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Return-Path: <jl2012@xbt.hk>
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Date: Fri, 07 Aug 2015 01:20:21 -0400
From: jl2012@xbt.hk
To: Wes Green <maveric100@gmail.com>
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Cc: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size implementation using Game Theory
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It won't work as you thought. If a miner has 95% of hashing power, he 
would have 95% of chance to find the next block and collect the penalty. 
In long term, he only needs to pay 5% penalty. It's clearly biased 
against small miners.

Instead, you should require the miners to burn the penalty. Whether this 
is a good idea is another issue.

Wes Green via bitcoin-dev 於 2015-08-06 19:52 寫到:
> Bitcoin is built on game theory. Somehow we seem to have forgotten
> that and are trying to fix our "block size issue" with magic numbers,
> projected percentage growth of bandwidth speeds, time limits, etc...
> There are instances where these types of solutions make sense, but
> this doesn't appear to be one of them. Lets return to game theory.
> 
> Proposal: Allow any miner to, up to, double the block size at any
> given time - but penalize them. Using the normal block reward,
> whatever percentage increase the miner makes over the previous limit
> is taken from both the normal reward and fees. The left over is
> rewarded to the next miner that finds a block.
> 
> If blocks stay smaller for an extended period of time, it goes back
> down to the previous limit/ x amount decrease/% decrease  (up for
> debate)
> 
> Why would this work?: Miners only have incentive to do raise the limit
> when they feel there is organic growth in the network. Spam attacks,
> block bloat etc would have to be dealt with as it is currently. There
> is no incentive to raise the size for spam because it will subside and
> the penalty will have been for nothing when the attack ends and block
> size goes back down.
> 
> I believe it would have the nice side effect of forcing miners to hold
> the whole block chain. I believe SPV does not allow you to see all the
> transactions in a block and be able to calculate if you should be
> adding more to your reward transaction if the last miner made the
> blocks bigger. Because of this, the miners would also have an eye on
> blockchain size and wont want it getting huge too fast (outsize of
> Moore's law of Nielsen's Law). Adding to the gamification.
> 
> This system would encourage block size growth due to organic growth
> and the penalty would encourage it to be slow as to still keep reward
> high and preserve ROE.
> 
> What this would look like: The miners start seeing what looks like
> natural network growth, and make the decision (or program an
> algorithm, the beauty is it leaves the "how" up to the miners) to
> increase the blocksize. They think that, in the long run, having
> larger blocks will increase their revenue and its worth taking the hit
> now for more fees later. They increase the size to 1.25 MB. As a
> result, they reward would be 18.75 (75%). The miner fees were .5BTC.
> The miner fees are also reduced to .375BTC. Everyone who receives that
> block can easily calculate 1) if the previous miner gave themselves
> the proper reward 2) what the next reward should be if they win it.
> Miners now start building blocks with a 31.25 reward transaction and
> miner fee + .125.
> 
> 
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