Received: from sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.192] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-3.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1U5yPu-0002KK-FS for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Thu, 14 Feb 2013 12:59:59 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of email.bitpay.com designates 198.37.155.136 as permitted sender) client-ip=198.37.155.136; envelope-from=bounces+404635-86d7-bitcoin-development=lists.sourceforge.net@email.bitpay.com; helo=o19837155136.outbound-mail.sendgrid.net; Received: from [198.37.155.136] (helo=o19837155136.outbound-mail.sendgrid.net) by sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with smtp (Exim 4.76) id 1U5yPr-0000J8-Af for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Thu, 14 Feb 2013 12:59:58 +0000 Received: by 10.37.85.72 with SMTP id mf94.11518.511CDFC2D Thu, 14 Feb 2013 06:59:46 -0600 (CST) Received: from mail-lb0-f171.google.com (unknown [209.85.217.171]) by mi16 (SG) with ESMTP id 511cdfc2.40cf.d34b0a for ; Thu, 14 Feb 2013 06:59:46 -0600 (CST) Received: by mail-lb0-f171.google.com with SMTP id gg13so1753531lbb.2 for ; Thu, 14 Feb 2013 04:59:44 -0800 (PST) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20120113; h=x-received:mime-version:x-originating-ip:in-reply-to:references :from:date:message-id:subject:to:cc:content-type:x-gm-message-state; bh=t9EmpdiStvESTuXVwwGhsMhYv3BLnZ6DcLz2xXIsdYo=; b=TklrHRi6pn9OWfCSfr/JlBuYyayEZRH+oibpj4p3M+IKDHCrKVLkmo0qoMfBAyB2fL sx+eAl4FGAzWkgRYe+Be4ja2dzTXxViqEVPapAClXK/H5RrM+J9MLlCJwMrsWYI81LBY zft3I7mXw5nQQTwN2svvEdEjMUI2Il6sW59kySgoFsQwt+6vwsmFh0QPgTsUlnI1ZrrH v2pgZdlf9O7mSVsbpIgjA5Weph9KAl4wUWriUi0PsyEmsz4ULKSxDO5k+wzuvucywXAf Jp51mGv0h8zodfutPbGWj+34w9CfQpOUDYNELIkeg8Jwz3Ox4dNcjPeyhW9FMGB7jIrS EwOw== X-Received: by 10.152.110.116 with SMTP id hz20mr14675593lab.18.1360846784564; Thu, 14 Feb 2013 04:59:44 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.114.1.47 with HTTP; Thu, 14 Feb 2013 04:59:04 -0800 (PST) X-Originating-IP: [71.204.90.78] In-Reply-To: <20130214060744.GA15157@savin> References: <20130214060744.GA15157@savin> From: Stephen Pair Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2013 07:59:04 -0500 Message-ID: To: Peter Todd Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=bcaec5485810300d1f04d5aed5ac X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQm3+kbDRfbDpJDIWeZXrfWUBpesl2nrho18HsmcyrAJxs4ZGwZ3a50uzMkyu96RbX0tIPOS X-Sendgrid-EID: MKV9IjI68is80Jqz/eG9wzL0RPGq34wm6zZKLyf9fV5O8HKFIs9vx7uQQ4ODbOsXIAJUiC6KiCgXtvj5BKyZnzPS64C9dwKsLkKoek2l4M1S3b7H3aqzScxVZvh8Mt91g6lxdFlLSa/MKsWy+Zs9Gw== X-Spam-Score: 0.5 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 0.0 HTML_IMAGE_ONLY_32 BODY: HTML: images with 2800-3200 bytes of words 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature 1.0 RDNS_NONE Delivered to internal network by a host with no rDNS X-Headers-End: 1U5yPr-0000J8-Af Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Incorporating block validation rule modifications into the block chain X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2013 12:59:59 -0000 --bcaec5485810300d1f04d5aed5ac Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 On Thu, Feb 14, 2013 at 1:07 AM, Peter Todd wrote: > On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 09:44:11PM -0500, Stephen Pair wrote: > > One of the beauties of bitcoin is that the miners have a very strong > > incentive to distribute as widely and as quickly as possible the blocks > > they find...they also have a very strong incentive to hear about the > blocks > > that others find. There will not be an issue with blocks being > "jealously > > The idea that miners have a strong incentive to distribute blocks as > widely and as quickly as possible is a serious misconception. The > optimal situation for a miner is if they can guarantee their blocks > would reach just over 50% of the overall hashing power, but no more. The > reason is orphans. > Perhaps, but a miner trying to target just over 50% of the network will run the very real risk that they'll only reach 49%. What about the case for centralization if the block size remains capped? I see a far greater risk of centralization in that scenario than if the cap were to be removed. The reason is very simple, bitcoin would ultimately become useful only for very high value, settlement transactions. Only the mega corporations and banks would be using it directly, everyone else would be doing daily transacting in centrally issued currencies of one form or another. As the banks and mega corps learned about the utility of bitcoin and began to use it en masse, they would start to take the whole network off the public internet and put it on a higher speed and more reliable backbone. Those corporations would establish mining agreements among themselves to ensure none of the participants could take over the system and compromise it, while at the same time keeping the operational costs to a minimum. Bitcoin is now a great alternative to the wire transfer system, but has no value to the average person wanted to have cheap and private transactions over the Internet. Maybe Litecoin starts to fill that niche. --bcaec5485810300d1f04d5aed5ac Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On Thu, Feb 14, 2013 at 1:07 AM= , Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org> wrote:
On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 09= :44:11PM -0500, Stephen Pair wrote:
> One of the beauties of bitcoin is that the miners have a very strong > incentive to distribute as widely and as quickly as possible the block= s
> they find...they also have a very strong incentive to hear about the b= locks
> that others find. =A0There will not be an issue with blocks being &quo= t;jealously

The idea that miners have a strong incentive to distribute blocks as<= br> widely and as quickly as possible is a serious misconception. The
optimal situation for a miner is if they can guarantee their blocks
would reach just over 50% of the overall hashing power, but no more. The
reason is orphans.

Perhaps, but a miner trying to targe= t just over 50% of the network will run the very real risk that they'll= only reach 49%.

What about the case for centralization if the block size remains capped? = =A0I see a far greater risk of centralization in that scenario than if the = cap were to be removed. =A0The reason is very simple, bitcoin would ultimat= ely become useful only for very high value, settlement transactions. =A0Onl= y the mega corporations and banks would be using it directly, everyone else= would be doing daily transacting in centrally issued currencies of one for= m or another. =A0As the banks and mega corps learned about the utility of b= itcoin and began to use it en masse, they would start to take the whole net= work off the public internet and put it on a higher speed and more reliable= backbone. =A0Those corporations would establish mining agreements among th= emselves to ensure none of the participants could take over the system and = compromise it, while at the same time keeping the operational costs to a mi= nimum. =A0Bitcoin is now a great alternative to the wire transfer system, b= ut has no value to the average person wanted to have cheap and private tran= sactions over the Internet. =A0Maybe Litecoin starts to fill that niche.
3D"" --bcaec5485810300d1f04d5aed5ac--