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Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2013 12:19:58 +0200
Message-ID: <CAPg+sBgXviFDBZqS5EhCkb2fLsvP3ySN+b_Q9K3tK5Q=z8Bv_w@mail.gmail.com>
From: Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille@gmail.com>
To: Andy Parkins <andyparkins@gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>,
	Andreas Schildbach <andreas@schildbach.de>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] HTTP REST API for bitcoind
Precedence: list

On Tue, Jul 23, 2013 at 12:00 PM, Andy Parkins <andyparkins@gmail.com> wrote:
>> The REST API has nothing to do with SPV clients; it's similar to the RPC
>> interface and won't be exposed to the network as a whole.
>
> Yes; I know that.  I'm saying that it would make it easier for SPV (and other
> lightweight clients) for that matter.

In what way?

>> Increasing the resource usage by SPV clients on full nodes is undesirable;
>
> I don't think that's thinking big enough.  What I imagine is that making it
> easier and easier to store a partial blockchain would result in lower demand
> on full nodes.

A partial blockchain is quite useless, as you can't build an UTXO set from it.
If you're talking simply about the storage requirements for maintaining history,
perhaps, but why rely on SPV nodes for this? Right now, those don't store any
blocks at all, and there is no reason why they should.

The only requirement is that old blocks remain available for new full
nodes to be
able to bootstrap. It's certainly not required that everyone keeps
every block ever
created. That's how the software currently works, but as soon as we get to a few
protocol changes that would allow new full nodes to find specific
peers with the data
they need, we can have fully-verifying yet (partially) pruning nodes.
I think that's a
much better idea than conflating "maintaining a wallet" with
"maintaining a subset
of historical block data".


> Obviously the miners would still be keeping the entire
> chain, but we'd have a lot more nodes in the network, each contributing a
> little bit and so reducing the load on the full nodes.

I disagree strongly here. The rules of the network are enforced by
full nodes, not by
miners - they are just trying to satisfy the rules demaned by the network.

And as far as I know, there is no way to do some "partial validation"
using just the blocks
you care about (and remember, SPV nodes currently have none at all).
One interesting
possibility here is fraud proofs, where the network can relay proofs
that certain blocks or
transactions are violating certain network rules. In this case, even
SPV nodes can just
communicate with eachother and get some "herd immunity". But storing some blocks
doesn't matter here - it is all about whether you can maintain the
UTXO set or not.

>
>> In any case UTXO data currently requires you to have full trust in
>> whomever is providing you with it, and that situation will continue
>> until UTXO commitments are implemented - if they are implemented.
>
> Almost; because you can go and ask someone else the same question, it's pretty
> easy to check if you're being lied to.  Also, it's far easier to maintain a
> headers-only block chain.  When you fetch your relevant block subset, you can
> easily see that they are real blocks in your headers-only blockchain; and so
> it's pretty much impossible to lie to "give me the block containing
> transaction X".

That's assuming there is no powerful enough attacker that can benefit from doing
a sybil attack on you. For SPV nodes currently, that risk is limited
to an attacker
that can spend enough on faking a chain with valid proof-of-work, to make you
accept a transaction that will be reversed.

If you go let SPV nodes rely on unauthenticated UTXO set data, there is no such
limitation, and they can let you believe *anything*. There are some safeguards,
like combining it with merkle paths for all outputs that credit you (which again
requires a more expensive index on the other side), but you can't ever guarantee
that a particular outputs isn't spent yet.

-- 
Pieter