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[79.135.106.28]) by gmr-mx.google.com with ESMTPS id ffacd0b85a97d-39efa488ce6si39316f8f.5.2025.04.18.06.29.17 for (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Fri, 18 Apr 2025 06:29:17 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of darosior@protonmail.com designates 79.135.106.28 as permitted sender) client-ip=79.135.106.28; Date: Fri, 18 Apr 2025 13:29:12 +0000 To: Greg Sanders , Sjors Provoost From: "'Antoine Poinsot' via Bitcoin Development Mailing List" Cc: Bitcoin Development Mailing List Subject: Re: [bitcoindev] Relax OP_RETURN standardness restrictions Message-ID: <8nHXu-p_oewEJ1P95eVG57v_qugup8KrgFCQ5sSM88TKMumrjwIdk9cRs3cPon6cEwxSgSiE2OWnoU2xCfa6DtrnT2SSWRsJmT1wkpWh9k0=@protonmail.com> In-Reply-To: References: Feedback-ID: 7060259:user:proton X-Pm-Message-ID: 975a5f31fba51f9e9eab3d35424b1574c4967d69 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="b1=_n2XVMvsXoSViApXSqxhhlflCCIQbMzDRMk8oZnoCdps" X-Original-Sender: darosior@protonmail.com X-Original-Authentication-Results: gmr-mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@protonmail.com header.s=protonmail3 header.b=g5KNVrUA; spf=pass (google.com: domain of darosior@protonmail.com designates 79.135.106.28 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=darosior@protonmail.com; dmarc=pass (p=QUARANTINE sp=QUARANTINE dis=NONE) header.from=protonmail.com X-Original-From: Antoine Poinsot Reply-To: Antoine Poinsot Precedence: list Mailing-list: list bitcoindev@googlegroups.com; contact bitcoindev+owners@googlegroups.com List-ID: X-Google-Group-Id: 786775582512 List-Post: , List-Help: , List-Archive: , List-Unsubscribe: , X-Spam-Score: -1.0 (-) --b1=_n2XVMvsXoSViApXSqxhhlflCCIQbMzDRMk8oZnoCdps Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable > IIUC [..] The size of a single OP_RETURN is limited only by the maximum t= ransaction size, i.e. 100 kvB. Yes. >>> is there ever a case where using OP_RETURN to embed data actually resul= ts in fewer bytes onchain than embedding the same data using the segwit/tap= root witness space> Yes, a back-of-the-envelope calculation [..] > For reference Vojt=C4=9Bch Strnad also has a good StackExchange answer with= details about this here: https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/a/122322/101498= . TL;DR: OP_RETURN is cheaper for data smaller than 143 bytes. I don't thin= k this is sufficient reason not to drop the limit. > we *could have* reserved multi-output as some sort of signaling mechanism= [..] though I can't imagine what that would be. Additional OP_RETURNs woul= d be an expensive signal. Exactly, and it's not like we would be running out of upgrade hooks anytime= soon. On Friday, April 18th, 2025 at 8:54 AM, Greg Sanders = wrote: >> From perusing the Citrea paper (page 18) it seems a single output is eno= ugh, and they only need 144 bytes. > > From discussion in person it seems as though they could adapt their use t= o batch publish these transactions as SIGHASH_SINGLE|ACP transactions, with= each output being a 144-byte OP_RETURN. It's a less pressing issue perhaps= , but if we can derive additional efficiency and don't want to revisit this= conversation again later, may be worth doing. > > The only drawback I can see to the second step would be that we *could ha= ve* reserved multi-output as some sort of signaling mechanism since it's pr= eviously not relayable on Bitcoin Core, even with knob fiddling, though I c= an't imagine what that would be. Additional OP_RETURNs would be an expensiv= e signal. > > Greg > On Friday, April 18, 2025 at 8:16:00=E2=80=AFAM UTC-4 Sjors Provoost wrot= e: > >>> Op 17 apr 2025, om 20:52 heeft 'Antoine Poinsot' via Bitcoin Developmen= t Mailing List het volgende geschreven: >> >>> Developers are now designing constructions that work around these limit= ations. An example is Clementine, the recently-announced Citrea bridge, whi= ch uses unspendable Taproot outputs to store data in its "WatchtowerChallen= ge" transaction due to the standardness restrictions on the size of OP_RETU= RNs[^0]. Meanwhile, we have witnessed in recent years that the nudge is ine= ffective to deter storing data onchain. >>> >>> Since the restrictions on the usage of OP_RETURN outputs encourage harm= ful practices while being ineffective in deterring unwanted usage, i propos= e to drop them. I suggest to start by lifting the restriction on the size o= f the scriptPubKey for OP_RETURN outputs, as a first minimal step to stop e= ncouraging harmful behaviour, and to then proceed to lift the restriction o= n the number of OP_RETURN outputs per transactions. >> >> It might be better to do both, if only to avoid repeating the discussion= in a