MIME-Version: 1.0
In-Reply-To: <CAED3CWgTOMFgaM6bBfU0Dn-R0NrdrhGAQo34wHEneYkTtB4Opg@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAED3CWgTOMFgaM6bBfU0Dn-R0NrdrhGAQo34wHEneYkTtB4Opg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2015 13:26:45 -0400
Message-ID: <CAEieSeSw04FYCCa-Df+V6BgJo1RHqPvJWt9t=c-JCC=dnhraWA@mail.gmail.com>
From: Chris Wardell <wardell.c@gmail.com>
To: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11456cbcee9a35051d9938e6
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Dynamically Controlled Bitcoin Block Size Max Cap
Precedence: list

--001a11456cbcee9a35051d9938e6
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8

I'm no authority on the subject, but I don't understand why there is a max
block-size, other than anti-spam measures.

The only other reason I have heard for a max-block-size is to force people
into paying higher fees.

This seems like the wrong way to force fees.  If you want to force fees,
then do exactly that - make fees required, and set a minimum... don't force
people to pay fees by limiting transactions per second.  That's like
shooting yourself in the foot to get free surgery....


On Tue, Aug 18, 2015 at 8:13 AM, Upal Chakraborty via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> Regarding:
> http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-August/010295.html
>
>
> I am arguing with the following statement here...
>
> *I see problems to this approach. The biggest one I see is that a miner
>> with 11% of hash power could sabotage block size increases by only ever
>> mining empty blocks.*
>
>
>
> First, I would like to argue from economics' point of view. If someone
> wants to hold back the block size increase with 11% hash power by mining
> empty blocks, he has to sacrifice Tx fees, which is not economical. 11%
> hash power will most likely be a pool and pool miners will find out soon
> that they are losing Tx fees because of pool owner's intention. Hence,
> they'll switch pool and pool owner will lose out. This is the same reason
> why 51% attack will never happen, even if a pool gets more than 51% hash
> power.
>
>
> Next, I would like to propose a slightly modified technical solution to
> this problem in algorithmic format...
>
> If more than 50% of block's size, found in the first 2000 of the last
> difficulty period, is more than 90% MaxBlockSize
>          Double MaxBlockSize
> Else if more than 90% of block's size, found in the first 2000 of the last
> difficulty period, is less than 50% MaxBlockSize
>          Half MaxBlockSize
> Else
>          Keep the same MaxBlockSize
>
> This is how, those who want to stop increase, need to have more than 50%
> hash power. Those who want to stop decrease, need to have more than 10%
> hash power, but must mine more than 50% of MaxBlockSize in all blocks. In
> this approach, not only miners, but also the end user have their say.
> Because, end users will fill up the mempool, from where miners will take Tx
> to fill up the blocks. Please note that, taking first 2000 of the last 2016
> blocks is important to avoid data discrepancy among different nodes due to
> orphan blocks. It is assumed that a chain can not be orphaned after having
> 16 confirmation.
>
> Looking for comments.
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
>

--001a11456cbcee9a35051d9938e6
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>I&#39;m no authority on the subject, but I don&#39;t =
understand why there is a max block-size, other than anti-spam measures.<br=
><br></div><div>The only other reason I have heard for a max-block-size is =
to force people into paying higher fees.<br><br>This seems like the wrong w=
ay to force fees.=C2=A0 If you want to force fees, then do exactly that - m=
ake fees required, and set a minimum... don&#39;t force people to pay fees =
by limiting transactions per second.=C2=A0 That&#39;s like shooting yoursel=
f in the foot to get free surgery....<br><br><br></div></div><div class=3D"=
gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Aug 18, 2015 at 8:13 AM=
, Upal Chakraborty via bitcoin-dev <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:=
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target=3D"_blank">bitcoin-dev@lists.=
linuxfoundation.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quo=
te" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"=
><div dir=3D"ltr">Regarding:=C2=A0<a href=3D"http://lists.linuxfoundation.o=
rg/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-August/010295.html" target=3D"_blank">http://=
lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-August/010295.html</a>=
<div><br><div><br></div><div>I am arguing with the following statement here=
...</div><div><br></div><div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"mar=
gin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,2=
04);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><i>I see problems to this app=
roach. The biggest one I see is that a miner with 11% of hash power could s=
abotage block size increases by only ever mining empty blocks.</i></blockqu=
ote><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>First, I would like to argue from ec=
onomics&#39; point of view. If someone wants to hold back the block size in=
crease with 11% hash power by mining empty blocks, he has to sacrifice Tx f=
ees, which is not economical. 11% hash power will most likely be a pool and=
 pool miners will find out soon that they are losing Tx fees because of poo=
l owner&#39;s intention. Hence, they&#39;ll switch pool and pool owner will=
 lose out. This is the same reason why 51% attack will never happen, even i=
f a pool gets more than 51% hash power.</div></div></div><div><br></div><di=
v><br></div><div>Next, I would like to propose a slightly modified technica=
l solution to this problem in algorithmic format...</div><div><br></div><di=
v>If more than 50% of block&#39;s size, found in the first 2000 of the last=
 difficulty period, is more than 90% MaxBlockSize</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Double MaxBlockSize</div><div><div>Else if more than 90=
% of block&#39;s size, found in the first 2000 of the last difficulty perio=
d, is less than 50% MaxBlockSize</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0Half MaxBlockSize</div></div><div>Else</div><div>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Keep the same MaxBlockSize</div><div><br></div><div>This is ho=
w, those who want to stop increase, need to have more than 50% hash power. =
Those who want to stop decrease, need to have more than 10% hash power, but=
 must mine more than 50% of MaxBlockSize in all blocks. In this approach, n=
ot only miners, but also the end user have their say. Because, end users wi=
ll fill up the mempool, from where miners will take Tx to fill up the block=
s. Please note that, taking first 2000 of the last 2016 blocks is important=
 to avoid data discrepancy among different nodes due to orphan blocks. It i=
s assumed that a chain can not be orphaned after having 16 confirmation.</d=
iv><div><br></div><div>Looking for comments.</div><div><br></div><div><br><=
/div><div><br></div><div><br></div></div>
<br>_______________________________________________<br>
bitcoin-dev mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org">bitcoin-dev@lists.=
linuxfoundation.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev" =
rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail=
man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>

--001a11456cbcee9a35051d9938e6--