Received: from sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.194] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-1.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1UFNvL-0001UN-Qd for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Tue, 12 Mar 2013 12:03:19 +0000 X-ACL-Warn: Received: from vps7135.xlshosting.net ([178.18.90.41]) by sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) id 1UFNvG-0005gw-SE for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Tue, 12 Mar 2013 12:03:19 +0000 Received: by vps7135.xlshosting.net (Postfix, from userid 1000) id A4D8E33C78A; Tue, 12 Mar 2013 12:44:28 +0100 (CET) Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2013 12:44:28 +0100 From: Pieter Wuille To: Michael Gronager Message-ID: <20130312114426.GA3701@vps7135.xlshosting.net> References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: X-PGP-Key: http://sipa.ulyssis.org/pubkey.asc User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) X-Spam-Score: -1.4 (-) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (pieter.wuille[at]gmail.com) 0.0 DKIM_ADSP_CUSTOM_MED No valid author signature, adsp_override is CUSTOM_MED -2.6 RP_MATCHES_RCVD Envelope sender domain matches handover relay domain 1.2 NML_ADSP_CUSTOM_MED ADSP custom_med hit, and not from a mailing list X-Headers-End: 1UFNvG-0005gw-SE Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Warning: many 0.7 nodes break on large number of tx/block; fork risk X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2013 12:03:19 -0000 On Tue, Mar 12, 2013 at 11:13:09AM +0100, Michael Gronager wrote: > Yes, 0.7 (yes 0.7!) was not sufficiently tested it had an undocumented and unknown criteria for block rejection, hence the upgrade went wrong. We're using "0.7" as a short moniker for all clients, but this was a limitation that all BDB-based bitcoins ever had. The bug is simply a limit in the number of lock objects that was reached. It's ironic that 0.8 was supposed to solve all problems we had due to BDB (except the wallet...), but now it seems it's still coming back to haunt us. I really hated telling miners to go back to 0.7, given all efforts to make 0.8 signficantly more tolerable... > More space in the block is needed indeed, but the real problem you are describing is actually not missing space in the block, but proper handling of mem-pool transactions. They should be pruned on two criteria: > > 1. if they gets to old >24hr > 2. if the client is running out of space, then the oldest should probably be pruned > > clients are anyway keeping, and re-relaying, their own transactions and hence it would mean only little, and only little for clients. Dropping free / old transaction is a much a better behavior than dying... Even a scheme where the client dropped all or random mempool txes would be a tolerable way of handling things (dropping all is similar to a restart, except for no user intervention). Right now, mempools are relatively small in memory usage, but with small block sizes, it indeed risks going up. In 0.8, conflicting (=double spending) transactions in the chain cause clearing the mempool of conflicts, so at least the mempool is bounded by the size of the UTXO subset being spent. Dropping transactions from the memory pool when they run out of space seems a correct solution. I'm less convinced about a deterministic time-based rule, as that creates a double spending incentive at that time, and a counter incentive to spam the network with your risking-to-be-cleared transaction as well. Regarding the block space, we've seen the pct% of one single block chain space consumer grow simultaneously with the introduction of larger blocks, so I'm not actually convinced there is right now a big need for larger blocks (note: right now). The competition for block chain space is mostly an issue for client software which doesn't deal correctly with non-confirming transactions, and misleading users. It's mostly a usability problem now, but increasing block sizes isn't guaranteed to fix that; it may just make more space for spam. However, the presence of this bug, and the fact that a full solution is available (0.8), probably helps achieving consensus fixing it (=a hardfork) is needed, and we should take advantage of that. But please, let's not rush things... -- Piter