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From: vjudeu@gazeta.pl
To: Andrew Melnychuk Oseen <amo.personal@protonmail.com>,
 Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>,
 Giuseppe B <beppeben2030@gmail.com>,
 Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Sun, 05 Mar 2023 22:58:51 +0100
Message-Id: <179086234-135a72949cf38fda9b4e75be5889fe02@pmq1v.m5r2.onet>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Minimum fees
Precedence: list

> I don't know of any data of what happens at the point where the coinbase =
drops to below the fees on any chain. I don't think there has been one wher=
e that has happened. Perhaps there is a chain out there where it is fee's o=
nly? Perhaps that can provide insight.

I think federations like RSK or additional layers like LN can be a good exa=
mple of what happens if there are no additional coins. In RSK, all coins ar=
e backed by BTC, so all you have is what users deposited, or what was Merge=
 Mined, there are no more coins than that. In LN, there are nodes, and chan=
nels are formed only with existing coins, by default there is no mining, so=
 all fees collected by nodes are based only on LN transaction fees (there a=
re ways to reward small miners with LN coins, for example by enabling free =
LN transactions for those miners, or create channels directly by using outp=
uts of the coinbase transaction, but it is not widely used).

Also note that when it comes to other chains, we still have testnet3, where=
 there were more halvings than on the mainnet, because of blockstorms. So, =
if that network will not be resetted, then I guess we will see, how that ne=
twork will behave, when there will be no other coins. For now, you can see =
some users complaining that it is hard to get enough test coins, and with e=
ach halving you can see, how that network is getting closer and closer to t=
he case you want to observe. So, if we want to check, how potential solutio=
ns can solve that problem, using testnet3 will give better results than sig=
net, simply because of more halvings. Also, as testnet3 has blockstorms, it=
 is possible to also test extreme cases with huge reorgs, and see if taking=
 fees from other blocks will still be profitable after introducing proposed=
 changes.

Another important thing to note is that even if coins are worthless, then s=
till, if there are some minimal fees (like one satoshi per virtual byte), t=
hen on-chain amounts simply represents, how many data can be sent by each u=
ser. It means that users can simply send zero satoshis (if there is a need =
to create any additional UTXOs), and place as many coins as they can in the=
ir change addresses, and then the whole game is about having any coins, to =
have the right to broadcast any transaction to the network. Because then, a=
n interesting thing to note is that if there is no coins, then the chain is=
 not going to be halted. It is still possible to create a coinbase transact=
ion with zero coins, and it is still used in all block-based calculations, =
so mining such blocks can prevent other miners from reorging older blocks, =
and taking those fees. And then, if you look at the last miners that had so=
me blocks with fees, then you notice that reaching 100 confirmations can en=
courage them to mine blocks with zero coinbase amount, just to spend their =
rewards.

On 2023-03-04 18:32:01 user Andrew Melnychuk Oseen via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin=
-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
From my limited knowledge in the space, and I've taken opinions of people =
I respect that are far more knowledgeable than me.


I don't know of any data of what happens at the point where the coinbase dr=
ops to below the fees on any chain. I don't think there has been one where =
that has happened. Perhaps there is a chain out there where it is fee's onl=
y? Perhaps that can provide insight.


Opinion: I think as bitcoin's capabilities grow, demand for it will as well=
. There are a lot of efforts to increase the amount of transactions that ca=
n fit into a block. I think the combination of limited block space and a re=
duced amount of bitcoin's entering the market is the right combination for =
the system to self sustain. I'm looking forward to seeing the result!
=C2=A0
=C2=A0




Sent with Proton Mail secure email.


------- Original Message -------
On Wednesday, March 1st, 2023 at 12:18 PM, Giuseppe B via bitcoin-dev <bitc=
oin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:


Hello everyone,


I'm relatively new here so what I'm proposing could have already been discu=
ssed, or may be flawed or inapplicable. I apologize for that.


I was picturing a situation where block rewards are almost zero, and the ba=
se layer is mainly used as a settlement layer for relatively few large tran=
sactions, since the majority of smaller ones goes through LN.


In such a case it may very well be that even if transaction amounts are ver=
y consistent, transaction fees end up being very small since there is enoug=
h space for everyone in a block. Users wouldn't mind paying higher fees as =
they know that that would increase the network security, however nobody wan=
ts to be the only one doing that. Miners would of course like being paid mo=
re. So everyone involved would prefer higher fees but they just stay low be=
cause that's the only rational individual choice.


Therefore I was imagining the introduction of a new protocol rule, min_fees=
, that would work like this:
- the miner that gets to mine a block appends a min_fee field to the block,=
 specifying the minimum fees that need to be contained in the following blo=
ck in order for it to be valid.
- one can also mine an empty block and reset the min_fee, to avoid the chai=
n getting stuck.


min_fees could either represent the total fees of the following block, or t=
he minimal fee for each single transaction, as a percentage of the value tr=
ansacted. Both seem to have some merits and some potential drawbacks. Of co=
urse min_fees=3D0 would correspond to the current situation.


It looks to me that this could have the potential to bring the equilibrium =
closer to a socially optimal one (as opposed to individually optimal), and =
to benefit the network security in the long term. Of course it's just a rou=
gh sketch and it would deserve a much deeper analysis. I was just intereste=
d in knowing if you think that the principle has some merit or if it's not =
even worth discussing it for some reason that I'm not considering.


Cheers,


Giuseppe.