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Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] CPFP Carve-Out for Fee-Prediction
Issues in Contracting Applications (eg Lightning)
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I responded to a few things in-line before realizing I think we're out of sy=
nc on what this alternative proposal actually implies. In my understanding i=
s it, it does *not* imply that you are guaranteed the ability to RBF as fees=
change. The previous problem is still there - your counterparty can announc=
e a bogus package and leave you unable to add a new transaction to it, the d=
ifference being it may be significantly more expensive to do so. If it were t=
he case the you could RBF after the fact, I would likely agree with you.
> On Jan 8, 2019, at 00:50, Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> wrote:
>=20
> Matt Corallo <lf-lists@mattcorallo.com> writes:
>> Ultimately, defining a "near the top of the mempool" criteria is fraught=20=
>> with issues. While it's probably OK for the original problem (large=20
>> batched transactions where you don't want a single counterparty to=20
>> prevent confirmation), lightning's requirements are very different.=20
>> Instead is wanting a high probability that the transaction in question=20=
>> confirms "soon", we need certainty that it will confirm by some deadline.=
>=20
> I don't think it's different, in practice.
I strongly disagree. If you're someone sending a batched payment, 5% chance i=
t takes 13 blocks is perfectly acceptable. If you're a lightning operator, t=
hat quickly turns into "5% chance, or 35% chance if your counterparty is mal=
icious and knows more about the market structure than you". Eg in the past i=
t's been the case that transaction volume would spike every day at the same t=
ime when Bitmex proceed a flood of withdrawals all at once in separate trans=
actions. Worse, it's probably still the case that, in case is sudden market m=
ovement, transaction volume can spike while people arb exchanges and move co=
ins into exchanges to sell.
>> Thus, even if you imagine a steady-state mempool growth, unless the=20
>> "near the top of the mempool" criteria is "near the top of the next=20
>> block" (which is obviously *not* incentive-compatible)
>=20
> I was defining "top of mempool" as "in the first 4 MSipa", ie. next
> block, and assumed you'd only allow RBF if the old package wasn't in the
> top and the replacement would be. That seems incentive compatible; more
> than the current scheme?
My point was, because of block time variance, even that criteria doesn't hol=
d up. If you assume a steady flow of new transactions and one or two blocks c=
ome in "late", suddenly "top 4MWeight" isn't likely to get confirmed until a=
few blocks come in "early". Given block variance within a 12 block window, t=
his is a relatively likely scenario.
> The attack against this is to make a 100k package which would just get
> into this "top", then push it out with a separate tx at slightly higher
> fee, then repeat. Of course, timing makes that hard to get right, and
> you're paying real fees for it too.
>=20
> Sure, an attacker can make you pay next-block high fees, but it's still
> better than our current "*always* overpay and hope!", and you can always
> decide at the time based on whether the expiring HTLC(s) are worth it.
>=20
> But I think whatever's simplest to implement should win, and I'm not in
> a position to judge that accurately.
>=20
> Thanks,
> Rusty.
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