1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
|
Received: from sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.193]
helo=mx.sourceforge.net)
by sfs-ml-4.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76)
(envelope-from <david.vorick@gmail.com>) id 1Z6MXM-0000LX-HH
for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net;
Sat, 20 Jun 2015 17:26:36 +0000
Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com
designates 209.85.214.178 as permitted sender)
client-ip=209.85.214.178; envelope-from=david.vorick@gmail.com;
helo=mail-ob0-f178.google.com;
Received: from mail-ob0-f178.google.com ([209.85.214.178])
by sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128)
(Exim 4.76) id 1Z6MXL-0003Hg-DA
for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net;
Sat, 20 Jun 2015 17:26:36 +0000
Received: by obpn3 with SMTP id n3so8879477obp.0
for <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>;
Sat, 20 Jun 2015 10:26:30 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Received: by 10.182.112.138 with SMTP id iq10mr8814235obb.38.1434821189887;
Sat, 20 Jun 2015 10:26:29 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by 10.202.97.131 with HTTP; Sat, 20 Jun 2015 10:26:29 -0700 (PDT)
In-Reply-To: <CAPg+sBhb6TyS=Bz4chLixw4Qc0Q1w6VdW-YTHZ-O_fyfvCJ+6Q@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAPg+sBijQ0Q9U00hUaotYujqW8M+v1ED+PV+ap2g7b0Z4=RNSA@mail.gmail.com>
<CAPg+sBhb6TyS=Bz4chLixw4Qc0Q1w6VdW-YTHZ-O_fyfvCJ+6Q@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 20 Jun 2015 13:26:29 -0400
Message-ID: <CAFVRnyoqdbhGB1LVcawMqviq4ExvoOMM7CfFKSAtDgcZBc1TKw@mail.gmail.com>
From: David Vorick <david.vorick@gmail.com>
Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e0149cd4e56ed150518f6572a
X-Spam-Score: 0.6 (/)
X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net.
See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details.
-1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for
sender-domain
0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider
(david.vorick[at]gmail.com)
-0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record
1.2 MISSING_HEADERS Missing To: header
1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message
-0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from
author's domain
0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature,
not necessarily valid
-0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature
X-Headers-End: 1Z6MXL-0003Hg-DA
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Hard fork via miner vote
X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: <bitcoin-development.lists.sourceforge.net>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development>,
<mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://sourceforge.net/mailarchive/forum.php?forum_name=bitcoin-development>
List-Post: <mailto:bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
List-Help: <mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development>,
<mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 20 Jun 2015 17:26:36 -0000
--089e0149cd4e56ed150518f6572a
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
I see it as unreasonable to expect all nodes to upgrade during a hardfork.
If you are intentionally waiting for that to happen, it's possible for an
extreme minority of nodes to hold the rest of the network hostage by simply
refusing to upgrade. However you want nodes to be able to protest until it
is clear that they have lost the battle without being at risk of getting
hardforked out of the network unexpectedly.
I think it makes sense to add a second fuse. After the 95% barrier has been
crossed, a 6 week timer starts that gives the remaining 5% time to upgrade.
If they still don't upgrade, they have intentionally forked themselves from
the network and it is not something that the remaining 95% need to be
concerned with.
On Sat, Jun 20, 2015 at 1:13 PM, Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille@gmail.com>
wrote:
> Hello all,
>
> I've seen ideas around hard fork proposals that involve a block version
> vote (a la BIP34, BIP66, or my more recent versionbits BIP draft). I
> believe this is a bad idea, independent of what the hard fork itself is.
>
> Ultimately, the purpose of a hard fork is asking the whole community to
> change their full nodes to new code. The purpose of the trigger mechanism
> is to establish when that has happened.
>
> Using a 95% threshold, implies the fork can happen when at least 5% of
> miners have not upgraded, which implies some full nodes have not (as miners
> are nodes), and in addition, means the old chain can keep growing too,
> confusing old non-miner nodes as well.
>
> Ideally, the fork should be scheduled when one is certain nodes will have
> upgraded, and the risk for a fork will be gone. If everyone has upgraded,
> no vote is necessary, and if nodes have not, it remains risky to fork them
> off.
