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Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2018 11:20:20 -0500
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On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 7:39 AM, Pavol Rusnak via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> On 08/01/18 05:22, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
> >> https://github.com/satoshilabs/slips/blob/master/slip-0039.md
>
>
> > The 16-bit "checksum" based on sha2 seems pretty poor since basing
> > small checksums on a cryptographic hash results in a fairly poor
> > checksum that is surprisingly likely to accept an errored string. Your
> > wordlist is 10 bits and you have much less than 1023*10 bits of input,
> > so you could easily have a 20 bit code (two words) which guaranteed
> > that up to two errored words would always be detected, and probably
> > could choose one which catches three words much more often 1:2^20
> > (sipa's crc tools can help find codes like this).
>
> Originally, we wanted to use 16-bit of CRC32 for checksum, but after the
> discussion with Daan Sprenkels we were suggested to change this for
> cryptographically strong function. The argument was that CRC32 contains
> less entropy and mixing high-entropy data (secret) with low-entropy data
> (checksum) is not a good idea.
>

This entropy argument seems confused.  Ignoring constant factors, the
entropy of a checksum is the sum over all possible checksums, i, of
-n_i*log(n_i), where n_i is the number of times the ith checksum occurs
over the space of all possible data being checksummed.  In this application
the checksum is being applied to a fixed m-bit blob of uniformly random
data.

The entropy is maximized when every possible checksum occurs equally as
frequently, that is we achieve maximum entropy when all the n_i values are
equal to each other.  Any error correcting code worth it's salt will try to
achieve this property because the designers want every checksum value to
have as much error correcting power as every other checksum value.  I'm
almost certain that the algebraic properties of your typical error
correcting codes allow you to prove that maximum entropy is perfectly
achieved whenever the data-blob size is at least as large as the checksum
size.

Meanwhile the truncated value of a cryptographic hash function is expected
to be slightly under the maximum entropy value, under the assumption that
the hash function it behaves like a random function.

The main properties of a "strong cryptographic hash function" is that it is
infeasible to find collisions and preimages.  However these properties are
lost when you truncate the hash down to 16-bits.  At this point is it
entirely feasible to find collisions and preimages.

So using a truncated cryptographic hash function doesn't provide you with
more entropy (and, in fact, probably a sliver less entropy), and doesn't
provide you with any of the befits of strong cryptographic hash function.


> Also, there is an argument between a checksum and ECC. We discussed that
> ECC might not be a good idea, because it helps the attacker to compute
> missing information, while we only want to check for integrity. Also the
> word mnemonic is itself a ECC, because if you see the word "acadornic"
> it is probably the word "academic".
>

Every checksum is error correcting.  Given an failed checksum, all you have
to do is search around the space of edits to find the smallest set edits
that yield a valid checksum.  With a 2^16 bit checksum one will expect to
find a nearby checksum within 2^16 trails, even when using a truncated hash
function.

What an error-correcting codes gives you isn't the ability to correct
errors, which we have seen is something that all short checksums provide,
rather they provide *guarantees* about the ability to detect (and correct)
certain common classes of errors.  For example we can have an ECC that
guarantees to find the error where are word is accidentally written down
twice (see
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-January/015506.html
).

The advice you have been given will only result in losing any guarantees
about detecting common classes or errors; it won't stop attackers from
recovering missing information, and it won't provide a cryptographically
strong function.

