Received: from sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.192] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-1.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1YLxVS-0008DU-19 for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Thu, 12 Feb 2015 17:24:50 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.212.175 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.212.175; envelope-from=oleganza@gmail.com; helo=mail-wi0-f175.google.com; Received: from mail-wi0-f175.google.com ([209.85.212.175]) by sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1YLxVQ-0001xD-UK for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Thu, 12 Feb 2015 17:24:50 +0000 Received: by mail-wi0-f175.google.com with SMTP id r20so6075892wiv.2 for ; Thu, 12 Feb 2015 09:24:42 -0800 (PST) X-Received: by 10.194.133.101 with SMTP id pb5mr10419770wjb.40.1423761882276; Thu, 12 Feb 2015 09:24:42 -0800 (PST) Received: from ?IPv6:2a01:e35:8a2c:a630:28c0:1758:7e4d:9520? ([2a01:e35:8a2c:a630:28c0:1758:7e4d:9520]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPSA id hn2sm6539058wjc.5.2015.02.12.09.24.41 (version=TLSv1 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA bits=128/128); Thu, 12 Feb 2015 09:24:41 -0800 (PST) Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="Apple-Mail=_DD1E8954-3242-433F-AFF8-C3FBA702C621" Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 8.1 \(1993\)) From: Oleg Andreev In-Reply-To: Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2015 18:24:40 +0100 Message-Id: <356E7F6E-300A-4127-9885-2183FB1DE447@gmail.com> References: <20150212064719.GA6563@savin.petertodd.org> To: Btc Drak X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1993) X-Spam-Score: -0.6 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (oleganza[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1YLxVQ-0001xD-UK Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] replace-by-fee v0.10.0rc4 X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2015 17:24:50 -0000 --Apple-Mail=_DD1E8954-3242-433F-AFF8-C3FBA702C621 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii > I think that is a misdirection on your part. The point of = replace-by-fee is to make 0-confirms reliably unreliable. Currently = people can "get away" with 0-confirms but it's only because most people = arent actively double spending, and when they do it is for higher value = targets. Double spend attacks are happening a lot more frequently than = is being admitted here, according to Peter from work with various = clients.=20 >=20 > Like single address reuse, people have gotten used to something which = is bad. Generally accepting 0-conf is also a bad idea(tm) and instant = confirmation solutions should be sought elsewhere. There are already = interesting solutions and concepts: greenaddress for example, and = CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY micropayment channels for example. Rather than = supporting and promoting risky 0-confirms, we need to spend time on = better alternative solutions that will work for everyone and not during = the honeymoon phase where attackers are fewer. Here's value-free assessment of the issue here: 1. Zero-conf txs are unsafe. 2. We'd all want to have a safer instant payments solution if possible. 3. As a social artifact, today zeroconf txs happen to work for some = people in some situations. 4. Replace-by-fee will break #3 and probably hasten development of #2. The discussion boils down to whether we should make #2 happen sooner by = breaking remnants of #3 sooner. I personally would rather not break anything, but work as fast as = possible on #2 so no matter when and how #3 becomes utterly broken, we = have a better solution. This implies that I also don't want to waste = time debating with Peter Todd and others. I want to be ready with a = working tool when zeroconf completely fails (with that patch or for some = other reasons). TL;DR: those who are against the patch are better off building a = decentralized clearing network rather than wasting time on debates. When = we have such network, we might all want this patch to be used for all = the reasons Peter has already outlined. --Apple-Mail=_DD1E8954-3242-433F-AFF8-C3FBA702C621 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
I = think that is a misdirection on your part. The point of replace-by-fee = is to make 0-confirms reliably unreliable. Currently people can "get = away" with 0-confirms but it's only because most people arent actively = double spending, and when they do it is for higher value targets. Double = spend attacks are happening a lot more frequently than is being admitted here, = according to Peter from work with various = clients. 

Like = single address reuse, people have gotten used to something which is bad. = Generally accepting 0-conf is also a bad idea(tm) and instant = confirmation solutions should be sought elsewhere. There are already = interesting solutions and concepts: greenaddress for example, and = CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY micropayment channels for example. Rather than = supporting and promoting risky 0-confirms, we need to spend time on = better alternative solutions that will work for everyone and not during = the honeymoon phase where attackers are = fewer.

Here's= value-free assessment of the issue here:

1. Zero-conf txs are unsafe.
2. We'd all want to have a safer instant payments solution if = possible.
3. As a social artifact, today zeroconf = txs happen to work for some people in some situations.
4. Replace-by-fee will break #3 and probably hasten = development of #2.

The discussion boils down to whether we should make #2 happen = sooner by breaking remnants of #3 sooner.

I personally would rather not break = anything, but work as fast as possible on #2 so no matter when and how = #3 becomes utterly broken, we have a better solution. This implies that = I also don't want to waste time debating with Peter Todd and others. I = want to be ready with a working tool when zeroconf completely fails = (with that patch or for some other reasons).

TL;DR: those who are against the patch = are better off building a decentralized clearing network rather than = wasting time on debates. When we have such network, we might all want = this patch to be used for all the reasons Peter has already = outlined.


= --Apple-Mail=_DD1E8954-3242-433F-AFF8-C3FBA702C621--