Return-Path: <hampus.sjoberg@gmail.com> Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2C1D7949 for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>; Sat, 10 Dec 2016 12:05:26 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-wm0-f54.google.com (mail-wm0-f54.google.com [74.125.82.54]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CE022E3 for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>; Sat, 10 Dec 2016 12:05:24 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-wm0-f54.google.com with SMTP id a197so9012463wmd.0 for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>; Sat, 10 Dec 2016 04:05:24 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=fOdX7tWxOXXyVAtbvDyfMj9sE7DjzhrY7HSSTEzUNiM=; b=Xea79CjPlpodrEDj1Dq8dKLSql0LuhQ6KNOwIKhLsOm5dERDkYXIofgKjuDhxg4LiK vBc23O+L8gY6ljtCmS5k0Sv4Cu35BdtYFC7SPym1Ph6Xf5uc77nCPpF7h9IDuo5zhuxI WghkgbVj5iRAh12ZNu+FA8A5h6L1cnx9yj4q94xQrnYWjI2TatK+Ibr/nE4GRy0NM4BX cA7Vb9/Ku5i8aHHUedCiEG/PrxzRD5e4ShQYWDpPysFH9gYkrCdg8ZmQtWtXqH2rbu8r 2rH/bTB4apNlxNN1uIFirJZ0pUUmdfjFRbrYLDL26Q0Q5U/SuKpzlBB5j67loMCW4Ncw M9kQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date :message-id:subject:to; bh=fOdX7tWxOXXyVAtbvDyfMj9sE7DjzhrY7HSSTEzUNiM=; b=nByLAHz85A2VXDTpnSrst0dozdzD0/o23RggHKoWTYS6owwO+sMVs7dXPHmMwgWRef f45nkXGTIJYPPBnCcIKrLHRAb5KoFQ/52172qs/1HvOXaG3OveUt3qdlvIXthA4fgqOB Ra4tdAmJO17iw/TORhETo0Xw2bXtiIimkUrpGWoGnQAUMiLRqn5oyMudPj9CCGPZZaDL 88k7UlP/F5oLhveTwLI+8vSC9Aj7DiJS1EWosdj6C37xtbRQT0VqRJq+ofQilcmEY2Rp UZdlyLYNHYdk4u3IyMUKK4a8BEYRSmhcWWCGuPBjVp8OAGHvqNroVqAcsAPZcDztvLrT U4pQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AKaTC01ZuOJiyCTj/0VemPOSFkZO6DpW9YTMBfu3bAxX9HH3xIrkLsf1+UzM8RK1AP6scqoKibQ3GNNr7r7d9Q== X-Received: by 10.28.25.134 with SMTP id 128mr10107446wmz.37.1481371523379; Sat, 10 Dec 2016 04:05:23 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.28.63.66 with HTTP; Sat, 10 Dec 2016 04:05:22 -0800 (PST) In-Reply-To: <c318f76d-0904-2e1b-453b-60179f8209bb@sky-ip.org> References: <CAGCNRJqdu7DMC+AMR4mYKRAYStRMKVGqbnjtEfmzcoeMij5u=A@mail.gmail.com> <c318f76d-0904-2e1b-453b-60179f8209bb@sky-ip.org> From: =?UTF-8?Q?Hampus_Sj=C3=B6berg?= <hampus.sjoberg@gmail.com> Date: Sat, 10 Dec 2016 13:05:22 +0100 Message-ID: <CAFMkqK9v6OkNd04FvfMfk+1zYtvZwm0dgx8L=J0ehn0iuyVVoA@mail.gmail.com> To: s7r@sky-ip.org, Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a114d46b86e7b2105434cafd4 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.0 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, FREEMAIL_FROM, HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org X-Mailman-Approved-At: Sat, 10 Dec 2016 13:57:30 +0000 Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Managing block size the same way we do difficulty (aka Block75) X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev.lists.linuxfoundation.org> List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/options/bitcoin-dev>, <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=unsubscribe> List-Archive: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/> List-Post: <mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> List-Help: <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=help> List-Subscribe: <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev>, <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=subscribe> X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 10 Dec 2016 12:05:26 -0000 --001a114d46b86e7b2105434cafd4 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable > While disk space requirements might not be a big problem, block propagation time is Is block propagation time really still a problem? Compact blocks and FIBRE should help here. > Bitcoin, because its fundamental design, can scale by using offchain solutions. I agree. However, I believe that on-chain scaling will be needed regardless of which off-chain solution gains popularity. 2016-12-10 11:44 GMT+01:00 s7r via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>: > t. khan via bitcoin-dev wrote: > > BIP Proposal - Managing Bitcoin=E2=80=99s block size the same way we do > > difficulty (aka Block75) > > > > The every two-week adjustment of difficulty has proven to be a > > reasonably effective and predictable way of managing how quickly blocks > > are mined. Bitcoin needs a reasonably effective and predictable way of > > managing the maximum block size. > > > > It=E2=80=99s clear at this point that human beings should not be involv= ed in the > > determination of max block size, just as they=E2=80=99re not involved i= n > > deciding the difficulty. > > > > Instead of setting an arbitrary max block size (1MB, 2MB, 8MB, etc.) or > > passing the decision to miners/pool operators, the max block size shoul= d > > be adjusted every two weeks (2016 blocks) using a system similar to how > > difficulty is calculated. > > > > Put another way: let=E2=80=99s stop thinking about what the max block s= ize > > should be and start thinking about how full we want the average block t= o > > be regardless