--94eb2c0ef16eba70b505625a4bc5
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
On Mon, Jan 8, 2018 at 7:39 AM, Pavol Rusnak via bitcoin-dev <span dir=3D"l=
tr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target=3D"=
_blank">bitcoin-dev@lists.<wbr>linuxfoundation.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br=
><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">On 08/01/18 05:22, Grego=
ry Maxwell wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://github.com/satoshilabs/slips/blob/master/slip-0=
039.md" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/satoshilabs=
<wbr>/slips/blob/master/slip-0039.<wbr>md</a><br>
<br><span><br>
&gt; The 16-bit &quot;checksum&quot; based on sha2 seems pretty poor since =
basing<br>
&gt; small checksums on a cryptographic hash results in a fairly poor<br>
&gt; checksum that is surprisingly likely to accept an errored string. Your=
<br>
&gt; wordlist is 10 bits and you have much less than 1023*10 bits of input,=
<br>
&gt; so you could easily have a 20 bit code (two words) which guaranteed<br=
>
&gt; that up to two errored words would always be detected, and probably<br=
>
&gt; could choose one which catches three words much more often 1:2^20<br>
&gt; (sipa&#39;s crc tools can help find codes like this).<br>
<br>
</span>Originally, we wanted to use 16-bit of CRC32 for checksum, but after=
 the<br>
discussion with Daan Sprenkels we were suggested to change this for<br>
cryptographically strong function. The argument was that CRC32 contains<br>
less entropy and mixing high-entropy data (secret) with low-entropy data<br=
>
(checksum) is not a good idea.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>This ent=
ropy argument seems confused.=C2=A0 Ignoring constant factors, the entropy =
of a checksum is the sum over all possible checksums, i, of -n_i*log(n_i), =
where n_i is the number of times the ith checksum occurs over the space of =
all possible data being checksummed.=C2=A0 In this application the checksum=
 is being applied to a fixed m-bit blob of uniformly random data.</div><div=
><br></div><div>The entropy is maximized when every possible checksum occur=
s equally as frequently, that is we achieve maximum entropy when all the n_=
i values are equal to each other.=C2=A0 Any error correcting code worth it&=
#39;s salt will try to achieve this property because the designers want eve=
ry checksum value to have as much error correcting power as every other che=
cksum value.=C2=A0 I&#39;m almost certain that the algebraic properties of =
your typical error correcting codes allow you to prove that maximum entropy=
 is perfectly achieved whenever the data-blob size is at least as large as =
the checksum size.</div><div><br></div><div>Meanwhile the truncated value o=
f a cryptographic hash function is expected to be slightly under the maximu=
m entropy value, under the assumption that the hash function it behaves lik=
e a random function.</div><div><br></div><div>The main properties of a &quo=
t;strong cryptographic hash function&quot; is that it is infeasible to find=
 collisions and preimages.=C2=A0 However these properties are lost when you=
 truncate the hash down to 16-bits.=C2=A0 At this point is it entirely feas=
ible to find collisions and preimages.</div><div><br></div><div>So using a =
truncated cryptographic hash function doesn&#39;t provide you with more ent=
ropy (and, in fact, probably a sliver less entropy), and doesn&#39;t provid=
e you with any of the befits of strong cryptographic hash function.<br></di=
v><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0p=
x 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
Also, there is an argument between a checksum and ECC. We discussed that<br=
>
ECC might not be a good idea, because it helps the attacker to compute<br>
missing information, while we only want to check for integrity. Also the<br=
>
word mnemonic is itself a ECC, because if you see the word &quot;acadornic&=
quot;<br>
it is probably the word &quot;academic&quot;.<br></blockquote><div><br></di=
v><div>Every checksum is error correcting.=C2=A0 Given an failed checksum, =
all you have to do is search around the space of edits to find the smallest=
 set edits that yield a valid checksum.=C2=A0 With a 2^16 bit checksum one =
will expect to find a nearby checksum within 2^16 trails, even when using a=
 truncated hash function.</div><div><br></div><div>What an error-correcting=
 codes gives you isn&#39;t the ability to correct errors, which we have see=
n is something that all short checksums provide, rather they provide *guara=
ntees* about the ability to detect (and correct) certain common classes of =
errors.=C2=A0 For example we can have an ECC that guarantees to find the er=
ror where are word is accidentally written down twice (see <a href=3D"https=
://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-January/015506.html=
">https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-January/0155=
06.html</a>).</div><div><br></div><div>The advice you have been given will =
only result in losing any guarantees about detecting common classes or erro=
rs; it won&#39;t stop attackers from recovering missing information, and it=
 won&#39;t provide a cryptographically strong function.<br></div></div></di=
v></div>

--94eb2c0ef16eba70b505625a4bc5--