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Subject: [Bitcoin-development] A look back and a look forward
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--047d7bf0c0a680c8f9050c2851e0
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Alex Daley recently stated that "one of the problems with Bitcoin is that
it takes us backwards in the transaction chain. Suddenly, you're dealing
with something that's much more cash-like. If Target had been hacked, and
instead of using credit-cards, what was stolen from them were actually
bitcoins, that they have been storing Bitcoin addresses in their systems
and those systems were compromised, Target wouldn't just have a PR
nightmare in their hands. They would be out of business."
Of course, it needn't be Target. The scenario has played out with a number
of exchanges, and is a sword of Damocles hanging over the cryptocurrency
space. The recent Winklevoss Bitcoin Trust SEC filing warns that "the
Trust=E2=80=99s bitcoins may be subject to loss, damage, theft or restricti=
on on
access. There is a risk that part or all of the Trust=E2=80=99s bitcoins co=
uld be
lost, stolen or destroyed. The Sponsor believes that the Trust=E2=80=99s bi=
tcoins
held in the Trust Custody Account will be an appealing target to hackers or
malware distributors seeking to destroy, damage or steal the Trust=E2=80=99=
s
bitcoins. Although the Security System=E2=80=99s design includes various el=
ements,
such as redundancy, segregation and cold storage, to minimize the risk of
loss, damage and theft, neither the Custodian nor the Sponsor can guarantee
that the Security System will prevent such loss, damage or theft..."
This needn't be so, once an optional identity layer, modeled after the
Internet itself, is provided, as proposed in late August of last year on
this mailing list:
http://sourceforge.net/p/bitcoin/mailman/message/32737796/
http://sourceforge.net/p/bitcoin/mailman/message/32742809/
I hope it is apparent that this is the killer app folks have been searching
for in vain. Like its Internet analogues, BCIs will not be created
overnight and without collaboration - and TNABC is as good a place as any
for it.
--047d7bf0c0a680c8f9050c2851e0
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Alex Daley recently stated that "one of the problems =
with Bitcoin is that it takes us backwards in the transaction chain. Sudden=
ly, you're dealing with something that's much more cash-like. If Ta=
rget had been hacked, and instead of using credit-cards, what was stolen fr=
om them were actually bitcoins, that they have been storing Bitcoin address=
es in their systems and those systems were compromised, Target wouldn't=
just have a PR nightmare in their hands. They would be out of business.&qu=
ot;<br><br>Of course, it needn't be Target. The scenario has played out=
with a number of exchanges, and is a sword of Damocles hanging over the cr=
yptocurrency space. The recent Winklevoss Bitcoin Trust SEC filing warns th=
at "the Trust=E2=80=99s bitcoins may be subject to loss, damage, theft=
or restriction on access. There is a risk that part or all of the Trust=E2=
=80=99s bitcoins could be lost, stolen or destroyed. The Sponsor believes t=
hat the Trust=E2=80=99s bitcoins held in the Trust Custody Account will be =
an appealing target to hackers or malware distributors seeking to destroy, =
damage or steal the Trust=E2=80=99s bitcoins. Although the Security System=
=E2=80=99s design includes various elements, such as redundancy, segregatio=
n and cold storage, to minimize the risk of loss, damage and theft, neither=
the Custodian nor the Sponsor can guarantee that the Security System will =
prevent such loss, damage or theft..."<br><br>This needn't be so, =
once an optional identity layer, modeled after the Internet itself, is prov=
ided, as proposed in late August of last year on this mailing list:<br><br>=
<a href=3D"http://sourceforge.net/p/bitcoin/mailman/message/32737796/">http=
://sourceforge.net/p/bitcoin/mailman/message/32737796/</a><br><a href=3D"ht=
tp://sourceforge.net/p/bitcoin/mailman/message/32742809/">http://sourceforg=
e.net/p/bitcoin/mailman/message/32742809/</a><br><br>I hope it is apparent =
that this is the killer app folks have been searching for in vain. Like its=
Internet analogues, BCIs will not be created overnight and without collabo=
ration - and TNABC is as good a place as any for it.<br><br></div>
--047d7bf0c0a680c8f9050c2851e0--
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