of size. Over the last year, we=E2=80=99ve had averages o= f 75% or > > higher, so aiming for 75% full seems reasonable, hence naming this > > concept =E2=80=98Block75=E2=80=99. > > > > The target capacity over 2016 blocks would be 75%. If the last 2016 > > blocks are more than 75% full, add the difference to the max block size= . > > Like this: > > > > MAX_BLOCK_BASE_SIZE =3D 1000000 > > TARGET_CAPACITY =3D 750000 > > AVERAGE_OVER_CAP =3D average block size of last 2016 blocks minus > > TARGET_CAPACITY > > > > To check if a block is valid, =E2=89=A4 (MAX_BLOCK_BASE_SIZE + AVERAGE_= OVER_CAP) > > > > For example, if the last 2016 blocks are 85% full (average block is 850 > > KB), add 10% to the max block size. The new max block size would be > > 1,100 KB until the next 2016 blocks are mined, then reset and > > recalculate. The 1,000,000 byte limit that exists currently would > > remain, but would effectively be the minimum max block size. > > > > Another two weeks goes by, the last 2016 blocks are again 85% full, but > > now that means they average 935 KB out of the 1,100 KB max block size. > > This is 93.5% of the 1,000,000 byte limit, so 18.5% would be added to > > that to make the new max block size of 1,185 KB. > > > > Another two weeks passes. This time, the average block is 1,050 KB. The > > new max block size is calculated to 1,300 KB (as blocks were 105% full, > > minus the 75% capacity target, so 30% added to max block size). > > > > Repeat every 2016 blocks, forever. > > > > If Block75 had been applied at the difficulty adjustment on November > > 18th, the max block size would have been 1,080KB, as the average block > > during that period was 83% full, so 8% is added to the 1,000KB limit. > > The current size, after the December 2nd adjustment would be 1,150K. > > > > Block75 would allow the max block size to grow (or shrink) in response > > to transaction volume, and does so predictably, reasonably quickly, and > > in a method that prevents wild swings in block size or transaction fees= . > > It attempts to keep blocks at 75% total capacity over each two week > > period, the same way difficulty tries to keep blocks mined every ten > > minutes. It also keeps blocks as small as possible. > > > > Thoughts? > > > > -t.k. > > > > I like the idea. It is good wrt growing the max. block size > automatically without human action, but the main problem (or question) > is not how to grow this number, it is what number can the network > handle, considering both miners and users. While disk space requirements > might not be a big problem, block propagation time is. The time required > for a block to propagate in the network (or at least to all the miners) > is directly dependent of its size. If blocks take too much time to > propagate in the network, the orphan rate will increase in unpredictable > ways. For example if the internet speed in China is worse than in > Europe, and miners in China have more than 50% of the hashing power, > blocks mined by European miners might get orphaned. > > The system as described can also be gamed, by filling the network with > transactions. Miners have the monetary interest to include as many > transactions as possible in a block in order to collect the fees. > Regardless how you think about it, there has to be a maximum block size > that the network will allow as a consensus rule. Increasing it > dynamically based on transaction volume will reach a point where the > number got big enough that it broke things. Bitcoin, because its > fundamental design, can scale by using offchain solutions. > > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > --001a114d46b86e7b2105434cafd4 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable <div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div><div>> While disk space requirements might no= t be a big problem, block propagation time is<br><br></div>Is block propaga= tion time really still a problem? Compact blocks and FIBRE should help here= .<br><br>> Bitcoin, because its fundamental design, can scale by using o= ffchain solutions.<br></div><br></div>I agree.<br>However, I believe that o= n-chain scaling will be needed regardless of which off-chain solution gains= popularity.<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_qu= ote">2016-12-10 11:44 GMT+01:00 s7r via bitcoin-dev <span dir=3D"ltr"><<= a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target=3D"_blank">b= itcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a>></span>:<br><blockquote class= =3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padd= ing-left:1ex"><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5">t. khan via bitcoin-d= ev wrote:<br> > BIP Proposal - Managing Bitcoin=E2=80=99s block size the same way we d= o<br> > difficulty (aka Block75)<br> ><br> > The every two-week adjustment of difficulty has proven to be a<br> > reasonably effective and predictable way of managing how quickly block= s<br> > are mined. Bitcoin needs a reasonably effective and predictable way of= <br> > managing the maximum block size.