Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2016 19:00:02 +1000
From: Anthony Towns <aj@erisian.com.au>
To: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Message-ID: <20160209090002.GB18324@sapphire.erisian.com.au>
References: <56B8EBF8.4050602@mattcorallo.com>
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Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] On Hardforks in the Context of SegWit
Precedence: list

On Mon, Feb 08, 2016 at 07:26:48PM +0000, Matt Corallo via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> As what a hard fork should look like in the context of segwit has never
> (!) been discussed in any serious sense, I'd like to kick off such a
> discussion with a (somewhat) specific proposal.

> Here is a proposed outline (to activate only after SegWit and with the
> currently-proposed version of SegWit):

Is this intended to be activated soon (this year?) or a while away
(2017, 2018?)?

> 1) The segregated witness discount is changed from 75% to 50%. The block
> size limit (ie transactions + witness/2) is set to 1.5MB. This gives a
> maximum block size of 3MB and a "network-upgraded" block size of roughly
> 2.1MB. This still significantly discounts script data which is kept out
> of the UTXO set, while keeping the maximum-sized block limited.

This would mean the limits go from:

   pre-segwit  segwit pkh  segwit 2/2 msig  worst case
   1MB         -           -                1MB
   1MB         1.7MB       2MB              4MB
   1.5MB       2.1MB       2.2MB            3MB

That seems like a fairly small gain (20% for pubkeyhash, which would
last for about 3 months if you're growth rate means doubling every 9
months), so this probably makes the most sense as a "quick cleanup"
change, that also safely demonstrates how easy/difficult doing a hard
fork is in practice?

On the other hand, if segwit wallet deployment takes longer than
hoped, the 50% increase for pre-segwit transactions might be a useful
release-valve.

Doing a "2x" hardfork with the same reduction to a 50% segwit discount
would (I think) look like:

   pre-segwit  segwit pkh  segwit 2/2 msig  worst case
   1MB         -           -                1MB
   1MB         1.7MB       2MB              4MB
   2MB         2.8MB       2.9MB            4MB

which seems somewhat more appealing, without making the worst-case any
worse; but I guess there's concern about the relay networking scaling
above around 2MB per block, at least prior to IBLT/weak-blocks/whatever?

> 2) In order to prevent significant blowups in the cost to validate
> [...] and transactions are only allowed to contain
> up to 20 non-segwit inputs. [...]

This could potentially make old, signed, but time-locked transactions
invalid. Is that a good idea?

> Along similar lines, we may wish to switch MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS from
> 1-per-50-bytes across the entire block to a per-transaction limit which
> is slightly looser (though not too much looser - even with libsecp256k1
> 1-per-50-bytes represents 2 seconds of single-threaded validation in
> just sigops on my high-end workstation).

I think turning MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS and MAX_BLOCK_SIZE into a combined
limit would be a good addition, ie:

  #define MAX_BLOCK_SIZE       1500000
  #define MAX_BLOCK_DATA_SIZE  3000000
  #define MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS     50000

  #define MAX_COST             3000000
  #define SIGOP_COST           (MAX_COST / MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS)
  #define BLOCK_COST           (MAX_COST / MAX_BLOCK_SIZE)
  #define DATA_COST            (MAX_COST / MAX_BLOCK_DATA_SIZE)

  if (utxo_data * BLOCK_COST + bytes * DATA_COST + sigops * SIGOP_COST
       > MAX_COST)
  {
      block_is_invalid();
  }

Though I think you'd need to bump up the worst-case limits somewhat to
make that work cleanly.

> 4) Instead of requiring the first four bytes of the previous block hash
> field be 0s, we allow them to contain any value. This allows Bitcoin
> mining hardware to reduce the required logic, making it easier to
> produce competitive hardware [1].
> [1] Simpler here may not be entirely true. There is potential for
> optimization if you brute force the SHA256 midstate, but if nothing
> else, this will prevent there being a strong incentive to use the
> version field as nonce space. This may need more investigation, as we
> may wish to just set the minimum difficulty higher so that we can add
> more than 4 nonce-bytes.

Could you just use leading non-zero bytes of the prevhash as additional
nonce?

So to work out the actual prev hash, set leading bytes to zero until
you hit a zero. Conversely, to add nonce info to a hash, if there are
N leading zero bytes, fill up the first N-1 (or less) of them with
non-zero values.

That would give a little more than 255**(N-1) possible values
((255**N-1)/254) to be exact). That would actually scale automatically
with difficulty, and seems easy enough to make use of in an ASIC?

Cheers,
aj