Date: Thu, 08 Aug 2019 03:03:04 +0000
To: Sergio Demian Lerner <sergio.d.lerner@gmail.com>,
	Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
From: ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCPxj@protonmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Bitcoin vaults with anti-theft recovery/clawback
	mechanisms
Precedence: list

Good morning Sergio,


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=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90 Original Me=
ssage =E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90
On Thursday, August 8, 2019 10:09 AM, Sergio Demian Lerner via bitcoin-dev =
<bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> Seems to be comparable to the proposed "Tick Method" from 2013:
> https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=3D307211.msg3308565#msg3308565=
=C2=A0
>
> However I remember that someone told me the tick method had a flaw..


Maybe the use of `SIGHASH_NONE` for both inputs of the TxOut transactions?
Also txid malleability.

The first can be fixed by not using `SIGHASH_NONE` for one of the inputs an=
d requiring a hot privkey to sign with that.
The second can be fixed by using SegWit outputs.

Regards,
ZmnSCPxj

> =C2=A0
>
> On Wed, Aug 7, 2019 at 6:28 PM Dustin Dettmer via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-de=
v@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> > Does revaulting vault up with the same keys, or new ones?
> >
> > Are they new derivation paths on the same key?
> >
> > Would love some expanded explanation on how you=E2=80=99re proposing th=
is would work.
> >
> > Thanks,
> > Dustin
> >
> > On Wed, Aug 7, 2019 at 1:35 PM Bryan Bishop via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-de=
v@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >
> > > Hi,
> > >
> > > One of the biggest problems with the vault scheme (besides all of the
> > > setup data that has to be stored for a long time) is an attacker that
> > > silently steals the hot wallet private key and waits for the vault's
> > > owner to make a delayed-spend transaction to initiate a withdrawal
> > > from the vault. If the user was unaware of the theft of the key, then
> > > the attacker could steal the funds after the delay period.
> > >
> > > To mitigate this, it is important to choose a stipend or withdrawal
> > > amount per withdrawal period like x% of the funds. This limits the
> > > total stolen funds to x% because once the funds are stolen the user
> > > would know their hot key is compromised, and the user would know to
> > > instead use one of the other clawback paths during all of the future
> > > withdrawal delay periods instead of letting the delay timeout all the
> > > way to the (stolen) default/hot key.
> > >
> > > The reason why a loss limiter is the way to go is because there's
> > > currently no way (that I am aware of, without an upgrade) to force an
> > > attacker to reveal his key on the blockchain while also forcing the
> > > attacker to use a timelock before the key can spend the coins. I am
> > > curious about what the smallest least invasive soft-fork would be for
> > > enabling this kind of timelock. There are so many covenant proposals
> > > at this point (CHECKSIGFROMSTACK, SECURETHEBAG, CHECKOUTPUTVERIFY,
> > > ....). Or there's crazy things like a fork that enables a transaction
> > > mode where the (timelock...) script of the first output is
> > > automatically prefixed to any of the other scripts on any of the othe=
r
> > > outputs when an input tries to spend in the future. A thief could add
> > > his key to a new output on the transaction and try to spend (just lik=
e
> > > a user would with a fresh/rotated key), but the OP_CSV would be
> > > automatically added to his script to implement the public observation
> > > delay window.
> > >
> > > Also, there was other previous work that I was only informed about
> > > today after posting my proposal, so I should mention these as related
> > > work:
> > > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-February=
/015793.html
> > > https://blog.oleganza.com/post/163955782228/how-segwit-makes-security=
-better
> > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DdiNxp3ZTquo
> > > https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=3D5111656
> > >
> > > - Bryan
> > > http://heybryan.org/
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > bitcoin-dev mailing list
> > > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> > > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
> >
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