should be authenticated in some way (for example, sig=
ned with a merchant-only key)."</span></div>
<div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;=
border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><span st=
yle=3D"line-height:1.5em"></span></div><div><span style=3D"line-height:1.5e=
m">=A0 =A0"</span><span style=3D"line-height:19.200000762939453px;font=
-size:12.800000190734863px;font-family:sans-serif">PaymentDetails.payment_u=
rl must be secure against man-in-the-middle attacks that might alter Paymen=
t.refund_to (if using HTTP, it must be TLS-protected).</span></div>
<div><br></div><div><font color=3D"#000000" face=3D"sans-serif"><span style=
=3D"line-height:19.1875px">This says "must", but what should a cl=
ient do here if the payment URL is not HTTPS? I suggest weakening this to &=
quot;should", as sometimes TLS is redundant (e.g. if you're sendin=
g to a Tor hidden service).</span></font></div>
</div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>done.</div><div>=A0</div><blockquote=
class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc soli=
d;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">
<div><span style=3D"line-height:19.1875px;font-family:sans-serif">The Payme=
ntACK message contains a copy of Payment, but the BIP doesn't say what =
to do with it. I assume this means a client is free to ignore it and rely o=
n TCP state to figure out the payment/ack connection instead? It may be wor=
th noting that explicitly.</span></div>
</div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Added:</div><div><br></div><div>&quo=
t;payment | Copy of the Payment message that triggered this PaymentACK. Cli=
ents may ignore this if they implement another way of associating Payments =
with PaymentACKs."</div>
<div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;=
border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">
<div><font color=3D"#000000" face=3D"sans-serif"><span style=3D"line-height=
:19.1875px"><br></span></font></div><div><font color=3D"#000000" face=3D"sa=
ns-serif"><span style=3D"line-height:19.1875px">In the certificates section=
, you could observe that "validation" means "verification th=
at it correctly chains to a trusted root authority, where trusted roots may=
be obtained from the operating system. If there is no operating system, th=
e Mozilla root store is recommended".</span></font></div>
<div><font color=3D"#000000" face=3D"sans-serif"><span style=3D"line-height=
:19.1875px"></span></font></div></div></blockquote></div><div><br></div><di=
v>Modified that section to say:</div><div><br></div><div>"...<span sty=
le=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,255);font-family:sans-serif;font-size:13=
px;line-height:19.1875px">followed by additional certificates, with each su=
bsequent certificate being the one used to certify the previous one, up to =
a trusted root authority. The recipient must verify the certificate chain a=
ccording to [RFC5280] and reject the PaymentRequest if any validation failu=
re occurs.</span></div>
<p style=3D"margin:0.4em 0px 0.5em;line-height:19.1875px;font-family:sans-s=
erif;font-size:13px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">Trusted root certifi=
cates may be obtained from the operating system; if validation is done on a=
device without an operating system, the=A0<a rel=3D"nofollow" class=3D"ext=
ernal text" href=3D"http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/included=
/index.html" style=3D"text-decoration:none;color:rgb(102,51,102);background=
-image:url(
+9AAAAVklEQVR4Xn3PgQkAMQhDUXfqTu7kTtkpd5RA8AInfArtQ2iRXFWT2QedAfttj2FsPIOE1=
eCOlEuoWWjgzYaB/IkeGOrxXhqB+uA9Bfcm0lAZuh+YIeAD+cAqSz4kCMUAAAAASUVORK5CYII=
=3D);padding-right:13px;background-repeat:no-repeat no-repeat">Mozilla root=
store</a>=A0is recommended."</p>
<div><br></div>-- <br>--<br>Gavin Andresen<br>
--f46d044517f7bdfe7a04e2cce4b1--
|
