Return-Path: Received: from smtp3.osuosl.org (smtp3.osuosl.org [IPv6:2605:bc80:3010::136]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5C531C000D for ; Fri, 8 Oct 2021 15:08:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp3.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3E74B61013 for ; Fri, 8 Oct 2021 15:08:21 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -0.698 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.698 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_05=-0.5, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: smtp3.osuosl.org (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com Received: from smtp3.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp3.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id jvR_buSkTuOV for ; Fri, 8 Oct 2021 15:08:20 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.8.0 Received: from mail-ed1-x532.google.com (mail-ed1-x532.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::532]) by smtp3.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0CFF06101D for ; Fri, 8 Oct 2021 15:08:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-ed1-x532.google.com with SMTP id z20so37404303edc.13 for ; Fri, 08 Oct 2021 08:08:19 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=zOkIQuX+UGm2zanZyXOdRILv1wr2pa8ZoVqb07SVx8w=; b=S4OrCw5YYHggu68smb9EHpcaqaoPIz48F7tHNp/r0TAFQt/pXWY59MtALEek4hDCaj TbP4hLH+FWAC+KAlDOtOdbJflNjGD3b1KVR8yTkB+bgfUo22jyIow0PwrryC/w2SLZBo +Fz64YxVjVFAjNuq7b4Z/H+QueL5mtYHDn1tv7Gm5qxpO1wY+1LCZWspSJJocKEAUDPk j1bwwIMQHH75/3LlYdRu2LwSocnJyxqedIyI4RnfPMx8/g4VRNCcMNPzAnHUOZPm97tW fEQRoQOb7UuNSk0nbrtMTGkfCmNAXWmeI/ex+clxPqt2k1vFwG4+79SvAuGt6VEbAiLX 4HWQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=zOkIQuX+UGm2zanZyXOdRILv1wr2pa8ZoVqb07SVx8w=; b=B/srzzcvNVfjI9r81iti5/3MJjFULhNUMpAD3tllKA3SNl7Mr1fjnbTef7a6/P739k 9cRnnLqbs/zSLN5a4chQXBZLmfNRoEUVKI+MgjbYgOSlEq1hTYG7WnHIezQwFQMI4210 0lIDW/ICx+4wKTAxpmBmmEC6aqU62RlHcyMViecP7qFbbt2NQQK6Ol1lPSozS4FChefL 8zYQmfCZj/WVFiVwlTM1tO3Q0OdbS08psvdNEjjdhIKdwMaRb0LRcYSbQ8NctAoQT+iD iXo9h75pTwzpRb+8+ph4vUM0rzHKav1le00Mnod+4hm574ovlZP7WRH9AO5ygOUpIqHA m2NA== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM531xy7rj1oLU1VraIZDmSok2b0XzfGFuPX0L7Yxfg824YVKRurwC SoPlNvlmkF0jx/Lh8vr4lKMHIZkwwD4xEkQ9Tjp224n/Sl7bSw== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJybBGytB3MoVxW5DNa8LeKPpSSkM8n6GOqjb32pZf4UHBA6e4Hca3zHWkc2Nm6JtZheggE0IYyyXqqcwnIEnhE= X-Received: by 2002:a05:6402:319a:: with SMTP id di26mr16461826edb.84.1633705698101; Fri, 08 Oct 2021 08:08:18 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: In-Reply-To: From: Billy Tetrud Date: Fri, 8 Oct 2021 11:08:02 -0400 Message-ID: To: Ruben Somsen , Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000cd8c4605cdd8bf88" X-Mailman-Approved-At: Fri, 08 Oct 2021 19:20:25 +0000 Cc: Nathan T Alexander Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Question- must every mining rig attempt every block? X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 08 Oct 2021 15:08:21 -0000 --000000000000cd8c4605cdd8bf88 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Proof of stake systems attempt to create red light - green light types of things with non-gameable attributes (eg collaborative random numbers). This can't be done with mining because mining is completely random - its not possible to know which miner will mine a block. If it were, it wouldn't be proof of work, but something else. What you describe sounds like proof of identity, which isn't possible in a decentralized adversarial environment. In fact, one of the primary achievements of the Proof of Work consensus mechanism is to work around the Sybil issue, where (like ZmnSCPxj mentioned) a single user can have many identities. There can be hybrid systems that use both proof of work and proof of stake, but my conclusion after having done a lot of research and thinking about it ([1] , [2] ) is that the security mostly boils down to the weakest piece of the hybrid system, and so its not very effective to have hybrid systems like you mentioned. On Tue, Oct 5, 2021 at 10:43 AM Ruben Somsen via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > Hi Nathan, > > That's a fair question, but note that we've already had a bunch of "green > mining" related posts a few months ago, so I suspect you'll be able to find > many criticisms to this idea in the following thread: > > > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-May/018937.html > > It also looks like you'll be able to find some related answers on Bitcoin > Stack Exchange: > > https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/106308/decreasing-energy-consumption-of-bitcoins-pow-with-paired-mining-rounds > > And generally speaking these types of discussions don't end up being very > fruitful for bitcoin-dev, because these are the types of changes that are > unlikely to ever be seriously considered for Bitcoin. > > Cheers, > Ruben > > On Tue, Oct 5, 2021 at 4:09 PM Nathan T Alexander via bitcoin-dev < > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > >> For purposes of conserving energy, couldn't each mining rig have some >> non-gameable attribute which would be used to calculate if a block would >> be accepted by that rig? >> >> Don't the mining rigs have to be able to identify themselves to the >> network somehow, in order to claim their block reward? Could their >> bitcoin network ID be used as a non-gameable attribute? >> >> Essentially a green light / red light system. In order for a block to be >> accepted by the network, it must have all attributes of a successful >> block today, and it must also have come from a rig that had a green light. >> >> Perhaps hash some data from the last successful block, along with the >> miners non-gameable attribute, and if it's below a certain number set by >> algorithm, the miner gets a green light to race to produce a valid block. >> >> Nathan Alexander >> >> Arlington, TX >> >> _______________________________________________ >> bitcoin-dev mailing list >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >> > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > --000000000000cd8c4605cdd8bf88 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Proof of stake systems attempt to create red light - green= light types of things with non-gameable attributes (eg collaborative rando= m numbers). This can't be done with mining because mining is completely= random - its not possible to know which miner will mine a block. If it wer= e, it wouldn't be proof of work, but something else. What you describe = sounds like proof of identity, which isn't possible in a decentralized = adversarial environment. In fact, one of the primary achievements of the Pr= oof of Work consensus mechanism is to work around the Sybil issue, where (l= ike=C2=A0ZmnSCPxj mentioned) a single user can have many identities.=C2=A0<= div>
There can be hybrid systems that use both proof of work = and proof of stake, but my conclusion after having done a lot of research a= nd thinking about it ([1], [2]) is that the security mostly boils do= wn to the weakest piece of the hybrid system, and so its not very effective= to have hybrid systems like you mentioned.

