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From: Ethan Heilman <eth3rs@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Jul 2021 15:02:15 -0400
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To: ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCPxj@protonmail.com>, 
 Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
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Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] OP_CAT Makes Bitcoin Quantum Secure [was
 CheckSigFromStack for Arithmetic Values]
Precedence: list

>Yes, quite neat indeed, too bad Lamport signatures are so huge (a couple k=
ilobytes)... blocksize increase *cough*

Couldn't you significantly compress the signatures by using either
Winternitz OTS or by using OP_CAT to build a merkle tree so that the
full signature can be derived during script execution from a much
shorter set of seed values?

On Thu, Jul 8, 2021 at 4:12 AM ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev
<bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>
> Good morning Jeremy,
>
> Yes, quite neat indeed, too bad Lamport signatures are so huge (a couple =
kilobytes)... blocksize increase *cough*
>
> Since a quantum computer can derive the EC privkey from the EC pubkey and=
 this scheme is resistant to that, I think you can use a single well-known =
EC privkey, you just need a unique Lamport keypair for each UTXO (uniquenes=
s being mandatory due to Lamport requiring preimage revelation).
>
> Regards,
> ZmnSCPxj
>
>
> > Dear Bitcoin Devs,
> >
> > As mentioned previously, OP_CAT (or similar operation) can be used to m=
ake Bitcoin "quantum safe" by signing an EC signature. This should work in =
both Segwit V0 and Tapscript, although you have to use HASH160 for it to fi=
t in Segwit V0.
> >
> > See [my blog](https://rubin.io/blog/2021/07/06/quantum-bitcoin/) for th=
e specific construction, reproduced below.
> >
> > Yet another entry to the "OP_CAT can do that too" list.
> >
> > Best,
> >
> > Jeremy
> > -----
> >
> > I recently published [a blog
> > post](https://rubin.io/blog/2021/07/02/signing-5-bytes/) about signing =
up to a
> > 5 byte value using Bitcoin script arithmetic and Lamport signatures.
> >
> > By itself, this is neat, but a little limited. What if we could sign lo=
nger
> > messages? If we can sign up to 20 bytes, we could sign a HASH160 digest=
 which
> > is most likely quantum safe...
> >
> > What would it mean if we signed the HASH160 digest of a signature? What=
 the
> > what? Why would we do that?
> >
> > Well, as it turns out, even if a quantum computer were able to crack EC=
DSA, it
> > would yield revealing the private key but not the ability to malleate t=
he
> > content of what was actually signed.  I asked my good friend and crypto=
grapher
> > [Madars Virza](https://madars.org/) if my intuition was correct, and he
> > confirmed that it should be sufficient, but it's definitely worth close=
r
> > analysis before relying on this. While the ECDSA signature can be malle=
ated to a
> > different, negative form, if the signature is otherwise made immalleabl=
e there
> > should only be one value the commitment can be opened to.
> >
> > If we required the ECDSA signature be signed with a quantum proof signa=
ture
> > algorithm, then we'd have a quantum proof Bitcoin! And the 5 byte signi=
ng scheme
> > we discussed previously is a Lamport signature, which is quantum secure=
.
> > Unfortunately, we need at least 20 contiguous bytes... so we need some =
sort of
> > OP\_CAT like operation.
> >
> > OP\_CAT can't be directly soft forked to Segwit v0 because it modifies =
the
> > stack, so instead we'll (for simplicity) also show how to use a new opc=
ode that
> > uses verify semantics, OP\_SUBSTRINGEQUALVERIFY that checks a splice of=
 a string
> > for equality.
> >
> > ```
> > ... FOR j in 0..=3D5
> >     <0>
> >     ... FOR i in 0..=3D31
> >         SWAP hash160 DUP <H(K_j_i_1)> EQUAL IF DROP <2**i> ADD ELSE <H(=
K_j_i_0)> EQUALVERIFY ENDIF
> >     ... END FOR
> >     TOALTSTACK
> > ... END FOR
> >
> > DUP HASH160
> >
> > ... IF CAT AVAILABLE
> >     FROMALTSTACK
> >     ... FOR j in 0..=3D5
> >         FROMALTSTACK
> >         CAT
> >     ... END FOR
> >     EQUALVERIFY
> > ... ELSE SUBSTRINGEQUALVERIFY AVAILABLE
> >     ... FOR j in 0..=3D5
> >         FROMALTSTACK <0+j*4> <4+j*4> SUBSTRINGEQUALVERIFY DROP DROP DRO=
P
> >     ...  END FOR
> >     DROP
> > ... END IF
> >
> > <pk> CHECKSIG
> > ```
> >
> > That's a long script... but will it fit? We need to verify 20 bytes of =
message
> > each bit takes around 10 bytes script, an average of 3.375 bytes per nu=
mber
> > (counting pushes), and two 21 bytes keys =3D 55.375 bytes of program sp=
ace and 21
> > bytes of witness element per bit.
> >
> > It fits! `20*8*55.375 =3D 8860`, which leaves 1140 bytes less than the =
limit for
> > the rest of the logic, which is plenty (around 15-40 bytes required for=
 the rest
> > of the logic, leaving 1100 free for custom signature checking). The sta=
ck size
> > is 160 elements for the hash gadget, 3360 bytes.
> >
> > This can probably be made a bit more efficient by expanding to a ternar=
y
> > representation.
> >
> > ```
> >         SWAP hash160 DUP <H(K_j_i_0)> EQUAL  IF DROP  ELSE <3**i> SWAP =
DUP <H(K_j_i_T)> EQUAL IF DROP SUB ELSE <H(K_j_i_1)> EQUALVERIFY ADD  ENDIF=
 ENDIF
> > ```
> >
> > This should bring it up to roughly 85 bytes per trit, and there should =
be 101
> > trits (`log(2**160)/log(3) =3D=3D 100.94`), so about 8560 bytes... a bi=
t cheaper!
> > But the witness stack is "only" `2121` bytes...
> >
> > As a homework exercise, maybe someone can prove the optimal choice of r=
adix for
> > this protocol... My guess is that base 4 is optimal!
> >
> > ## Taproot?
> >
> > What about Taproot? As far as I'm aware the commitment scheme (`Q =3D p=
G + hash(pG
> > || m)G`) can be securely opened to m even with a quantum computer (find=
ing `q`
> > such that `qG =3D Q` might be trivial, but suppose key path was disable=
d, then
> > finding m and p such that the taproot equation holds should be difficul=
t because
> > of the hash, but I'd need to certify that claim better).  Therefore thi=
s
> > script can nest inside of a Tapscript path -- Tapscript also does not i=
mpose a
> > length limit, 32 byte hashes could be used as well.
> >
> > Further, to make keys reusable, there could be many Lamport keys comitt=
ed inside
> > a taproot tree so that an address could be used for thousands of times =
before
> > expiring. This could be used as a measure to protect accidental use rat=
her than
> > to support it.
> >
> > Lastly, Schnorr actually has a stronger non-malleability property than =
ECDSA,
> > the signatures will be binding to the approved transaction and once Lam=
port
> > signed, even a quantum computer could not steal the funds.
> >
> > --
> > @JeremyRubin
>
>
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