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From: "Russell O'Connor" <roconnor@blockstream.io>
Date: Tue, 16 Aug 2016 18:52:38 -0400
Message-ID: <CAMZUoKnebdULkJXqM38i-SkzoD6ufcxdEhcBD1PG5C78qyjFOw@mail.gmail.com>
To: Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille@gmail.com>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11466018cdb41d053a383511
Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] New BIP: Dealing with OP_IF and OP_NOTIF
 malleability in P2WSH
Precedence: list

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I see.

But is it really necessary to soft fork over this issue?  Why not just make
it a relay rule?  Miners are already incentivized to modify transactions to
drop excess witness data and/or prioritize (versions of) transactions based
on their cost.  If a miner wants to mine a block with excess witness data,
it is mostly their own loss.

On Tue, Aug 16, 2016 at 6:39 PM, Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille@gmail.com>
wrote:

> On Aug 17, 2016 00:36, "Russell O'Connor" <roconnor@blockstream.io> wrote:
>
> > Can I already do something similar with replace by fee, or are there
> limits on that?
>
> BIP125 and mempool eviction both require the replacing transaction to have
> higher fee, to compensate for the cost of relaying the replaced
> transaction(s).
>
> --
> Pieter
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>I see.<br><br></div>But is it really necessary to sof=
t fork over this issue?=C2=A0 Why not just make it a relay rule?=C2=A0 Mine=
rs are already incentivized to modify transactions to drop excess witness d=
ata and/or prioritize (versions of) transactions based on their cost.=C2=A0=
 If a miner wants to mine a block with excess witness data, it is mostly th=
eir own loss.<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_q=
uote">On Tue, Aug 16, 2016 at 6:39 PM, Pieter Wuille <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;=
<a href=3D"mailto:pieter.wuille@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">pieter.wuille@=
gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span cl=
ass=3D""><p dir=3D"ltr">On Aug 17, 2016 00:36, &quot;Russell O&#39;Connor&q=
uot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:roconnor@blockstream.io" target=3D"_blank">rocon=
nor@blockstream.io</a>&gt; wrote:</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">&gt; Can I already do something similar with replace by fee,=
 or are there limits on that? </p>
</span><p dir=3D"ltr">BIP125 and mempool eviction both require the replacin=
g transaction to have higher fee, to compensate for the cost of relaying th=
e replaced transaction(s).</p><span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888=
">
<p dir=3D"ltr">-- <br>
Pieter</p>
</font></span></blockquote></div><br></div>

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