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From: Andy Parkins <andyparkins@gmail.com>
To: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2011 17:21:11 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] [BIP 15] Aliases
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On 2011 December 16 Friday, Rick Wesson wrote:

> I believe that any URI scheme will still leverage DNS and inherit any
> base issues you would have with TXT records. I suggest looking at DANE

HTTPS takes care of that.

> and reviewing their work on hardening certificate (x.509)
> infrastructure as your HTTPS scheme will inherit the issues we
> currently experience with CAs getting p0wned.

This is the only real problem with HTTPS: we would be centralising part of =
our=20
otherwise decentralised system.  CAs are certainly a risk.

However, trust is needed somewhere in the communication.  There is no way t=
o=20
securely communicate between A and B without the use of some previously=20
trusted secure channel -- in Joe Sixpack's case it's by assuming that the=20
browser he downloaded came with an untainted CA list, and that the CAs are=
=20
trustworthy.  Neither of which is guaranteed.  Until and unless we get PGP=
=20
support in browsers, CAs are all that we have.

Worrying about CAs misses the point anyway; if we're being that paranoid --=
=20
how did A tell B the appropriate alias to use for a lookup?  Was that chann=
el=20
secure too?  I could set up a MITM server that simply looks for the alias=20
"RICKWESSON@bitcoinaliases.org" and rewrites it to=20
"ANDYPARKINS@bitcoinaliases.org".  When the answer to that problem is HTTPS=
=20
(or some other system that requires a previously authorised secure channel =
for=20
transfer of trust), then we're back where we started, and HTTPS is acceptab=
le.



Andy

=2D-=20
Dr Andy Parkins
andyparkins@gmail.com

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