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In-Reply-To: <Yrj9N7k8osWsxhY4@petertodd.org>
From: Greg Sanders <gsanders87@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2022 08:03:38 -0400
Message-ID: <CAB3F3DtwX=nkcYPDHxFygEMZafhD3m+XuKc+BKuhwFs0J4VNUA@mail.gmail.com>
To: Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org>, 
 Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="00000000000087152e05e26cb6fe"
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Playing with full-rbf peers for fun and L2s
	security
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One key difference seems to be that properly punishing someone based on
mempool behavior seems much more difficult. As we all know there is no "the
mempool".



On Sun, Jun 26, 2022, 8:43 PM Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> On Sun, Jun 26, 2022 at 04:40:24PM +0000, alicexbt via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> > Hi Antoine,
> >
> > Thanks for sharing the DoS attack example with alternatives.
> >
> > > - Caroll broadcasts a double-spend of her own input C, the
> double-spend is attached with a low-fee (1sat/vb) and it does _not_ signal
> opt-in RBF
> > > - Alice broadcasts the multi-party transaction, it is rejected by the
> network mempools because Alice double-spend is already present
> >
> > I think this affects almost all types of coinjoin transaction including
> coordinator based implementations. I tried a few things and have already
> reported details for an example DoS attack to one of the team but there is
> no response yet.
> >
> > It was fun playing with RBF, DoS and Coinjoin. Affected projects should
> share their opinion about full-rbf as it seems it might improve things.
> >
> > Example:
> >
> > In Wasabi an attacker can broadcast a transaction spending input used in
> coinjoin after sending signature in the round. This would result in a
> coinjoin tx which never gets relayed:
> https://nitter.net/1440000bytes/status/1540727534093905920
>
> Note that Wasabi already has a DoS attack vector in that a participant can
> stop
> participating after the first phase of the round, with the result that the
> coinjoin fails. Wasabi mitigates that by punishing participating in future
> rounds. Double-spends only create additional types of DoS attack that need
> to
> be detected and punished as well - they don't create a fundamentally new
> vulerability.
>
> --
> https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>

--00000000000087152e05e26cb6fe
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"auto">One key difference seems to be that properly punishing so=
meone based on mempool behavior seems much more difficult. As we all know t=
here is no &quot;the mempool&quot;.=C2=A0<div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div d=
ir=3D"auto"><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr"=
 class=3D"gmail_attr">On Sun, Jun 26, 2022, 8:43 PM Peter Todd via bitcoin-=
dev &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target=3D"=
_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a>&gt; wr=
ote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;=
border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">On Sun, Jun 26, 2022 at 04:40:=
24PM +0000, alicexbt via bitcoin-dev wrote:<br>
&gt; Hi Antoine,<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Thanks for sharing the DoS attack example with alternatives.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; - Caroll broadcasts a double-spend of her own input C, the double=
-spend is attached with a low-fee (1sat/vb) and it does _not_ signal opt-in=
 RBF<br>
&gt; &gt; - Alice broadcasts the multi-party transaction, it is rejected by=
 the network mempools because Alice double-spend is already present<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; I think this affects almost all types of coinjoin transaction includin=
g coordinator based implementations. I tried a few things and have already =
reported details for an example DoS attack to one of the team but there is =
no response yet.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; It was fun playing with RBF, DoS and Coinjoin. Affected projects shoul=
d share their opinion about full-rbf as it seems it might improve things.<b=
r>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Example:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; In Wasabi an attacker can broadcast a transaction spending input used =
in coinjoin after sending signature in the round. This would result in a co=
injoin tx which never gets relayed: <a href=3D"https://nitter.net/1440000by=
tes/status/1540727534093905920" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://nitter.net/1440000bytes/status/1540727534093905920<=
/a><br>
<br>
Note that Wasabi already has a DoS attack vector in that a participant can =
stop<br>
participating after the first phase of the round, with the result that the<=
br>
coinjoin fails. Wasabi mitigates that by punishing participating in future<=
br>
rounds. Double-spends only create additional types of DoS attack that need =
to<br>
be detected and punished as well - they don&#39;t create a fundamentally ne=
w<br>
vulerability.<br>
<br>
-- <br>
<a href=3D"https://petertodd.org" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://petertodd.org</a> &#39;peter&#39;[:-1]@<a href=3D=
"http://petertodd.org" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_=
blank">petertodd.org</a><br>
_______________________________________________<br>
bitcoin-dev mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" rel=3D"noreferrer =
noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev" =
rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.li=
nuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

--00000000000087152e05e26cb6fe--