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From: Eric Voskuil <eric@voskuil.org>
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Date: Mon, 17 Sep 2018 12:36:15 -0700
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To: Andrew <onelineproof@gmail.com>
Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Selfish Mining Prevention
Precedence: list

> Once hashrate gets large enough, no new miners (additional
hashrate) will want to join since their share of the hashrate is too
small to make a profit.

The share (hash power) of a miner is proportional to capital investment, not=
 the newness of that investment. The efficiency of a new mine (inclusive of p=
ooling pressures) can certainly be sufficient to outperform other miners, re=
sulting in the departure of the latter, thus not preventing the entry of the=
 former.

The point you should be making here is that energy consumption is regulated b=
y the cost of capital (in addition to reward value and the cost of energy).

Note that higher efficiency mining does not reduce energy consumption, nor d=
oes variation in the necessary cost of mining hardware. The total energy cos=
t is the control, not the hash rate. This is of course why proof-of-memory (=
space) is pointless. It simply shifts most of the energy cost to hardware ma=
nufacture, shipment, etc.

e

On Sep 17, 2018, at 06:18, Andrew <onelineproof@gmail.com> wrote:

>> I see what you say, however, since the proposal as I have read it says "A=
nd this will keep happening as long as hashrate keeps rising," - what actual=
ly happens in the case hashrate stagnates or falls?
>=20
> In general, a target hashrate can be set by users (can be less or more
> than the peak hashrate). As long as hashrate is rising and still
> didn't reach the target, miners will incrementally get the reserve
> fees. Once the "contract" times out, the remaining part can be used as
> fees by the users who created the reserve fee "contract". So if
> hashrate remains the same or falls, then users get the reserve fees
> back.
>=20
> I agree that we can't stop people from being greedy. If they are not
> Bitcoin mining, they will try to put their energy to earn in some
> other way...The hashrate is related the demand for Bitcoin (price) and
> the amount of fees/subsidies the miners will get paid. For every level
> of mining rewards (based on demand) there exists a limit on the
> hashrate. Once hashrate gets large enough, no new miners (additional
> hashrate) will want to join since their share of the hashrate is too
> small to make a profit.
>=20
> Also with merge mining and proof of space we can be quite efficient in
> the future. But of course I sympathize with the "don't be greedy"
> philosophy, and it can be good to educate people to use less resources
> than they need, just I think it's a bit outside of the scope of what
> the Bitcoin software protocol does.