Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of m.gmane.org
	designates 80.91.229.12 as permitted sender)
	client-ip=80.91.229.12;
	envelope-from=gcbd-bitcoin-development@m.gmane.org;
	helo=lo.gmane.org; 
To: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
From: Elden Tyrell <tyrell.elden@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 2 Jan 2012 17:39:09 -0800
Message-ID: <jdtm7t$4ed$1@dough.gmane.org>
References: <jdrds3$3tf$1@dough.gmane.org>
	<CAAS2fgTOZKM9c=UvfVW1rajnPQVQMNS4mR5KUqq8p0HreG=vuQ@mail.gmail.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
User-Agent: Unison/2.1.6
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] does "stubbing" off Merkle trees reduce
	initial download bandwidth?
Precedence: list

On 2012-01-02 14:41:10 -0800, Gregory Maxwell said:
> make this possible: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=21995.0

Neat!  I had a similar idea but you've clearly beat me to [a big part of] it.


> Er, no—  if a node controls the private keys for a transaction, and
> that transaction makes it into the chain then it can safely assume
> that its unspent (at least once its buried a few blocks into the
> chain).

I'm not so sure about that.  If you accept X successor blocks as proof 
that none of the transactions in a block re-used an output, then the 
cost of attacking is X*50BTC since the hashpower needed for the attack 
could have earned that much reward.

However, an attacker could use the same faked X-block sequence to 
attack multiple clients by putting several double-spend transactions in 
the first faked block.  This would spread out the cost over more than 
one attack.  So simply checking that the value of the transaction is 
less than X*50 isn't necessarily enough, although the logistics of the 
attack aren't exactly easy.

There's also the question of knowing what the difficulty for those X 
blocks ought to be.  If the attacker controls your network connection 
(e.g. your ISP attacks you) you wouldn't be able to get a second 
opinion on how high the difficulty ought to be, and might get fooled by 
X very-low-difficulty blocks that were each produced with a lot less 
than 50BTC worth of hashpower.

  - e