Received: from sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.194] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-2.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1SDwAw-0001Ei-3G for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Sat, 31 Mar 2012 11:08:54 +0000 X-ACL-Warn: Received: from vps7135.xlshosting.net ([178.18.90.41]) by sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) id 1SDwAv-0004to-96 for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Sat, 31 Mar 2012 11:08:54 +0000 Received: by vps7135.xlshosting.net (Postfix, from userid 1000) id 619E2244516; Sat, 31 Mar 2012 13:08:47 +0200 (CEST) Date: Sat, 31 Mar 2012 13:08:47 +0200 From: Pieter Wuille To: Luke-Jr Message-ID: <20120331110846.GA15011@vps7135.xlshosting.net> References: <201203310003.18599.luke@dashjr.org> <20120331105401.GA14117@vps7135.xlshosting.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20120331105401.GA14117@vps7135.xlshosting.net> X-PGP-Key: http://sipa.ulyssis.org/pubkey.asc User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.20 (2009-06-14) X-Spam-Score: 1.2 (+) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (pieter.wuille[at]gmail.com) 0.0 DKIM_ADSP_CUSTOM_MED No valid author signature, adsp_override is CUSTOM_MED -0.0 T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD Envelope sender domain matches handover relay domain 1.2 NML_ADSP_CUSTOM_MED ADSP custom_med hit, and not from a mailing list X-Headers-End: 1SDwAv-0004to-96 Cc: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] 0.7 merge recommendations/status X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 31 Mar 2012 11:08:54 -0000 On Sat, Mar 31, 2012 at 12:54:02PM +0200, Pieter Wuille wrote: > Something else was suggested by Jeff: what if a node accidentally connects to itself? > As we're moving towards multiple local addresses with IPv6, the chances for this > become larger. Finally, there are always extra risks involved, as we could unknowingly > be opening DoS or others vulnerabilities. My mistake: I mean two nodes connecting twice to eachother. There is already protection against a node connecting to itself. -- Pieter