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charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable >This "reserve" part of the fee will be paid to miners if the hashrate rise= s. Anticipating ongoing hashrate rise shows that you have not yet thought abou= t moving outside of the current greed model, a model wherein mining will co= nsume all available resources within the colony's objective just to spread = as far as possible with each new miner bringing diminishing individual retu= rns and shortening the life of Earth for no additional gain. Greed model := =3D bacteria. ________________________________ From: bitcoin-dev-bounces@lists.linuxfoundation.org on behalf of Andrew via bitcoin-dev Sent: Friday, 14 September 2018 9:19:37 AM To: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Selfish Mining Prevention I discussed this more at bitcointalk: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=3D4998410.0 The attacks I'm interested in preventing are not only selfish mining and collusion, but also more subtle attacks like block withholding, and in general anything that aims to drive out the competition in order to increase hashrate fraction. I also scrapped the idea of changing the block subsidies, and I am only focuses on fees. You can read more about the motivation and details in the bitcointalk thread, but my proposal in short would be to add the concept of "reserve fees". When a user makes a transaction, for each txout script, they can add parameters that specify the fraction of the total fee that is held in "reserve" and the time it is held in "reserve" (can set a limit of 2016 blocks). This "reserve" part of the fee will be paid to miners if the hashrate rises. So if hashrate is currently h and peak hashrate (from past year) is p, then for each period (1 day), a new hashrate is calculated h1, and if h1 > h, then the fraction (h1-h)/p from the reserve fees created in the past 2016 blocks will be released to miners for that period (spread out over the 144 blocks in that period). And this will keep happening as long as hashrate keeps rising, until the "contract" expires, and the leftover part can be used by the owner of the unspent output, but it can only be used for paying fees, not as inputs for future transactions (to save on block space). This should incentivize miners to not drive out the competition, since if they do, there will be less of these reserve fees given to miners. Yes in the end the miners will get all the fees, but with rising hashrate they get an unconditional subsidy that does not require transactions, thus more space for transactions with fees. I can make a formal BIP and pull request, but I need to know if there is interest in this. Now fees don't play such a large part of the block reward, but they will get more important, and this change wouldn't force anything (would be voluntary by each user), just miners have to agree to it with a soft fork (so they don't spend from the anyone-can-spend outputs used for reserve fees). Resource requirements for validation are quite small I believe. On Sat, Sep 1, 2018 at 12:11 AM, Andrew wrote: > As I understand, selfish mining is an attack where miners collude to > mine at a lower hashrate then with all miners working independently. > What are the current strategies used to prevent this and what are the > future plans? > > One idea I have is to let the block reward get "modulated" according > to peak hashrate. Say p is the peak hashrate for 365 periods (1 year) > consisting of 144 blocks, h is the hashrate of the last 144 block (1 > day) period, and r is the base subsidy (12.5 BTC currently). You can > then make the max block reward 0.5 r (1 + h/p). So if hashrate is at > peak you get the full reward. Otherwise you get less, down to a min of > 0.5 r. > > If miners were to collude to mine at a lower than peak hashrate, then > they may be able to do it profitably for 144 blocks, but after that, > the reward would get modulated and it wouldn't be so much in their > interest to continue mining at the lower hashrate. > > What flaws are there with this? I know it could be controversial due > to easier mining present for early miners, so maybe it would have to > be done in combination with a new more dynamic difficulty adjustment > algorithm. But I don't see how hashrate can continue rising > indefinitely, so a solution should be made for selfish mining. > > Also when subsidies stop and a fee market is needed, I guess a portion > of the fees can be withheld for later if hashrate is not at peak. > > > -- > PGP: B6AC 822C 451D 6304 6A28 49E9 7DB7 011C D53B 5647 -- PGP: B6AC 822C 451D 6304 6A28 49E9 7DB7 011C D53B 5647 _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev --_000_PS2P216MB017942E0336DD337CB1EB6A89D180PS2P216MB0179KORP_ Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

>This "reserve" part of the fee will be paid = to miners if the hashrate rises.


