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From: Peter R <peter_r@gmx.com>
In-Reply-To: <CAAS2fgShF=2vtPrKtXmdA454s_xpJbxSB0SFBsstniHB8WtGzQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 30 Aug 2015 00:41:16 -0700
Message-Id: <D00DB16B-6DAD-4F15-9DA6-15441C6223DA@gmx.com>
References: <CAEgR2PFB3h_8fr=d8HegRSD0XdooimhFKtLR4vKr2QXv+EwBfQ@mail.gmail.com>
	<AD284610-4F40-445C-A074-CC94EDFFCBA8@gmx.com>
	<CAAS2fgRs5NVM2nHKNXbgMJa51tDq-6ZBc6XfaScyP45UPWTW_g@mail.gmail.com>
	<5CC48639-11D0-4682-BF82-443286C8E58D@gmx.com>
	<CAAS2fgShF=2vtPrKtXmdA454s_xpJbxSB0SFBsstniHB8WtGzQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Gregory Maxwell <gmaxwell@gmail.com>
Cc: "bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org Dev"
	<bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Your Gmaxwell exchange
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Hi Greg,

>> I agree that miners may change their level of centralization.  This =
neither
>> affects the model nor the results presented in the paper.
>=20
> It has tremdous significance to the real-world impact of your results.

The paper makes no claims about "miners changing their level of =
centralization."  Whether it is or is not significant, it is outside the =
scope of the paper and irrelevant to the result that a fee market exists =
without a block size limit (given the assumption that some information =
about the transactions included in a block is communicated between =
miners during block solution propagation).     =20

> If not for the other errors in your work,

Again, what you are calling "errors" are assumptions--in fact very =
reasonable assumptions that we know are valid for the network as a whole =
right now.  You are proposing that maybe they won't be valid in the =
future if the miners move to some hypothetical configuration that you =
worry may be possible.  I say prove it: show rigorously what the network =
would look like in a case where information about the transactions =
contained in a block is never communicated with the block solution.  How =
do you get the miners to agree (assuming such a configuration is even =
physically possible)?  Do you need all the miners to agree or only a =
portion of them?  How reasonable is it that the systems moves into such =
a configuration?  I know you spoke to this in your last response, but I =
mean really prove it...with a mathematical model, with diagrams and =
charts, with equations, with your assumptions clearly stated so that =
they can be put to the test--not by waving your hands on the bitcoin-dev =
mailing list.   =20

This is an exciting field of research and we should encourage people to =
continue to explore these questions.  =20

> this point would make the
> take away of your work not "a healthy transaction fee market exists
> without a block size limit" but rather "a decenteralized bitcoin
> cannot exist"-- as, accepting the other errors as fact your model
> shows that centralizing mining is always strictly more profitable at
> any level of fee demand; because your model equivilent shows that for
> any level of fee demand and gamma miners could increase their income
> by centeralizing further.

OK, I actually sort of agree with your very last sentence above.  My =
paper indeed suggests that the most "profitable" configuration is one =
where there is only one "super pool." Is that likely to happen?  I =
personally don't think so because of the game theory involved.  But =
regardless of my opinion or your opinion on that matter, whether it is =
or isn't likely to happen is outside the scope of my paper.  It is =
irrelevant to the result that a fee market exists without a block size =
limit given the assumption that there is more than a single miner.

> I absolutely agree that simplifications are useful and essential, but
> it is critically important to call them out before someone mistakes
> theoretical work as useful motivation for policy in the non-simplified
> system.

I do call them out.  Furthermore, I've already agreed with you to =
further clarify these assumptions when I make the other corrections to =
the paper.  Doing so will make the paper stronger. =20

I'm not going to address the remainder of your email because I believe =
that we are now talking past each other.  I do appreciate the interest =
and attention that you've paid to my work on the Transaction Fee Market, =
and I also recognize the important contributions you've made such as =
coinjoin and HD wallets. =20

Best regards,
Peter


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; =
"><div>Hi Greg,</div><div><br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">I agree that miners may change their level of =
centralization. &nbsp;This neither<br>affects the model nor the results =
presented in the paper.<br></blockquote><br>It has tremdous significance =
to the real-world impact of your =
results.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>The paper makes no claims =
about "miners changing their level of centralization." &nbsp;Whether it =
<i>is</i> or <i>is not </i>significant, it is outside the scope of the =
paper and irrelevant to the result that a fee market exists without a =
block size limit (given the assumption that some information about the =
transactions included in a block is communicated between miners during =
block solution propagation). &nbsp; =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</div><div><br></div><blockquote type=3D"cite">If not =
for the other errors in your work, =
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>Again, what you are calling "errors" =
are assumptions--in fact very reasonable assumptions that we know are =
valid for the network as a whole&nbsp;<i>right now. &nbsp;</i>You are =
proposing that maybe they won't be valid in the future if the miners =
move to some hypothetical configuration that you worry may be possible. =
&nbsp;I say prove it: show rigorously what the network would look like =
in a case where information about the transactions contained in a block =
is never communicated with the block solution. &nbsp;How do you get the =
miners to agree (assuming such a configuration is even physically =
possible)? &nbsp;Do you need <i>all </i>the miners to agree or only a =
portion of them? &nbsp;How reasonable is it that the systems moves into =
such a configuration? &nbsp;I know you spoke to this in your last =
response, but I mean really prove it...with a mathematical model, with =
diagrams and charts, with equations, with your assumptions clearly =
stated so that they can be put to the test--not by waving your hands on =
the bitcoin-dev mailing list. &nbsp; =
&nbsp;</div><div><br></div><div>This is an exciting field of research =
and we should encourage people to continue to explore these questions. =
&nbsp;&nbsp;</div><br><blockquote type=3D"cite">this point would make =
the<br>take away of your work not "a healthy transaction fee market =
exists<br>without a block size limit" but rather "a decenteralized =
bitcoin<br>cannot exist"-- as, accepting the other errors as fact your =
model<br>shows that centralizing mining is always strictly more =
profitable at<br>any level of fee demand; because your model equivilent =
shows that for<br>any level of fee demand and gamma miners could =
increase their income<br>by centeralizing =
further.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>OK, I actually sort of =
agree with your very last sentence above. &nbsp;My paper indeed suggests =
that the most "profitable" configuration is one where there is only one =
"super pool."&nbsp;Is that likely to happen? &nbsp;I personally don't =
think so because of the game theory involved. &nbsp;But regardless of my =
opinion or your opinion on that matter, whether it is or isn't likely to =
happen is outside the scope of my paper. &nbsp;It is&nbsp;irrelevant to =
the result that a fee market exists without a block size limit given the =
assumption that there is more than a single =
miner.</div><div><br></div><blockquote type=3D"cite">I absolutely agree =
that simplifications are useful and essential, but<br>it is critically =
important to call them out before someone mistakes<br>theoretical work =
as useful motivation for policy in the =
non-simplified<br>system.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I do call =
them out. &nbsp;Furthermore, I've already agreed with you to further =
clarify these assumptions when I make the other corrections to the =
paper. &nbsp;Doing so will make the paper stronger. =
&nbsp;</div><div><br></div><div>I'm not going to address the remainder =
of your email because I believe that we are now talking past each other. =
&nbsp;I do appreciate the interest and attention that you've paid to my =
work on the Transaction Fee Market, and I also recognize the important =
contributions you've made such as coinjoin and HD wallets. =
&nbsp;</div><div><br></div><div>Best =
regards,</div><div>Peter</div></div><br></body></html>=

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