Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 701E5B6B for ; Wed, 7 Jun 2017 00:26:52 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from homiemail-a38.g.dreamhost.com (homie.mail.dreamhost.com [208.97.132.208]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E605118F for ; Wed, 7 Jun 2017 00:26:51 +0000 (UTC) Received: from homiemail-a38.g.dreamhost.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by homiemail-a38.g.dreamhost.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 74B5B10AFB5; Tue, 6 Jun 2017 17:26:51 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha1; c=relaxed; d=taoeffect.com; h= content-type:mime-version:subject:from:in-reply-to:date:cc :message-id:references:to; s=taoeffect.com; bh=+IfOOXDwIbdeLAU4/ iF/JA2a3Ig=; b=yKDPToEK0DI2HG3EWLN1AP+2kcCVGKgIo5WJtkAB6+Es2JYto B/8qMR2yx2RafXbjcKUtHqYPIdf+DizexyF70y4QoCl4hElliUaWasNs6cLrkjkI tMaullOzM1RePH+YZVtiaSlGt7/A7WEjaF93/V8ju4nF4Dx/gO0S9VlBvs= Received: from [192.168.42.64] (184-23-255-227.fiber.dynamic.sonic.net [184.23.255.227]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) (Authenticated sender: contact@taoeffect.com) by homiemail-a38.g.dreamhost.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 1210310AFB0; Tue, 6 Jun 2017 17:26:50 -0700 (PDT) Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="Apple-Mail=_10DEA4B2-422B-4D02-B9F8-EAF50EEFB722"; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; micalg=pgp-sha512 Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 10.3 \(3273\)) From: Tao Effect In-Reply-To: Date: Tue, 6 Jun 2017 17:26:50 -0700 X-Mao-Original-Outgoing-Id: 518488009.781592-063d0208f953a89a3226b2ec5e69d596 Message-Id: <52DF2F59-49DF-4F90-B2A6-AF903EACE6A0@taoeffect.com> References: <31833011-7179-49D1-A07E-8FD9556C4534@taoeffect.com> <20170606232015.GA11830@erisian.com.au> <38DDC3A2-2727-477E-A6FF-7638842AAB03@taoeffect.com> <78F1D626-0D38-48FD-B2AF-378765182751@taoeffect.com> To: Kekcoin X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3273) X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.0 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org X-Mailman-Approved-At: Wed, 07 Jun 2017 12:52:53 +0000 Cc: "bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" , Anthony Towns Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Replay attacks make BIP148 and BIP149 untennable X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 07 Jun 2017 00:26:52 -0000 --Apple-Mail=_10DEA4B2-422B-4D02-B9F8-EAF50EEFB722 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="Apple-Mail=_F2419FAE-D926-4AE8-B962-236FA0884F11" --Apple-Mail=_F2419FAE-D926-4AE8-B962-236FA0884F11 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii I don't know what you mean by "render the replay threat moot." If you don't have replay protection, replay is always a threat. A very = serious one. -- Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also = sharing with the NSA. > On Jun 6, 2017, at 5:19 PM, Kekcoin > wrote: >=20 > Hmm, that's not the difference I was talking about. I was referring to = the fact that using "post-chainsplit coinbases from the non-148 chain" = to unilaterally (ie. can be done without action on the 148-chain) taint = coins is more secure in extreme-adverserial cases such as secret-mining = reorg attacks (as unfeasibly expensive they may be); the only = large-scale (>100 block) reorganization the non-148 chain faces should = be a resolution of the chainsplit and therefore render the replay threat = moot. >=20 --Apple-Mail=_F2419FAE-D926-4AE8-B962-236FA0884F11 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii I don't know what you mean by "render the replay threat = moot."

If you don't = have replay protection, replay is always a threat. A very serious = one.

--
Please do not email me anything that you are not = comfortable also sharing with the NSA.

On Jun 6, 2017, at 5:19 PM, Kekcoin <kekcoin@protonmail.com> wrote:

Hmm, = that's not the difference I was talking about. I was referring to the = fact that using "post-chainsplit coinbases from the non-148 chain" to = unilaterally (ie. can be done without action on the 148-chain) taint = coins is more secure in extreme-adverserial cases such as secret-mining = reorg attacks (as unfeasibly expensive they may be); the only = large-scale (>100 block) reorganization the non-148 chain faces = should be a resolution of the chainsplit and therefore render the replay = threat moot.


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