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Date: Wed, 25 Feb 2015 16:58:51 -0500
From: Andrew Lapp <lapp0@purdue.edu>
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Cc: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Request for comments on hybrid,
PoW/PoS enhancement for Bitcoin
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Having stakeholders "endorse" blocks has, according to you, the benefits
of increasing the number of full nodes and making a 51% attack more
expensive. It seems to me it would have the opposite effects and other
negative side effects. Any stakeholder that has "won" could just be
running an SPV client and be informed by a full node that they have won,
then cooperate to collect the reward. You are mistaking proof of stake
as a proof you are running a full node. At the same time, the network
becomes cheaper to attack in proportion to the amount of the block
reward that is paid to "endorsers". Another side effect is that miners
would have a bigger economy of scale. The more stake a miner has, the
more they can "endorse" their own blocks and not others blocks. I
recommend reading this: https://download.wpsoftware.net/bitcoin/pos.pdf
-Andrew Lapp
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