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Hi, Peter

Thanks to human nature, still:

1. Bitcoin large holders are able to communicate with each other...
- and as a large bitcoin holder someone will very well understand that he s=
hould run his Antminers at loss for goodness of Bitcoin network security.
But he won't communicate that - due to his greed - he just betrayed it. May=
be someone will communicate that he is running Anminers... But it doesn't c=
hange a lot.
We can assume this additional possibility of communication (especially taki=
ng into account big number of large holders and their anonimity) - doesn't =
change this Prisoner's Dilemma into a "not textbook case enough".

2. The existing incentive that miners earn money for including transactions=
 is enough to motivate human nature...
- but paying $50 usd per such transaction (the amount necessary to compensa=
te lack of block reward right now) - is "no way" to motivate a human nature=
, just due to: personal interest (as you correctly highlighted). It really =
doesn't matter that the process of disappearance of block reward is spreade=
d over the long run.
(the same, but more terse: https://twitter.com/hasufl/status/15114706684576=
52224 )

3. In many jurisdictions you can take back from grid for free - the amount =
you have produced and uploaded earlier (I'm in one of such). So I won't inv=
est and oversize my solar panels by additional ~24kW of power for additiona=
l Antminer runing 24h/day - if I know it will be running at loss. (side not=
e: it's not a good idea to be dependant with future health of bitcoin -  on=
 what type of jurisdiction is the most popular one in given moment)


There are two statements to repeat then, but more precisely:

A. Bitcoiners (me too) are proud the bitcoin system is designed so clever, =
that from the beginning till now - is able to run without the trust to anyo=
ne. And utilise even people's greed - for system goodness/expansion. But wh=
en I wrote the FIRST edge case is behind us, but the SECOND one - with no d=
oubt with pathological Friedman's "free lunches" for part of participants -=
 is only some years ahead (like in a Titanic scene) - then most of them sud=
denly say:

"Ok, then... Bitcoin idea is so brilliant that maybe the game theory won't =
apply anymore. Let's TRUST the large holders they will run Antminers at los=
s."

It's not The Satoshi's Vision anymore.


B. Bitcoiners (me too) want to remove or neutralise all destructive things =
to Bitcoin, like for example: unfriendly government regulations, etc. But w=
hen I wrote there will be in the future (and the only question is: when) an=
 alarm siren that halvings start to be destructive to the Bitcoin network, =
while start to cause consecutive network security/hashrate regressions - th=
en most of them suddenly say:

"Ok, then... I'm to greed to resign from it."



It's not The Satoshi's Vision anymore.

Regards
Jaroslaw




W dniu 2022-08-16 23:21:30 u=C5=BCytkownik Peter via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-d=
ev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> napisa=C5=82:
Hi Jaroslaw,

In the Prisoner's Dilemma the prisoners cannot communicate. In Bitcoin larg=
e holders are able to communicate with each other. Also, prisoners need not=
 make an all or nothing decision in Bitcoin. Miners can join and leave the =
network freely over time. You can change your decision based on the decisio=
n of others.

The Bitcoin design is such that security is volatile but the issuance of bl=
ocks is timely and evened out to a 10 minutes average even after the reward=
 is exhausted.

The existing incentive that miners earn money for including transactions is=
 enough to motivate human nature. Transaction initiators have an incentive =
to mine and run full nodes for personal interest.

>Noone will waste his renewable energy on unprofitable Antminer while he/sh=
e can sell this energy for the market price.

The law in most jurisdictions prevents the resale of spare electricity unle=
ss an expensive license is obtained (and in most cases no license is availa=
ble as the government maintains a monopoly). Mining with waste electricity =
is reducing losses. Another incentive to motivate human nature.

Bitcoin holders can be enfranchised into any new system. So, no need for bi=
ke shedding the original design which is a Schelling Point.

Regards

Peter Kroll

pointbiz/ BTCCuracao