On Tue, Oct 5, 2021 at 10:= 43 AM Ruben Somsen via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
= Hi Nathan,

That's a fair question, but note that we&= #39;ve already had a bunch of "green mining" related posts a few = months ago, so I suspect you'll be able to find many criticisms to this= idea in the following thread:


It also looks like you'll b= e able to find some related answers on Bitcoin Stack Exchange:
https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/106308/decreasing-energy-consu= mption-of-bitcoins-pow-with-paired-mining-rounds

And generally speaking these types of discussions don't end up b= eing very fruitful for bitcoin-dev, because these are the types of changes = that are unlikely to ever be seriously considered for Bitcoin.
Cheers,
Ruben

On Tue, Oct 5, 2021 at 4:09 PM Na= than T Alexander via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org<= /a>> wrote:
F= or purposes of conserving energy, couldn't each mining rig have some non-gameable attribute which would be used to calculate if a block would be accepted by that rig?

Don't the mining rigs have to be able to identify themselves to the network somehow, in order to claim their block reward? Could their
bitcoin network ID be used as a non-gameable attribute?

Essentially a green light / red light system. In order for a block to be accepted by the network, it must have all attributes of a successful
block today, and it must also have come from a rig that had a green light.<= br>
Perhaps hash some data from the last successful block, along with the
miners non-gameable attribute, and if it's below a certain number set b= y
algorithm, the miner gets a green light to race to produce a valid block.
Nathan Alexander

Arlington, TX

_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
= bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
= bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
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