Received: from sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.192] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-2.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1YLu49-000290-VH for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Thu, 12 Feb 2015 13:44:25 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 74.125.82.53 as permitted sender) client-ip=74.125.82.53; envelope-from=mh.in.england@gmail.com; helo=mail-wg0-f53.google.com; Received: from mail-wg0-f53.google.com ([74.125.82.53]) by sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1YLu48-0002vL-Rc for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Thu, 12 Feb 2015 13:44:25 +0000 Received: by mail-wg0-f53.google.com with SMTP id x13so10121374wgg.12 for ; Thu, 12 Feb 2015 05:44:18 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.194.93.134 with SMTP id cu6mr7588666wjb.79.1423748658750; Thu, 12 Feb 2015 05:44:18 -0800 (PST) Sender: mh.in.england@gmail.com Received: by 10.194.188.11 with HTTP; Thu, 12 Feb 2015 05:44:18 -0800 (PST) In-Reply-To: References: <20150212064719.GA6563@savin.petertodd.org> Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2015 14:44:18 +0100 X-Google-Sender-Auth: PR22O3ZJ0cCzZo_Ak6HoCl18ArE Message-ID: From: Mike Hearn To: Natanael Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=047d7bb7092c0decf1050ee4515d X-Spam-Score: -0.5 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (mh.in.england[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature 0.0 AWL AWL: Adjusted score from AWL reputation of From: address X-Headers-End: 1YLu48-0002vL-Rc Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] replace-by-fee v0.10.0rc4 X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2015 13:44:26 -0000 --047d7bb7092c0decf1050ee4515d Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > You can prove a doublespend instantly by showing two conflicting > transactions both signed by thar party. This pair can be distributed as a > proof of malice globally in seconds via a push messaging mechanism. > There have been lots of e-cash schemes proposed in the academic literature that work like this, or variants of it. Schemes where participants are anonymous until they double spend are popular. Let's re-write your proposal but substituting the word notary for miner: To profit, the *miner* would have to be sure the payout from agreeing on collusion (or to perform the doublespend themselves) would pay out better than acting honestly for a given amount of time info the future. This means transactions for small sums are secure. That's the exact argument we're having. The assertion is that a "rational" notary would kill his own business to increase his profits in the next few hours. So you're just arguing that a notary is different to a miner, without spelling out exactly why. Does the notary have to make a big up front investment? If so, why is that different to mining investment? Is the notary non-anonymous and afraid of being charged with payment fraud? If so, note that big miners do lots of non-anonymous things too, like renting warehouses and importing specialised equipment. Is it because of the big up front collateral they're meant to have lying around? If so, how do you ensure a fluid market for notaries? --047d7bb7092c0decf1050ee4515d Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

You can prove a doublespend instantly by showin= g two conflicting transactions both signed by thar party. This pair can be = distributed as a proof of malice globally in seconds via a push messaging m= echanism.

There have been lots of e-cash schemes p= roposed in the academic literature that work like this, or variants of it. = Schemes where participants are anonymous until they double spend are popula= r.

Let's re-write your proposal but substituti= ng the word notary for miner:

To profit, the miner would have to be sure the payout fro= m agreeing on collusion (or to perform the doublespend themselves) would pa= y out better than acting honestly for a given amount of time info the futur= e. This means transactions for small sums are secure.

That's the exa= ct argument we're having. The assertion is that a "rational" = notary would kill his own business to increase his profits in the next few = hours. So you're just arguing that a notary is different to a miner, wi= thout spelling out exactly why.

Does the notary have to make a big up front investment? If so, why is = that different to mining investment?

Is the notary non-anonymous and afraid of being charged wit= h payment fraud? If so, note that big miners do lots of non-anonymous thing= s too, like renting warehouses and importing specialised equipment.=C2=A0

Is it because of the b= ig up front collateral they're meant to have lying around? If so, how d= o you ensure a fluid market for notaries?


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