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Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2014 20:26:23 -0600
Message-ID: <CANg-TZAyr8LyRQ5e4DpQA8fXEbGq6kxv=peB9oYB+bU_xA98ww@mail.gmail.com>
From: Brooks Boyd <boydb@midnightdesign.ws>
To: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=f46d044288c0d95cd504f00d2605
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Tor / SPV
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>
> My goal here is not necessarily to hide P2P nodes - we still need lots of
> clearnet P2P nodes for the forseeable future no matter what. Rather we're
> just using hidden services as a way to get authentication and encryption.
> Actually the 6-hop hidden service circuits are overkill for this
> application, a 3-hop circuit would work just as well for most nodes that
> aren't Tor-exclusive.
>

Ah, I see, so you're intending to use the Tor hidden services not for their
original purpose (hiding), but rather as as "authentication" (someone may
spoof my clearnet IP, but only I have the private key that makes this Tor
hidden service connect to me, so you can trust when you connect to it it's
really me). So if you trust the clearnet IP to be a friendly node, that
makes a more secure connection, but if you're already talking to a bad
node, moving the communication to Tor doesn't change that. I agree the
six-hop circuits would be overkill for that; I wonder if the network
slowdown you get on Tor will be worth the increased security? Yes, you'll
be more protected from MITM, but if this is widely adopted, would the
overall transactions/second the Bitcoin network could handle go down?

Brooks

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blo=
ckquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #c=
cc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div=
 class=3D"gmail_quote">
<div>My goal here is not necessarily to hide P2P nodes - we still need lots=
 of clearnet P2P nodes for the forseeable future no matter what. Rather we&=
#39;re just using hidden services as a way to get authentication and encryp=
tion. Actually the 6-hop hidden service circuits are overkill for this appl=
ication, a 3-hop circuit would work just as well for most nodes that aren&#=
39;t Tor-exclusive.=A0<br>
</div>
</div></div></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Ah, I see, so you&#=
39;re intending to use the Tor hidden services not for their original purpo=
se (hiding), but rather as as &quot;authentication&quot; (someone may spoof=
 my clearnet IP, but only I have the private key that makes this Tor hidden=
 service connect to me, so you can trust when you connect to it it&#39;s re=
ally me). So if you trust the clearnet IP to be a friendly node, that makes=
 a more secure connection, but if you&#39;re already talking to a bad node,=
 moving the communication to Tor doesn&#39;t change that. I agree the six-h=
op circuits would be overkill for that; I wonder if the network slowdown yo=
u get on Tor will be worth the increased security? Yes, you&#39;ll be more =
protected from MITM, but if this is widely adopted, would the overall trans=
actions/second the Bitcoin network could handle go down?</div>
<div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Brooks</div=
><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div></div>

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