year. >> >> From perusing the Citrea paper (page 18) it seems a single output is eno= ugh, and they only need 144 bytes. >> >> 1. Regarding size >> >> The current ~80 byte limit was based on Counterparty needing it [0], and= otherwise using bare multisig. A similar argument would apply here. At the= time there was discussion about how much space Counterparty really needed = if their protocol was well implemented. >> >> The 144 bytes consist of a Groth16 proof and the total chain work. Along= similar lines we could pick a number based on various cryptographic commit= ment schemes, and then only raise the limit by that much. >> >> But that just guarantees repeating the argument in a year when some prot= ocol needs a slightly higher limit. In a post-inscription world that seems = pointless. My preference is to drop the size limit entirely. >> >> 2. Regarding count >> >> IIUC there's no consensus limit on the size of an OP_RETURN [1] and ther= e's also no standardness rule on the size of a scriptPubKey. The size of a = single OP_RETURN is limited only by the maximum transaction size, i.e. 100 = kvB. >> >> Without a size restriction on individual OP_RETURN outputs, there's no p= oint in limiting their number. >> >> That said, it would be interesting to know if any protocols are thinking= of using multiple OP_RETURN outputs. >> >> 3. Reminder why we didn't do this earlier >> >> In the August 2023 discussion [2] Murch wrote, in response to John Light= : >> >>>> is there ever a case where using OP_RETURN to embed data actually resu= lts in fewer bytes onchain than embedding the same data using the segwit/ta= proot witness space >>> >>> Yes, a back-of-the-envelope calculation has me thinking that only paylo= ads of 135 bytes would be cheaper with transcriptions than with nulldata ou= tputs. In detail: >> [...] >>> we learn that nulldata outputs are cheaper up to a payload size of 134 = bytes, only above that inscriptions become a more blockspace efficient data= carrier. >> >> Since we're discussing raising the limit to at least 144 bytes, the abov= e argument would no longer be relevant. >> >> And from what I recall at the time that was the only remaining reason to= keep the OP_RETURN restrictions around a bit longer, despite heavy use of = inscriptions. >> >> 4. PS - on liveliness assumptions >> >> The paper [3] states the following assumption: >> >>> We consider a secure ledger, i.e., a ledger that is safe and live. Safe= ty and liveness are defined as follows: >>> >>> ... >>> >>> Definition 2 (Liveness). A distributed ledger protocol is live with liv= eness parameter u if all transactions written by any correct party at round= r, appear in the ledgers of all correct parties by round r + u. >> >> For standard transactions this already not trivially true. See all of Li= ghtning pinning discussions. >> >> For non-standard transactions, does BitVM2 keep all its transactions und= er 100 kvB? >> >> Otherwise your liveness assumption requires a direct connection to at le= ast one miner / pool that is trusted to not censor (though you can shop aro= und until the deadline). >> >> Conversely, having actively used protocols that frequently require going= over some standardises limit puts pressure on that limit for the reasons A= ntoine outlined. So for anyone working on such protocols, please let this l= ist know, since these discussions can take a while. >> >> - Sjors >> >> [0] [https://www.reddit.com/r/btc/comments/80ycim/a_few_months_after_the= _counterparty_developers/?rdt=3D53592](https://www.reddit.com/r/btc/comment= s/80ycim/a_few_months_after_the_counterparty_developers/) >> [1] https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/a/117595/4948 >> [2] [https://gnusha.org/pi/bitcoindev/03551f0f-272e-2607...@murch.one/#t= ](https://gnusha.org/pi/bitcoindev/03551f0f-272e-2607-e95a-8ec671cbb9f3@mur= ch.one/#t) (click on the html attachment) >> [3] https://citrea.xyz/clementine_whitepaper.pdf > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups= "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an= email to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoinde= v/b51b952c-b8ba-4f13-a216-c29095c39d00n%40googlegroups.com. --=20 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "= Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an e= mail to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/= 8nHXu-p_oewEJ1P95eVG57v_qugup8KrgFCQ5sSM88TKMumrjwIdk9cRs3cPon6cEwxSgSiE2OW= noU2xCfa6DtrnT2SSWRsJmT1wkpWh9k0%3D%40protonmail.com. --b1=_n2XVMvsXoSViApXSqxhhlflCCIQbMzDRMk8oZnoCdps Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
IIUC [..] The s= ize of a single OP_RETURN is limited only by the maximum transaction size, = i.e. 100 kvB.
Yes.
=20
=20
=20