<br> ><br> > It=E2=80=99s clear at this point that human beings should not be invol= ved in the<br> > determination of max block size, just as they=E2=80=99re not involved = in<br> > deciding the difficulty.<br> ><br> > Instead of setting an arbitrary max block size (1MB, 2MB, 8MB, etc.) o= r<br> > passing the decision to miners/pool operators, the max block size shou= ld<br> > be adjusted every two weeks (2016 blocks) using a system similar to ho= w<br> > difficulty is calculated.<br> ><br> > Put another way: let=E2=80=99s stop thinking about what the max block = size<br> > should be and start thinking about how full we want the average block = to<br> > be regardless of size. Over the last year, we=E2=80=99ve had averages = of 75% or<br> > higher, so aiming for 75% full seems reasonable, hence naming this<br> > concept =E2=80=98Block75=E2=80=99.<br> ><br> > The target capacity over 2016 blocks would be 75%. If the last 2016<br= > > blocks are more than 75% full, add the difference to the max block siz= e.<br> > Like this:<br> ><br> > MAX_BLOCK_BASE_SIZE =3D 1000000<br> > TARGET_CAPACITY =3D 750000<br> > AVERAGE_OVER_CAP =3D average block size of last 2016 blocks minus<br> > TARGET_CAPACITY<br> ><br> > To check if a block is valid, =E2=89=A4 (MAX_BLOCK_BASE_SIZE + AVERAGE= _OVER_CAP)<br> ><br> > For example, if the last 2016 blocks are 85% full (average block is 85= 0<br> > KB), add 10% to the max block size. The new max block size would be<br= > > 1,100 KB until the next 2016 blocks are mined, then reset and<br> > recalculate. The 1,000,000 byte limit that exists currently would<br> > remain, but would effectively be the minimum max block size.<br> ><br> > Another two weeks goes by, the last 2016 blocks are again 85% full, bu= t<br> > now that means they average 935 KB out of the 1,100 KB max block size.= <br> > This is 93.5% of the 1,000,000 byte limit, so 18.5% would be added to<= br> > that to make the new max block size of 1,185 KB.<br> ><br> > Another two weeks passes. This time, the average block is 1,050 KB. Th= e<br> > new max block size is calculated to 1,300 KB (as blocks were 105% full= ,<br> > minus the 75% capacity target, so 30% added to max block size).<br> ><br> > Repeat every 2016 blocks, forever.<br> ><br> > If Block75 had been applied at the difficulty adjustment on November<b= r> > 18th, the max block size would have been 1,080KB, as the average block= <br> > during that period was 83% full, so 8% is added to the 1,000KB limit.<= br> > The current size, after the December 2nd adjustment would be 1,150K.<b= r> ><br> > Block75 would allow the max block size to grow (or shrink) in response= <br> > to transaction volume, and does so predictably, reasonably quickly, an= d<br> > in a method that prevents wild swings in block size or transaction fee= s.<br> > It attempts to keep blocks at 75% total capacity over each two week<br= > > period, the same way difficulty tries to keep blocks mined every ten<b= r> > minutes. It also keeps blocks as small as possible.<br> ><br> > Thoughts?<br> ><br> > -t.k.<br> ><br> <br> </div></div>I like the idea. It is good wrt growing the max. block size<br> automatically without human action, but the main problem (or question)<br> is not how to grow this number, it is what number can the network<br> handle, considering both miners and users. While disk space requirements<br= > might not be a big problem, block propagation time is. The time required<br= > for a block to propagate in the network (or at least to all the miners)<br> is directly dependent of its size.=C2=A0 If blocks take too much time to<br= > propagate in the network, the orphan rate will increase in unpredictable<br= > ways. For example if the internet speed in China is worse than in<br> Europe, and miners in China have more than 50% of the hashing power,<br> blocks mined by European miners might get orphaned.<br> <br> The system as described can also be gamed, by filling the network with<br> transactions. Miners have the monetary interest to include as many<br> transactions as possible in a block in order to collect the fees.<br> Regardless how you think about it, there has to be a maximum block size<br> that the network will allow as a consensus rule. Increasing it<br> dynamically based on transaction volume will reach a point where the<br> number got big enough that it broke things. Bitcoin, because its<br> fundamental design, can scale by using offchain solutions.<br> <br> <br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br> bitcoin-dev mailing list<br> <a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org">bitcoin-dev@lists.= <wbr>linuxfoundation.org</a><br> <a href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev" = rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.linuxfoundation.<wbr>org= /mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-<wbr>dev</a><br> <br></blockquote></div><br></div> --001a114d46b86e7b2105434cafd4--