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Date: Wed, 13 May 2015 18:31:56 -0700
Message-ID: <CACq0ZD6hDN0AY7jza46SuSA=-TqEii99oqR1gQyPt_vA+PqQgw@mail.gmail.com>
From: Aaron Voisine <voisine@gmail.com>
To: Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille@gmail.com>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a113fe0fe7c36ed051600b1ea
Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Long-term mining incentives
Precedence: list

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> by people and businesses deciding to not use on-chain settlement.

I completely agree. Increasing fees will cause people voluntary economize
on blockspace by finding alternatives, i.e. not bitcoin. A fee however is a
known, upfront cost... unpredictable transaction failure in most cases will
be a far higher, unacceptable cost to the user than the actual fee. The
higher the costs of using the system, the lower the adoption as a
store-of-value. The lower the adoption as store-of-value, the lower the
price, and the lower the value of bitcoin to the world.

> That only measures miner adoption, which is the least relevant.

I concede the point. Perhaps a flag date based on previous observation of
network upgrade rates with a conservative additional margin in addition to
supermajority of mining power.


Aaron Voisine
co-founder and CEO
breadwallet.com

On Wed, May 13, 2015 at 6:19 PM, Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille@gmail.com>
wrote:

> On Wed, May 13, 2015 at 6:13 PM, Aaron Voisine <voisine@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Conservative is a relative term. Dropping transactions in a way that is
>> unpredictable to the sender sounds incredibly drastic to me. I'm suggesting
>> increasing the blocksize, drastic as it is, is the more conservative choice.
>>
>
> Transactions are already being dropped, in a more indirect way: by people
> and businesses deciding to not use on-chain settlement. That is very sad,
> but it's completely inevitable that there is space for some use cases and
> not for others (at whatever block size). It's only a "things don't fit
> anymore" when you see on-chain transactions as the only means for doing
> payments, and that is already not the case. Increasing the block size
> allows for more utility on-chain, but it does not fundamentally add more
> use cases - only more growth space for people already invested in being
> able to do things on-chain while externalizing the costs to others.
>
>
>> I would recommend that the fork take effect when some specific large
>> supermajority of the pervious 1000 blocks indicate they have upgraded, as a
>> safer alternative to a simple flag date, but I'm sure I wouldn't have to
>> point out that option to people here.
>>
>
> That only measures miner adoption, which is the least relevant. The
> question is whether people using full nodes will upgrade. If they do, then
> miners are forced to upgrade too, or become irrelevant. If they don't, the
> upgrade is risky with or without miner adoption.
>
> --
> Pieter
>
>

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Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">&gt;=C2=A0<span style=3D"font-size:13px">by people and bus=
inesses deciding to not use on-chain settlement.</span><div><span style=3D"=
font-size:13px"><br></span></div><div>I completely agree. Increasing fees w=
ill cause people voluntary economize on blockspace by finding alternatives,=
 i.e. not bitcoin. A fee however is a known, upfront cost... unpredictable =
transaction failure in most cases will be a far higher, unacceptable cost t=
o the user than the actual fee. The higher the costs of using the system, t=
he lower=C2=A0the adoption as a store-of-value. The lower the adoption as s=
tore-of-value, the lower the price, and the lower the value of bitcoin to t=
he world.</div><div><span style=3D"font-size:13px"><br></span></div><div><s=
pan style=3D"font-size:13px">&gt;=C2=A0</span><span style=3D"font-size:13px=
">That only measures miner adoption, which is the least relevant.</span></d=
iv><div><span style=3D"font-size:13px"><br></span></div><div>I concede the =
point. Perhaps a flag date based on previous observation of network upgrade=
 rates with a conservative additional margin in addition to supermajority o=
f mining power.</div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br clear=3D"all"><di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><di=
v><br>Aaron Voisine</div><div>co-founder and CEO<br><a href=3D"http://bread=
wallet.com" target=3D"_blank">breadwallet.com</a></div></div></div></div></=
div></div>
<br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, May 13, 2015 at 6:19 PM, Pieter Wuil=
le <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pieter.wuille@gmail.com" target=
=3D"_blank">pieter.wuille@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;p=
adding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><span class=3D"">On Wed, May 13, 2015 at =
6:13 PM, Aaron Voisine <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:voisine@gmai=
l.com" target=3D"_blank">voisine@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br></span>=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><span class=3D""><blo=
ckquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #c=
cc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">Conservative is a relative term=
. Dropping transactions in a way that is unpredictable to the sender sounds=
 incredibly drastic to me. I&#39;m suggesting increasing the blocksize, dra=
stic as it is, is the more conservative choice.</div></blockquote><div><br>=
</div></span><div>Transactions are already being dropped, in a more indirec=
t way: by people and businesses deciding to not use on-chain settlement. Th=
at is very sad, but it&#39;s completely inevitable that there is space for =
some use cases and not for others (at whatever block size). It&#39;s only a=
 &quot;things don&#39;t fit anymore&quot; when you see on-chain transaction=
s as the only means for doing payments, and that is already not the case. I=
ncreasing the block size allows for more utility on-chain, but it does not =
fundamentally add more use cases - only more growth space for people alread=
y invested in being able to do things on-chain while externalizing the cost=
s to others.<br>=C2=A0<br></div><span class=3D""><blockquote class=3D"gmail=
_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:=
1ex"><div class=3D"gmail_extra">I would recommend that the fork take effect=
 when some specific large supermajority of the pervious 1000 blocks indicat=
e they have upgraded, as a safer alternative to a simple flag date, but I&#=
39;m sure I wouldn&#39;t have to point out that option to people here.</div=
></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>That only measures miner adoption,=
 which is the least relevant. The question is whether people using full nod=
es will upgrade. If they do, then miners are forced to upgrade too, or beco=
me irrelevant. If they don&#39;t, the upgrade is risky with or without mine=
r adoption.<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br><br>-- <br></=
font></span></div><span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><div>Piete=
r<br><br></div></font></span></div></div></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div>

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