>> is there ever a case where using OP_RETURN to embed data actually=20 results in fewer bytes onchain than embedding the same data using the=20 segwit/taproot witness space
> Yes, a back-o= f-the-envelope calculation [..]
For reference Vojt=C4=9Bch Strnad also has a goo= d StackExchange answer with details about this here: https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/a/122322/101498= . TL;DR: OP_RETURN is cheaper for data smaller than 143 byt= es. I don't think this is sufficient reason not to drop the limit.

we *could have* reserved multi-outpu= t as some sort of signaling mechanism [..] though I can't imagine what that= would be. Additional OP_RETURNs would be an expensive signal.
Exactly, and it's not like we would be running out of= upgrade hooks anytime soon.
On Friday, April 18th, 2025 at 8:54 AM, Greg Sanders <gsanders87= @gmail.com> wrote:
> From perusing the Citrea paper (page 18) it seems a single= output is enough, and they only need 144 bytes.

From di= scussion in person it seems as though they could adapt their use to batch p= ublish these transactions as SIGHASH_SINGLE|ACP transactions, with each out= put being a 144-byte OP_RETURN. It's a less pressing issue perhaps, but if = we can derive additional efficiency and don't want to revisit this conversa= tion again later, may be worth doing.

The only dra= wback I can see to the second step would be that we *could have* reserved m= ulti-output as some sort of signaling mechanism since it's previously not r= elayable on Bitcoin Core, even with knob fiddling, though I can't imagine w= hat that would be. Additional OP_RETURNs would be an expensive signal.

Greg

On Friday, April 18, 2025 at 8:16:00=E2=80=AF= AM UTC-4 Sjors Provoost wrote:

> Op 17 apr 2025, om 20:52 heeft 'Antoine Poinsot' via Bitcoin Devel= opment Mailing List <bitco...@googlegroups= .com> het volgende geschreven:

> Developers are now designing constructions that work around these = limitations. An example is Clementine, the recently-announced Citrea bridge= , which uses unspendable Taproot outputs to store data in its "WatchtowerCh= allenge" transaction due to the standardness restrictions on the size of OP= _RETURNs[^0]. Meanwhile, we have witnessed in recent years that the nudge i= s ineffective to deter storing data onchain.
>
> Since the restrictions on the usage of OP_RETURN outputs encourage= harmful practices while being ineffective in deterring unwanted usage, i p= ropose to drop them. I suggest to start by lifting the restriction on the s= ize of the scriptPubKey for OP_RETURN outputs, as a first minimal step to s= top encouraging harmful behaviour, and to then proceed to lift the restrict= ion on the number of OP_RETURN outputs per transactions.

It might be better to do both, if only to avoid repeating the discussio= n in a year.

From perusing the Citrea paper (page 18) it seems a single output is en= ough, and they only need 144 bytes.

1. Regarding size

The current ~80 byte limit was based on Counterparty needing it [0], an= d otherwise using bare multisig. A similar argument would apply here. At th= e time there was discussion about how much space Counterparty really needed= if their protocol was well implemented.

The 144 bytes consist of a Groth16 proof and the total chain work. Alon= g similar lines we could pick a number based on various cryptographic commi= tment schemes, and then only raise the limit by that much.

But that just guarantees repeating the argument in a year when some pro= tocol needs a slightly higher limit. In a post-inscription world that seems= pointless. My preference is to drop the size limit entirely.

2. Regarding count

IIUC there's no consensus limit on the size of an OP_RETURN [1] and the= re's also no standardness rule on the size of a scriptPubKey. The size of a= single OP_RETURN is limited only by the maximum transaction size, i.e. 100= kvB.

Without a size restriction on individual OP_RETURN outputs, there's no = point in limiting their number.

That said, it would be interesting to know if any protocols are thinkin= g of using multiple OP_RETURN outputs.

3. Reminder why we didn't do this earlier

In the August 2023 discussion [2] Murch wrote, in response to John Ligh= t:

>> is there ever a case where using OP_RETURN to embed data actua= lly results in fewer bytes onchain than embedding the same data using the s= egwit/taproot witness space
>
> Yes, a back-of-the-envelope calculation has me thinking that only = payloads of 135 bytes would be cheaper with transcriptions than with nullda= ta outputs. In detail:
[...]
> we learn that nulldata outputs are cheaper up to a payload size of= 134 bytes, only above that inscriptions become a more blockspace efficient= data carrier.

Since we're discussing raising the limit to at least 144 bytes, the abo= ve argument would no longer be relevant.

And from what I recall at the time that was the only remaining reason t= o keep the OP_RETURN restrictions around a bit longer, despite heavy use of= inscriptions.

4. PS - on liveliness assumptions

The paper [3] states the following assumption:

> We consider a secure ledger, i.e., a ledger that is safe and live.= Safety and liveness are defined as follows:
>
> ...
>
> Definition 2 (Liveness). A distributed ledger protocol is live wit= h liveness parameter u if all transactions written by any correct party at = round r, appear in the ledgers of all correct parties by round r + u.

For standard transactions this already not trivially true. See all of L= ightning pinning discussions.

For non-standard transactions, does BitVM2 keep all its transactions un= der 100 kvB?

Otherwise your liveness assumption requires a direct connection to at l= east one miner / pool that is trusted to not censor (though you can shop ar= ound until the deadline).

Conversely, having actively used protocols that frequently require goin= g over some standardises limit puts pressure on that limit for the reasons = Antoine outlined. So for anyone working on such protocols, please let this = list know, since these discussions can take a while.

- Sjors

[0] https://www.reddit.com/r= /btc/comments/80ycim/a_few_months_after_the_counterparty_developers/?rdt=3D= 53592
[1] https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/a/117595/4948
[2] https://gnusha.org/pi/bitcoindev/03551f0f-272e-2607...= @murch.one/#t (click on the html attachment)
[3] https://citrea.xyz/clementine_whitepaper.pdf

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