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Date: Wed, 23 Apr 2014 18:38:21 +0300
Message-ID: <CAE28kUQqFJUJSiSV4PSF2QK04D3GuL1n2EF46Yo3o_-LYsgSTA@mail.gmail.com>
From: Alex Mizrahi <alex.mizrahi@gmail.com>
To: Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11340566b4c88104f7b785c7
Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Coinbase reallocation to discourage
	Finney attacks
Precedence: list

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> And it still would. Non-collusive miners cast votes based on the outcome
> of their own attempts to double spend.
>

Individually rational strategy is to vote for coinbase reallocation on
every block.

Yes, in that case nobody will get reward. It is similar to prisoner's
dilemma: equilibrium has worst pay-off.
In practice that would mean that simple game-theoretic models are no longer
applicable, as they lead to absurd results.


> I'm using it in the same sense Satoshi used it. Honest miners work to
> prevent double spends. That's the entire justification for their existence.
> Miners that are deliberately trying to double spend are worse than useless.
>

Miners work to get rewards.
It absolutely doesn't matter whether they are deliberately trying to
double-spend or not: they won't be able to double-spend without a collusion.

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div=
>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;b=
order-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"=
gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">
<div class=3D""><div></div></div><div>
And it still would. Non-collusive miners cast votes based on the outcome of=
 their own attempts to double spend. </div></div></div></div></blockquote><=
div><br></div><div>Individually rational strategy is to vote for coinbase r=
eallocation on every block.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Yes, in that case nobody will get reward. It is similar=
 to prisoner&#39;s dilemma: equilibrium has worst pay-off.</div><div>In pra=
ctice that would mean that simple game-theoretic models are no longer appli=
cable, as they lead to absurd results.</div>
<div>=C2=A0<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 =
0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div class=3D""><div></div>=
</div><div>I&#39;m using it in the same sense Satoshi used it. Honest miner=
s work to prevent double spends. That&#39;s the entire justification for th=
eir existence. Miners that are deliberately trying to double spend are wors=
e than useless.</div>

</div></div></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Miners work to get =
rewards.=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">It absolutely doesn&#39;t ma=
tter whether they are deliberately trying to double-spend or not: they won&=
#39;t be able to double-spend without a collusion.</div>
</div>

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