Anticipating ongoing hashrate ris= e shows that you have not yet thought about moving outside of the current g= reed model, a model wherein mining will consume all available resources wit= hin the colony's objective just to spread as far as possible with each new miner bringing diminishing individ= ual returns and shortening the life of Earth for no additional gain. Greed = model :=3D bacteria.

From: bitcoin-dev-bounces@l= ists.linuxfoundation.org <bitcoin-dev-bounces@lists.linuxfoundation.org&= gt; on behalf of Andrew via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundati= on.org>
Sent: Friday, 14 September 2018 9:19:37 AM
To: Bitcoin Dev
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Selfish Mining Prevention
 
I discussed this more at bitcointalk:
https://bit= cointalk.org/index.php?topic=3D4998410.0

The attacks I'm interested in preventing are not only selfish mining
and collusion, but also more subtle attacks like block withholding,
and in general anything that aims to drive out the competition in
order to increase hashrate fraction. I also scrapped the idea of
changing the block subsidies, and I am only focuses on fees.

You can read more about the motivation and details in the bitcointalk
thread, but my proposal in short would be to add the concept of
"reserve fees". When a user makes a transaction, for each txout script, they can add parameters that specify the fraction of the total
fee that is held in "reserve" and the time it is held in "re= serve"
(can set a limit of 2016 blocks). This "reserve" part of the fee = will
be paid to miners if the hashrate rises. So if hashrate is currently h
and peak hashrate (from past year) is p, then for each period (1 day),
a new hashrate is calculated h1, and if h1 > h, then the fraction
(h1-h)/p from the reserve fees created in the past 2016 blocks will be
released to miners for that period (spread out over the 144 blocks in
that period). And this will keep happening as long as hashrate keeps
rising, until the "contract" expires, and the leftover part can b= e
used by the owner of the unspent output, but it can only be used for
paying fees, not as inputs for future transactions (to save on block
space).

This should incentivize miners to not drive out the competition, since
if they do, there will be less of these reserve fees given to miners.
Yes in the end the miners will get all the fees, but with rising
hashrate they get an unconditional subsidy that does not require
transactions, thus more space for transactions with fees.

I can make a formal BIP and pull request, but I need to know if there
is interest in this. Now fees don't play such a large part of the
block reward, but they will get more important, and this change
wouldn't force anything (would be voluntary by each user), just miners
have to agree to it with a soft fork (so they don't spend from the
anyone-can-spend outputs used for reserve fees). Resource requirements
for validation are quite small I believe.

On Sat, Sep 1, 2018 at 12:11 AM, Andrew <onelineproof@gmail.com> wrot= e:
> As I understand, selfish mining is an attack where miners collude to > mine at a lower hashrate then with all miners working independently. > What are the current strategies used to prevent this and what are the<= br> > future plans?
>
> One idea I have is to let the block reward get "modulated" a= ccording
> to peak hashrate. Say p is the peak hashrate for 365 periods (1 year)<= br> > consisting of 144 blocks, h is the hashrate of the last 144 block (1 > day) period, and r is the base subsidy (12.5 BTC currently). You can > then make the max block reward 0.5 r (1 + h/p). So if hashrate is = at
> peak you get the full reward. Otherwise you get less, down to a min of=
> 0.5 r.
>
> If miners were to collude to mine at a lower than peak hashrate, then<= br> > they may be able to do it profitably for 144 blocks, but after that, > the reward would get modulated and it wouldn't be so much in their
> interest to continue mining at the lower hashrate.
>
> What flaws are there with this? I know it could be controversial due > to easier mining present for early miners, so maybe it would have to > be done in combination with a new more dynamic difficulty adjustment > algorithm. But I don't see how hashrate can continue rising
> indefinitely, so a solution should be made for selfish mining.
>
> Also when subsidies stop and a fee market is needed, I guess a portion=
> of the fees can be withheld for later if hashrate is not at peak.
>
>
> --
> PGP: B6AC 822C 451D 6304 6A28  49E9 7DB7 011C D53B 5647



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