Delivery-date: Wed, 12 Mar 2025 05:41:16 -0700 Received: from mail-yw1-f187.google.com ([209.85.128.187]) by mail.fairlystable.org with esmtps (TLS1.3) tls TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (Exim 4.94.2) (envelope-from ) id 1tsLOd-00040h-C3 for bitcoindev@gnusha.org; Wed, 12 Mar 2025 05:41:16 -0700 Received: by mail-yw1-f187.google.com with SMTP id 00721157ae682-6f2c7746509sf99632487b3.1 for ; Wed, 12 Mar 2025 05:41:15 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=googlegroups.com; s=20230601; t=1741783269; x=1742388069; darn=gnusha.org; h=list-unsubscribe:list-subscribe:list-archive:list-help:list-post :list-id:mailing-list:precedence:x-original-sender:mime-version :subject:references:in-reply-to:message-id:to:from:date:sender:from :to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=NQToSFR1kAWULdz7QLb6APXySiSYjBSMr8KuTyo73vg=; b=xwfjpJX3v2QVBm4/J56EzmlGEJWT2vVM4B4XEeftpQM3+oCkhf4D9PFqBYfjYf71b0 iTrLfPOprtHLvm8I3NmzFNTC3HCBw4x/iBAdSFeyhxx3rcjRL3Pqn9vff7exLxxE4yhc mOQZhXe+UqzOGSmYjA7gbhADBBPHdCx7j1eMisXuJTQoY5i4/xvVodxledkoDlgZHURx 3LhF7WXpFqFtRqgdSWcmjjRawuq6y/seqrJHSayCn364Z5m9pxwxxovhrV5fOrnBzkJZ OoRpKjFOsduuGSx9jnE+j8jcm0ULC7f4cGQcBwayKI5Nrz8zQO2Y9NiV3oXbY3d2OnH7 MGjQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20230601; t=1741783269; x=1742388069; h=list-unsubscribe:list-subscribe:list-archive:list-help:list-post :list-id:mailing-list:precedence:x-original-sender:mime-version :subject:references:in-reply-to:message-id:to:from:date:x-beenthere :x-gm-message-state:sender:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id :reply-to; bh=NQToSFR1kAWULdz7QLb6APXySiSYjBSMr8KuTyo73vg=; b=pTKM0gLbQlFndeyVju62WI9na+DmeOkVS62tqwbr6ch+fH9WON4yJ5eqe8g18zCTi+ f3W2xbvkAXH9mAFyF1qmYemxVuX/FqUhmVxdHFtwRDH8p6TGj1pU0NDLtn/6v4Jn3r5S DLQQn4jF+j2jdBRChLYAGKO8rZo6idDNegboXpQLnfzsjr+N8A9JDIzeZryq2PC41HQJ ngtVXRCnAemjkFJoCqDwu3RBWrPSbb78u3YM5a+WtuBeYUICWN0khFz9M1TEfWcq8VkW odQqYy650Ar79Wn5UlWg9fVSP9hvZzieOAQ9zr7xfvikg7NbvgpVIa83kLHZpHaSN2ev SxZw== Sender: bitcoindev@googlegroups.com X-Forwarded-Encrypted: i=1; AJvYcCXQXZEJwiY2QkaYt9yzfEuJupTTXcUx7KMMJFL/JEaIlloaXioF1/8660FdVIVWS2tEukHDzfZWWyjE@gnusha.org X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0YyQmuh4cZuyX1ILatd2ktpxW4FLhKhdE4yxrHah2eL130CTT3i5 Np4f5hpV6ZH/Ee291GwmgBsSgRrbtxYwgK2prmk7eSWNP+PB9vQO X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGHT+IGOyMEl7DgwkO7ICkW/c1EEkULexYyFvyiWjWd6taafpf7RHxicQ+UvaMAmXHjxfztbq0HOvA== X-Received: by 2002:a05:6902:1b8d:b0:e63:d3fe:c0ac with SMTP id 3f1490d57ef6-e63d3fec24fmr583120276.31.1741783269345; Wed, 12 Mar 2025 05:41:09 -0700 (PDT) X-BeenThere: bitcoindev@googlegroups.com; h=Adn5yVFIHLDIiD+8xDRCX5QHwNNb7/k2w6qm91Ig4kGctgGEsA== Received: by 2002:a25:d890:0:b0:e63:6582:71c4 with SMTP id 3f1490d57ef6-e6365827368ls1350109276.1.-pod-prod-03-us; Wed, 12 Mar 2025 05:41:05 -0700 (PDT) X-Received: by 2002:a05:690c:48c2:b0:6fd:47a7:3fb2 with SMTP id 00721157ae682-6febf39bfecmr297556417b3.24.1741783265625; Wed, 12 Mar 2025 05:41:05 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 2002:a05:690c:7204:b0:6fd:27d2:c7f1 with SMTP id 00721157ae682-6ff199fc48ems7b3; Wed, 12 Mar 2025 04:14:08 -0700 (PDT) X-Received: by 2002:a05:690c:a93:b0:6fe:e79f:bd8f with SMTP id 00721157ae682-6fee79fbdbfmr184953587b3.26.1741778047062; Wed, 12 Mar 2025 04:14:07 -0700 (PDT) Date: Wed, 12 Mar 2025 04:14:06 -0700 (PDT) From: Jose Storopoli To: Bitcoin Development Mailing List Message-Id: <77dbf51a-93aa-4d4a-87c0-b1303d83d5ccn@googlegroups.com> In-Reply-To: References: <8797807d-e017-44e2-b419-803291779007n@googlegroups.com> <5667eb21-cd56-411d-a29f-81604752b7c4@gmail.com> <16d7adca-a01e-40c5-9570-31967ee339ecn@googlegroups.com> <5550807e-0655-4895-bc66-1b67bfde8c3e@gmail.com> <8e1cf1b5-27d1-4510-afec-52fb28959189n@googlegroups.com> <69ab395f-acba-4d11-87ee-9da6327509c6@gmail.com> Subject: Re: [bitcoindev] P2QRH / BIP-360 Update MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="----=_Part_46988_1905702069.1741778046769" X-Original-Sender: jose@storopoli.io Precedence: list Mailing-list: list bitcoindev@googlegroups.com; contact bitcoindev+owners@googlegroups.com List-ID: X-Google-Group-Id: 786775582512 List-Post: , List-Help: , List-Archive: , List-Unsubscribe: , X-Spam-Score: -0.7 (/) ------=_Part_46988_1905702069.1741778046769 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_Part_46989_1945388750.1741778046769" ------=_Part_46989_1945388750.1741778046769 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable I think that ECDSA was a mistake in Bitcoin (Schnorr patent expired in=20 2008; but I do understand its motives). My fear is that this BIP will become a mistake in Bitcoin in 15 years or=20 less. It adds orders of magnitude to public keys sizes and/or signature sizes;=20 and verification computation cost. About the whole QR cryptography hype: one thing is to do have key encapsulation QR schemes in symmetric-key=20 cryptography where we don't have tight constrains around storage, like with TLS, or E2EE messaging apps. Another thing is to add these huge public key and signature schemes to a=20 storage-restricted blockchain like Bitcoin. QR lattice-based asymmetric-key cryptography is still in its infancy both= =20 in standards and research; and we should wait. If we are worried about quantum menaces, a much better approach would be=20 the P2TRH (Pay To Taproot Hash), even with the loss of batch verification, combined with advising users to= =20 not re-use address. Address reuse should be treated the same as nonce reuse: you get pwned! Or Matt Corallo's emergency disable of key path spends in P2TR; Jose Storopoli On Monday, March 3, 2025 at 6:55:19=E2=80=AFPM UTC-3 Hunter Beast wrote: > Hi, Jonas > > In order to spend the coins, a valid signature will need to be present in= =20 > the attestation. Even if it's a 1/1024 multisig, a valid public key=20 > signature pair will need to be provided. The merkle path would then be ho= w=20 > the arbitrary data could be encoded. In my mind this is a highly=20 > impractical scenario that gets exponentially more complex, and only works= =20 > 32 bytes at a time. > > Does that make sense? > > Hunter > > On Wednesday, February 26, 2025 at 3:00:36=E2=80=AFAM UTC-7 Jonas Nick wr= ote: > >> > it would require an extraordinary amount of computation to wind up wit= h=20 >> enough=20 >> > to store arbitrary data.=20 >> >> I have no idea why this would require extraordinary amount of=20 >> computation. In=20 >> the example I provided, arbitrary data can be included in the attestatio= n=20 >> structure with zero additional computational cost, no elliptic curve=20 >> grinding or=20 >> hash collisions required.=20 >> > --=20 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "= Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an e= mail to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/= 77dbf51a-93aa-4d4a-87c0-b1303d83d5ccn%40googlegroups.com. ------=_Part_46989_1945388750.1741778046769 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable I think that ECDSA was a mistake in Bitcoin (Schnorr patent expired in 2008= ; but I do understand its motives).
My fear is that this BIP will becom= e a mistake in Bitcoin in 15 years or less.

