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From: Johnson Lau <jl2012@xbt.hk>
In-Reply-To: <CAAS2fgRXYtTyqqQp8Ehs_q_KsT7usA+vYSmngStnndd1rWNVNw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 25 May 2018 18:14:48 +0800
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To: Gregory Maxwell <greg@xiph.org>,
	bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Should Graftroot be optional?
Precedence: list



> On 24 May 2018, at 10:08 AM, Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev =
<bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>=20
> On Thu, May 24, 2018 at 1:58 AM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev
> <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>> Thanks everyone who commented so far, but let me clarify the context
>> of this question first a bit more to avoid getting into the weeds too
>> much.
>=20
> since the signer(s) could have signed an arbitrary
> transaction instead, being able to delegate is strictly less powerful.
>=20


Actually, we could introduce graftroot-like delegation to all existing =
and new P2PK and P2PKH UTXOs with a softfork:

1. Define SIGHASH_GRAFTROOT =3D 0x40. New rules apply if (nHashType & =
SIGHASH_GRAFTROOT)

2. The third stack item MUST be at least 64 bytes, with 32-byte R and =
32-byte S, followed by a script of arbitrary size. It MUST be a valid =
signature for the script with the original public key.

3. The remaining stack items MUST solve the script

Conceptually this could be extended to arbitrary output types, not just =
P2PK and P2PKH. But it might be too complicated to describe here.

(We can=E2=80=99t do this in P2WPKH and P2WSH due to the implicit =
CLEANSTACK rules. But nothing could stop us to do it by introducing =
another witness structure (which is invisible to current nodes) and =
store the extra graftroot signatures and scripts)

A graftroot design like this is a strict subset of existing signature =
checking rules. If this is dangerous, the existing signature checking =
rules must be dangerous. This also doesn=E2=80=99t have any problem with =
blind signature, since the first signature will always sign the =
outpoint, with or without ANYONECANPAY. (As I pointed out in my reply to =
Andrew, his concern applies only to SIGHASH_NOINPUT, not graftroot)


=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D

With the example above, I believe there is no reason to make graftroot =
optional, at the expense of block space and/or reduced privacy. Any =
potential problem (e.g. interaction with blind signature) could be fixed =
by a proper rules design.=