Received: from sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.194] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-2.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1WXMUF-0005hX-DX for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Tue, 08 Apr 2014 03:14:11 +0000 X-ACL-Warn: Received: from serv.jerviss.org ([12.47.47.47] helo=inana.jerviss.org) by sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:AES256-SHA:256) (Exim 4.76) id 1WXMUE-0008QA-In for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Tue, 08 Apr 2014 03:14:11 +0000 Received: from [10.8.2.254] ([192.151.168.151]) (username: kjj authenticated by PLAIN symmetric_key_bits=0) by inana.jerviss.org (8.13.6/8.12.11) with ESMTP id s383E0Wl027521 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA bits=128 verify=NOT); Mon, 7 Apr 2014 22:14:02 -0500 Message-ID: <53436977.4030808@jerviss.org> Date: Mon, 07 Apr 2014 22:13:59 -0500 From: kjj User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.2; WOW64; rv:28.0) Gecko/20100101 SeaMonkey/2.25 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Eric Martindale References: In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Received-SPF: pass (inana.jerviss.org: 192.151.168.151 is authenticated by a trusted mechanism) X-Spam-Score: -1.8 (-) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain -0.3 RP_MATCHES_RCVD Envelope sender domain matches handover relay domain X-Headers-End: 1WXMUE-0008QA-In Cc: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Why are we bleeding nodes? X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 08 Apr 2014 03:14:11 -0000 Multi-sig requires infrastructure. It isn't a magic wand that we can wave to make everyone secure. The protocols and techniques necessary don't exist yet, and apparently no one has much of an incentive to create them. I mean no offense, and I don't mean to pick on you. Your post stuck out while I was reading. Secure multi-sig is what we all want, but wanting apparently isn't enough to make it happen. Other random notes from reading this 50+ post thread: Perhaps we should have a config flag to prevent a node from serving IBD to new nodes. IBD crushes marginal machines, particularly those with spinning disks. This has been extensively discussed elsewhere. The ideal IBD hosts are serving the blockchain out of a RAM disk. Is there any interest in setting up a network of volunteers to host expensive servers with fast connections? It doesn't look too terribly difficult to figure out when a node has stopped asking for blocks in bulk, so we could add another config flag to eject nodes once they are done booting. Even ignoring IBD, I think that we are gradually outgrowing cheapass hosting options. Personally, I long ago gave up on answering forum questions about running nodes on virtual servers and VPSs. It is certainly still possible to run bitcoind on small boxes, but it isn't trivial any more. (Anyone running on less than my Athlon XP 1800+ with 896 MB RAM?) If we want those nodes back, we need to optimize the hell out of the memory use, and even that might not be enough. Eric Martindale wrote: > > We need to make it so mind-numbingly simple to "run Bitcoin correctly" > that the average user doesn't find reasons to do so in the course of > normal use. Right now, Coinbase and Bitstamp are winning in the user > experience battle, which technically endanger the user, and by proxy > the Bitcoin network. > > Multi-sig as a default is a start. It won't succeed unless the user > experience is simply better than trusted third parties, but we need to > start the education process with the very basic fundamental: trusting > a third-party with full access to your Bitcoin is just replacing one > centralized banking system with another. > >