It a= dds orders of magnitude to public keys sizes and/or signature sizes; and ve= rification computation cost.
About the whole QR cryptography hype= :
one thing is to do have key encapsulation QR schemes in symmetr= ic-key cryptography where we don't have tight constrains around storage,
like with TLS, or E2EE messaging apps.
Another thing is t= o add these huge public key and signature schemes to a storage-restricted b= lockchain like Bitcoin.
QR lattice-based asymmetric-key cryptogra= phy is still in its infancy both in standards and research; and we should w= ait.

If we are worried about quantum menaces, a = much better approach would be the P2TRH (Pay To Taproot Hash),
ev= en with the loss of batch verification, combined with advising users to not= re-use address.
Address reuse should be treated the same as nonc= e reuse: you get pwned!
Or Matt Corallo's emergency disable of ke= y path spends in P2TR;

Jose Storopoli
On= Monday, March 3, 2025 at 6:55:19=E2=80=AFPM UTC-3 Hunter Beast wrote:
=
Hi, Jonas
In order to spend the coins, a valid signature will need to be = present in the attestation. Even if it's a 1/1024 multisig, a valid pub= lic key signature pair will need to be provided. The merkle path would then= be how the arbitrary data could be encoded. In my mind this is a highly im= practical scenario that gets exponentially more complex, and only works 32 = bytes at a time.

Does that make sense?
<= br>
Hunter

On Wednesday, February 26, 2025 at 3:00:36=E2=80= =AFAM UTC-7 Jonas Nick wrote:
> it would require an extraordinary amount of computation to wi= nd up with enough
> to store arbitrary data.

I have no idea why this would require extraordinary amount of computati= on. In
the example I provided, arbitrary data can be included in the attestati= on
structure with zero additional computational cost, no elliptic curve gr= inding or
hash collisions required.

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