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From: Nagaev Boris <bnagaev@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 20:29:58 -0300
Message-ID: <CAFC_Vt4aDvWsUh4q+UxFa3ZyRC_eK2ek7HR-G+nOiaC-wSa-WA@mail.gmail.com>
To: Greg Tonoski <gregtonoski@gmail.com>
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Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] [BUG]: Bitcoin blockspace price discrimination
 put simple transactions at disadvantage
Precedence: list

On Sat, Jan 13, 2024 at 12:03=E2=80=AFPM Greg Tonoski <gregtonoski@gmail.co=
m> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Dec 27, 2023 at 8:06=E2=80=AFPM Nagaev Boris <bnagaev@gmail.com> =
wrote:
> >
> > On Wed, Dec 27, 2023 at 2:26=E2=80=AFPM Greg Tonoski via bitcoin-dev
> > <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > > As a result, there are incentives structure distorted and critical
> > > inefficiencies/vulnerabilities (e.g. misallocation of block space,
> > > blockspace value destruction, disincentivized simple transaction,
> > > centralization around complex transactions originators).
> > >
> > > Price of blockspace should be the same for any data (1 byte =3D 1 byt=
e,
> > > irrespectively of location inside or outside of witness), e.g. 205/20=
5
> > > and 767/767 bytes in the examples above.
> >
> > Witness data does not contribute to utxo set. The discount on storing
> > data in witness creates an incentive to store data exactly in the
> > witness and not in the parts contributing to utxo set.
> >
> > $ du -sh blocks/ chainstate/
> > 569G    blocks/
> > 9.3G    chainstate/
> >
> > Witness data is part of the "blocks" directory which is not
> > latency-critical and can be stored on a slow and cheap storage device.
> > Directory "chainstate" contains the data needed to validate new
> > transactions and should fit into a fast storage device otherwise
> > initial block download takes weeks. It is important to maintain the
> > incentives structure, resulting in a small chainstate.
>
> I think that the argument "discount on storing data in witness creates
> an incentive to store data exactly in the witness (...)" is
> fallacious. The "witness discount" does not affect the cost of data
> storage in a Bitcoin node. What the "witness discount" affects is the
> priority of a transaction pending confirmation only. For example, a
> SegWit type of transaction of size of 1MB is prioritized (by miners)
> over a non-SegWit transaction of the same size and fee. "Segwit
> discount" benefits bloated transactions and puts simple transactions
> at disadvantage (demonstrated at
> "https://gregtonoski.github.io/bitcoin/segwit-mispricing/comparison-of-co=
sts.html"
> and "https://gregtonoski.github.io/bitcoin/segwit-mispricing/Comparison_o=
f_4MB_and_1.33MB_blocks_in_Bitcoin.pdf").
>
> The Bitcoin fee is not charged per UTXO set size. It is not charged
> from a node operator. Nodes are up and running independently of
> Bitcoin fees.
>
> Any relation between UTXO set size and discount would be artificial
> and inefficient, wouldn't it?

Node operators are likely to put UTXO set to SSD and blocks to HDD.
SSD is more expensive than HDD. It is aligned with the fact that
people putting data into blockchain are financially motivated to put
it into witness data, i.e. into HDD. If miners charge the same per 1
byte in a transaction output and 1 byte in witness, then people
putting data into blockchain could put it into transaction outputs
(why not, if the price is the same), inflating the UTXO set and making
node operators buy bigger SSD (more costs for node operators). As a
node operator, I prefer the current structure.

--=20
Best regards,
Boris Nagaev