Received: from sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.192] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-2.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from <decker.christian@gmail.com>) id 1Rc0yD-0008BB-GC for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Sat, 17 Dec 2011 20:35:01 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 74.125.82.53 as permitted sender) client-ip=74.125.82.53; envelope-from=decker.christian@gmail.com; helo=mail-ww0-f53.google.com; Received: from mail-ww0-f53.google.com ([74.125.82.53]) by sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-MD5:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1Rc0yC-00061T-Fm for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Sat, 17 Dec 2011 20:35:01 +0000 Received: by wgbds1 with SMTP id ds1so7603844wgb.10 for <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>; Sat, 17 Dec 2011 12:34:54 -0800 (PST) Received: by 10.227.206.10 with SMTP id fs10mr8714609wbb.13.1324154094196; Sat, 17 Dec 2011 12:34:54 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.227.152.10 with HTTP; Sat, 17 Dec 2011 12:34:14 -0800 (PST) In-Reply-To: <CAAS2fgRqabDpXBZ7M8BAdzDAsRwFED4BPzoQJkLkwLOeURuXLA@mail.gmail.com> References: <CABr1YTebhitO4g-SarZ7H=aoG9a8zW1wd0rfR32o8i0vODbLJw@mail.gmail.com> <82659F61-0449-47BB-88DC-497E0D02F8A1@ceptacle.com> <CALxbBHUXEJLRDZ=RS1vuvkm7rDjFUPir0sU__f6TJXiTTQxWzA@mail.gmail.com> <CAAS2fgRqabDpXBZ7M8BAdzDAsRwFED4BPzoQJkLkwLOeURuXLA@mail.gmail.com> From: Christian Decker <decker.christian@gmail.com> Date: Sat, 17 Dec 2011 21:34:14 +0100 Message-ID: <CALxbBHWvJwOvnpGjN+A3MpzxrvzFGuJ0JBv6z_zz99Hvs0T+yg@mail.gmail.com> To: Gregory Maxwell <gmaxwell@gmail.com> Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=0015174c103669976804b44fa66d X-Spam-Score: -0.6 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (decker.christian[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1Rc0yC-00061T-Fm Cc: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Protocol extensions X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: <bitcoin-development.lists.sourceforge.net> List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development>, <mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=unsubscribe> List-Archive: <http://sourceforge.net/mailarchive/forum.php?forum_name=bitcoin-development> List-Post: <mailto:bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net> List-Help: <mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=help> List-Subscribe: <https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development>, <mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=subscribe> X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 17 Dec 2011 20:35:01 -0000 --0015174c103669976804b44fa66d Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Criticism accepted, although I'd appreciate it if you supply some reasons about why it's such a bad idea :-) The idea was never really popular and before starting work on a real implementation I wanted to test the water, and should it turn out it's complete non-sense I'm happy to accept that. I don't want to have a DHT for the DHTs sake, I was more interested in reducing the number of messages that need to be sent around the network, since network load is going to be a major problem if we ever grow beyond a certain point. Just wanting to brainstorm. Regards, Chris On Sat, Dec 17, 2011 at 8:28 PM, Gregory Maxwell <gmaxwell@gmail.com> wrote: > On Sat, Dec 17, 2011 at 8:37 AM, Christian Decker > <decker.christian@gmail.com> wrote: > > My idea was to structure the network in a hypercube and use prefixes to > > address different parts of the network, and use those prefixes also to > find > > the location where an item (transaction, block, ...) should be stored. > Each > > vertex in the hypercube is a small, highly connected, cluster of nodes. > > I strongly advise people who are not me to use this sort of scheme, so > that I may enjoy the benefits of robbing you blind. > > > .... But really, saying "some sort of DHT" without basically > presenting a working implementation that demonstrates the feasibility > of solving the very difficulty attack resistance problems these > schemes have basically triggers my time-wasting-idiot filter. (Or > likewise, presenting a fixed network structure that would have a nice > small and easily identifiable min-cut...) > > I don't doubt I'm completely alone in this, though perhaps I'm more > of a jerk about it. Even if your actual proposal might have some > merit you should be aware that every fool who has operated a > bittorrent client has heard of "DHT" and, although they may not even > understand what a hash table is, many have no reservation going around > suggesting them for _every_ distributed systems problem. Want to scale > matrix multiples? DHT! Want to validate bitcoin blocks? DHT! Network > syncup slow (because It's bound on validation related local IO)? DHT! > I suggest people solve the real problems first, then worry what name > to give the solutions. ;) > > To address gavin's tragedy of the commons concern, one useful feature > would being able to mutually authenticate a peer... then full nodes > could pick and choose which lite nodes they're willing to do (a lot > of) hard work for. This would also be valuable because some modes of > lite operation require non-zero trust of the full node being queried. > --0015174c103669976804b44fa66d Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Criticism accepted, although I'd appreciate it if you supply some reaso= ns about why it's such a bad idea :-)<br>The idea was never really popu= lar and before starting work on a real implementation I wanted to test the = water, and should it turn out it's complete non-sense I'm happy to = accept that.<br> <br>I don't want to have a DHT for the DHTs sake, I was more interested= in reducing the number of messages that need to be sent around the network= , since network load is going to be a major problem if we ever grow beyond = a certain point.<br> <br>Just wanting to brainstorm.<br><br>Regards,<br>Chris<br><div class=3D"g= mail_quote">On Sat, Dec 17, 2011 at 8:28 PM, Gregory Maxwell <span dir=3D"l= tr"><<a href=3D"mailto:gmaxwell@gmail.com">gmaxwell@gmail.com</a>></s= pan> wrote:<br> <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p= x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class=3D"im">On Sat, Dec 17, 2011 at 8:= 37 AM, Christian Decker<br> <<a href=3D"mailto:decker.christian@gmail.com">decker.christian@gmail.co= m</a>> wrote:<br> > My idea was to structure the network in a hypercube and use prefixes t= o<br> > address different parts of the network, and use those prefixes also to= find<br> > the location where an item (transaction, block, ...) should be stored.= Each<br> > vertex in the hypercube is a small, highly connected, cluster of nodes= .<br> <br> </div>I strongly advise people who are not me to use this sort of scheme, s= o<br> that I may enjoy the benefits of robbing you blind.<br> <br> <br> .... But really, saying "some sort of DHT" without basically<br> presenting a working implementation that demonstrates the feasibility<br> of solving the very difficulty attack resistance problems these<br> schemes have basically triggers my time-wasting-idiot filter. =A0(Or<br> likewise, presenting a fixed network structure that would have a nice<br> small and easily identifiable min-cut...)<br> <br> I don't doubt I'm completely alone in this, =A0though perhaps I'= ;m more<br> of a jerk about it. =A0 Even if your actual proposal might have some<br> merit you should be aware that every fool who has operated a<br> bittorrent client has heard of "DHT" and, although they may not e= ven<br> understand what a hash table is, many have no reservation going around<br> suggesting them for _every_ distributed systems problem. Want to scale<br> matrix multiples? DHT! Want to validate bitcoin blocks? DHT! Network<br> syncup slow (because It's bound on validation related local IO)? DHT!<b= r> I suggest people solve the real problems first, then worry what name<br> to give the solutions. ;)<br> <br> To address gavin's tragedy of the commons concern, one useful feature<b= r> would being able to mutually authenticate a peer... then full nodes<br> could pick and choose which lite nodes they're willing to do (a lot<br> of) hard work for. This would also be valuable because some modes of<br> lite operation require non-zero trust of the full node being queried.<br> </blockquote></div><br> --0015174c103669976804b44fa66d--