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From: Natanael <natanael.l@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 3 May 2017 21:10:47 +0200
Message-ID: <CAAt2M1_TH=1Xw=65QxxCHMZzE-fzC3UhRaEk+KkKY2SHkN6CbQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Erik Aronesty <erik@q32.com>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a113f1bbe0260e2054ea36a4e
Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Small Nodes: A Better Alternative to Pruned Nodes
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Den 3 maj 2017 16:05 skrev "Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev" <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>:

> But as you've observed, the failure probabilities are rather high,
> especially if an active attacker targets nodes carrying less commonly
> available blocks.

Wouldn't the solution be for nodes to use whatever mechanism an attacker
uses to determine less commonly available blocks and choose to store a
random percentage of them as well as their deterministic random set?

IE X blocks end of chain (spv bootstrap), Y% deterministic random set,  Z%
patch/fill set to deter attacks


Then he uses Sybil attacks to obscure what's actually rare and not. Even
proof of storage isn't enough, you need proof of INDEPENDENT storage, which
is essentially impossible, as well as a way of determining which nodes are
run by the same people (all the AWS nodes should essentially count as one).

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<div dir=3D"auto"><div data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature" dir=3D"auto"><br>=
</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra" dir=3D"auto"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">De=
n 3 maj 2017 16:05 skrev &quot;Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev&quot; &lt;<a h=
ref=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org">bitcoin-dev@lists.linu=
xfoundation.org</a>&gt;:<br type=3D"attribution"><blockquote class=3D"quote=
" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><=
div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div class=3D"quoted-text"><div>&gt; But as you&#39;ve=
 observed, the failure probabilities are rather high,<br>&gt; especially if=
 an active attacker targets nodes carrying less commonly<br>&gt; available =
blocks.=C2=A0 <br><br></div></div>Wouldn&#39;t the solution be for nodes to=
 use whatever mechanism an attacker uses to determine less commonly availab=
le blocks and choose to store a random percentage of them as well as their =
deterministic random set?=C2=A0 <br><br>IE X blocks end of chain (spv boots=
trap), Y% deterministic random set,=C2=A0 Z% patch/fill set to deter attack=
s<br></div></div></blockquote></div></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div =
dir=3D"auto">Then he uses Sybil attacks to obscure what&#39;s actually rare=
 and not. Even proof of storage isn&#39;t enough, you need proof of INDEPEN=
DENT storage, which is essentially impossible, as well as a way of determin=
ing which nodes are run by the same people (all the AWS nodes should essent=
ially count as one).=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra" dir=3D"auto"><di=
v class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .=
8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div></di=
v></div></blockquote></div></div></div>

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