>
> I understand that, in order to keep humans in the loop, you want an
> observable trigger mechanism, and a hashrate vote is an easy way to do
> this. But at least, use a minimum timestamp you believe to be reasonable
> for upgrade, and a 100% threshold afterwards. Anything else guarantees that
> your forking change happens *knowingly* before the risk is gone.
>
> You may argue that miners would be asked to - and have it in their best
> interest - to not actually make blocks that violate the changed rule before
> they are reasonably sure that everyone has upgraded. That is possible, but
> it does not gain you anything over just using a 100% threshold, as how
> would they be reasonably sure everyone has upgraded, while blocks creater
> by non-upgraded miners are still being created?
>
> TL;DR: use a timestamp switchover for a hard fork, or add a block voting
> threshold as a means to keep humans in the loop, but if you do, use 100% as
> threshold.
>
> --
> Pieter
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>
>
--089e0149cd4e56ed150518f6572a
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>I see it as unreasonable to expect all nodes to upgra=
de during a hardfork. If you are intentionally waiting for that to happen, =
it's possible for an extreme minority of nodes to hold the rest of the =
network hostage by simply refusing to upgrade. However you want nodes to be=
able to protest until it is clear that they have lost the battle without b=
eing at risk of getting hardforked out of the network unexpectedly.<br><br>=
</div><div>I think it makes sense to add a second fuse. After the 95% barri=
er has been crossed, a 6 week timer starts that gives the remaining 5% time=
to upgrade. If they still don't upgrade, they have intentionally forke=
d themselves from the network and it is not something that the remaining 95=
% need to be concerned with.<br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br>=
<div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Sat, Jun 20, 2015 at 1:13 PM, Pieter Wuille <=
span dir=3D"ltr"><<a href=3D"mailto:pieter.wuille@gmail.com" target=3D"_=
blank">pieter.wuille@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padd=
ing-left:1ex"><p dir=3D"ltr">Hello all,</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">I've seen ideas around hard fork proposals that involve =
a block version vote (a la BIP34, BIP66, or my more recent versionbits BIP =
draft). I believe this is a bad idea, independent of what the hard fork its=
elf is.</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">Ultimately, the purpose of a hard fork is asking the whole c=
ommunity to change their full nodes to new code. The purpose of the trigger=
mechanism is to establish when that has happened.</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">Using a 95% threshold, implies the fork can happen when at l=
east 5% of miners have not upgraded, which implies some full nodes have not=
(as miners are nodes), and in addition, means the old chain can keep growi=
ng too, confusing old non-miner nodes as well.</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">Ideally, the fork should be scheduled when one is certain no=
des will have upgraded, and the risk for a fork will be gone. If everyone h=
as upgraded, no vote is necessary, and if nodes have not, it remains risky =
to fork them off.</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">I understand that, in order to keep humans in the loop, you =
want an observable trigger mechanism, and a hashrate vote is an easy way to=
do this. But at least, use a minimum timestamp you believe to be reasonabl=
e for upgrade, and a 100% threshold afterwards. Anything else guarantees th=
at your forking change happens *knowingly* before the risk is gone.</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">You may argue that miners would be asked to - and have it in=
their best interest - to not actually make blocks that violate the changed=
rule before they are reasonably sure that everyone has upgraded. That is p=
ossible, but it does not gain you anything over just using a 100% threshold=
, as how would they be reasonably sure everyone has upgraded, while blocks =
creater by non-upgraded miners are still being created?</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">TL;DR: use a timestamp switchover for a hard fork, or add a =
block voting threshold as a means to keep humans in the loop, but if you do=
, use 100% as threshold.</p><span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888">
<p dir=3D"ltr">-- <br>
Pieter<br>
</p>
</font></span><br>---------------------------------------------------------=
---------------------<br>
<br>_______________________________________________<br>
Bitcoin-development mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net">Bitcoin-develo=
pment@lists.sourceforge.net</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development=
" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/=
listinfo/bitcoin-development</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>
--089e0149cd4e56ed150518f6572a--
|
